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ABSTRACT
The 'ulamã'(men of Islamic learning) occupy an important
position in the Muslim society.
	
Pakistan is no exception to this
general phenomenon. Although they were always on the periphery of
political decision-making throughout Muslim rule in South Asia
(1206-1857), their influence on the masses was never in question.
During the colonial period (1857-1947), however, the development of
Islamic thought resulted in a division of Muslim society into two
distinct sections:	 'Islamic modernists', and orthodox Muslims who
were under the influence of the u1ajna Secularist ideas could not
gain ground amongst Muslims on account of their minority status in
South Asia. Religion constituted the bedrock of their identity.
At the emergence of Pakistan, it was the 'Islamic
modernist' section of Muslim society which held the reins of power,
and successfully controlled the institutions of the power-
structure.	 On the related issues of polity and society in
Pakistan, it was not a matter of surprise that a conflict of
orientation persisted between the 'Islamic modernists' and the
orthodox Islam.
	 The 'u1am' started from a weaker position and
developed the political skills needed to assert their views. 	 The
failure of the dominant class to fulfil its promises enabled the
'u1amãto expose their true nature.
At the same time, the 'ulamä' divided amongst themselves on
the basis of sects and subsects, could not agree on an alternative
political strategy.
	 In actual fact, they were more effective in
achieving negative ends (such as help to topple a government) than
in capturing the reins of power.	 Even though their electoral
ix
strength has always been low.
	 Their undoubted skill in
manipulating and using the modern paraphernalia of political
mobilisation would appear to provide them with the apparatus,
albeit in the long term, to consolidate a political alternative to
the existing dominant class in control of state power.
	 In the
short and medium term, however, it is unlikely that the 'Islamic
modernist' elements will be dislodged from power.
x
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words which are, therefore, retained in their accepted standard
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upon the linguistic origin of the noun.	 In this work, generally
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	 The only exception
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correctly transliterated - as in Dihlawi (not Delhawl).
Uniformity is observed in the transliteration of the
names of persons even though they themselves wrote differently in
xii
English.	 Thus Mohamed and Mohammad are written as Muhammad;
similarly, Chaudhari, Choudhury, Chowdhury, etc., are all discarded
in favour of Chawdhar, according to this transliteration scheme.
Nevertheless, actual spellings of the names are retained in
quotations, notes and in the bibliography.
The English words used in Urdu phrases have not been
transliterated.	 The English spelling has been retained
irrespective of the different ways in which they occur in Urdu
script.
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INTRODUCTION
The 'ulamã'(i.e. the men of Islamic learning) played a
political role in varying degree throughout the history of the
Muslim peoples.	 The 'ulamä'of South Asia were no exception. 	 They
participated in the struggle against colonial rule during the 19th
and 20th centuries.	 Since the emergence of India and Pakistan as
independent states, they have been taking an active part in
politics in both countries. 	 The minority status of the Muslims in
India on the one hand, and India's constitutional commitment to
secularism on the other, have contributed to limiting the 'ularnä"s
role.	 In Pakistan, however, the religious basis of politics and
the objective proclaimed in its Constitution of enabling the people
to live in accordance with the injunctions of the Qurãn and the
Sunnah, have given added scope to the political role of the 'uiamã
The role played by the 'ulamã'in the freedom struggle
attracted the attention of scholars. 	 A few studies in Urdu (e.g.,
the	 writings	 of Mawlãná Sayyid	 MuI)ammad	 Miyn	 of
Jam1
.iyat_ul !Ulama_i_Hind) were produced highlighting the 'u1amã's
role.	 Dr. H.B. Rhan's doctoral dissertation, also in Urdu,
constitutes the latest attempt in this direction.
Dr. Ishtiyq Husayn Qurayshi's Ulema in Politics was the
first detailed study in English, focusing on the role that the
'1amã'generally played from the time Muslim power was consolidated
in South Asia until the emergence of Pakistan.
	 Ziy-u1-Hasan
Farüqi's study The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan
devotes special attention to the role of the Deobandi 'i1amá'in the
struggle for freedom and their orientation towards the Pakistan
xviii
question.	 Airtong recent studies Barbra Daly Metcalf's Islamic
Revival in British India:
	 Deoband, 1860-1900 can be justifiably
regarded as an important contribution to the history of Islamic
religious movements of the 19th century, especially the Deoband
movement.
Apart from such specific studies, writers dealing with
intellectual and cultural developments in South Asia, and the
history of the freedom movement have also touched on the role of
the u1amã
It is a matter of surprise that no thorough study has yet
been made of the political role of the 'iilazná' since the emergence of
Pakistan.	 Their role has been touched upon in a peripheral manner
by some authors in their writings on state and society in Pakistan.
Leonard Binder is the only author who had attempted to study the
political role of the ¶iiamá but, his study Religion and Politics
in Pakistan covers only the first nine years of Pakistan's history.
Binder did not have access to all the material pertinent to the
political role of the 'ulamä	 Therefore historical discrepancies
marred his otherwise pioneering work in the field.
	 The need for
fuller study in the political role of the 'ulaniä' has remained
unfulfilled.	 The present study is an attempt to fill this gap in
the literature.
At the time this study was originally undertaken, its
subject matter was to be the political role of the iz1ama' during the
first thirty years of Pakistan (i.e., 1947-1977).	 But at the time
that the final stage of this study was reached, Muhammad
Ziyã-ul-Haq's death occurred, and with it came the end of the most
xix
recent phase of the 'u1amã"s political role in Pakistan.	 The
author, therefore, decided to add a chapter dealing with Muhammad
Ziyã-ul-Haq's regime in order to bring the work up to date.
This study is divided into two parts. 	 Part One outlines
the position of the 'ulaniá'in South Asian society, the divisions
among them and their system of education, their contribution in the
political arena from the downfall of Muslim rule to the emergence
of Pakistan.	 Part Two focuses on the role of the 'u1amã' in the
socio-political milieu of Pakistan.
The approach adopted in this analysis of the role of the
'	 -,
ularna is mainly historical, the dynamics of social and political
changes being best understood in an historical perspective. 	 The
periodisation of Pakistan's four decades into 1947-1958; the Ayiib
Khãn regime; the Muhammad Yaiy Khãn interregnum; the Bhutto
regime; and the Ziy-ul-Haq regime, would appear to be logical from
the perspective of the difference in general attitude of the u1ain.'
towards each of these regimes. However, the fact remains that this
periodisation can be questioned on other grounds - namely that the
basic power structure was not radically altered even though there
was changes of place among power holders united by certain
homogeneous socio-economic and political characteristics.
The author would like to draw attention to a specific
feature of this work.	 Whilst Chapters 1-6 were written with the
advantage of a vast variety of material that could be consulted,
the subsequent two chapters were written on the basis of a more
restricted field of published scholarship.
xx
It is natural to use the Islanüc calendar in referring to
the events of Islandc history. Dates according to the Islanic
calendar carry an abbreviation of A.H. (i.e., after the hijrah of
the Prophet Muhammad from Makkah to Madinah). All other dates in
the text are in accordance with the Gregorian calendar.
xxi
PART ONE
CHAPTER 1
THE '(lLAMA 'IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY
'Ulamä' is the plural form of the word 'aiim which is
taken from the Arabic masdar (infinitive) 'lEN . 'ILH'means
'to know', 'knowledge' and therefore 'ularnä' are those who know
(i.e., possess knowledge). 	 The word u1amä' occurs twice in the
text of the Qurãn1 and the expression is referred to at several
places in the collections o hadi (traditions of the Prophet).2
With the passage of time the expression attained a technical
meaning in the context of Islamic learning. 	 Those who have
acquired knowledge up to a 'generally accepted and prescribed
standard' 3
 in all branches or any specific branch of Islamic
learning e.g. tafsir (Quranic exegesis), hadis, fiqh
(jurisprudence), kalà.m (scholastic theology) etc., are called the
'ulamã'.	 Some other titles and terms 4 for the	 u1arnâ' such as
mullã, mawlawl and mawlânä are also in common use.5
There were, of course, persons who had knowledge of Islam
right from the beginning, but no section of the society was
regarded as the 'u1am'.	 The 'ulamã' as a distinct section of
society made its first appearance only at the end of the first
century of Hijrah. 6 During the lifetime of the Prophet a group of
his companions was named as qurrä' (the reciters of the Qurin).7
They were, perhaps, the predecessors of the u1amã'.
The emergence of the 'ularnâ' as a distinct group can be
traced as a feature of expansion of Muslim society through conquest
followed by the conversion of non-Arab tribes. The codification of
1
Islamic laws became necessary for maintaining the Islamic structure
of the society intact.	 The 'ulamã' emerged as the custodians of
the structure. They gained power and influence during the Abbasid
period (750-1258).
They flourished with the establishment of the madrasai-ic.
The madrasahs seem to owe their beginning to the Ghaznavids
(977-1187), but their greatest patrons were the Suljuqs. 	 These
were the institutions specifically created to teach fiqh.	 Other
subjects were frequently taught, but 'there could be no madrasa
without law as technically the major subject'. 8 In the Ottoman
Empire a modest hierarchy of offices, reserved for the 'ulamã' was
created in (circa.) 1480, towards the end of Muhammad II'S reign.9
This hierarchy was further organised by his successors with
Shaykh-ul -Islam as its head.
Apart from the 'ularnã there was, generally speakinq,
another kind of religious leaders - viz., the süfis.	 They
dedicated themselves to rigorous spiritual self-discipline, and
were also known as mashVikh, awliyä and pirs10 in South Asian
Muslim society.
There was a thin line of demarcation between the two,
sometimes overlapping, categories - the 'ulam'and the süfis.	 The
ulamä'were well versed in the scholarly traditions of the religion,
and they were entrusted with the task of providing an authoritative
interpretation of ,9harih. The süfis were engaged in the moral and
spiritual uplift of the people through meditation and intuition.
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In order to propagate the faith among the people, the
si.ifis adopted the mass contact technique and developed a code of
doctrines based upon the esoteric interpretation of the Qurãn and
the traditions of the Prophet. The süfis were given a title of Ahi
al-Tariqah (people of the mystic path) in contrast with the 'u1amà'
who were named as Ahi al-Shari'ah (people of SharThh). Similarly,
if the 'ulamã'were 'ularnä-yi-zãhir' (externalists), then the üfis
were 'ularnä-yi-bätin' (internalists).
From the overlapping categories of the 'ularnã'and säf.is,
any particular individual was acknowledged either as an 'him or
süfi depending on which of the two approaches to the propagation of
faith that he emphasised in his practice. 	 From the 18th century
onwards, all the prominent 'ularnã'in South Asia were linked with the
süfi orders, and a fused category of 'älim-süfi or süfi-'ãlim emerged
which is still dominant in South Asia.
In this chapter we shall consider, in its historical
context, the position of the 'ulamã'and the süfls in the Muslim
state and society of South Asia, the theological and intellectual
divisions among them which have continued to exist, and the system
of madrasah education.	 It is the theological and intellectual
differences among them which prove to be a divisive factor in their
political stand on any given situation; at the same time, a
commonly shared madrasah education and uniform religious
observances have given them a cohesion and enabled them to forge
together a joint front on various social and political issues.
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1.1	 The Position of t
	 inin Muslim society
The 'ulamã' enjoy a position of special importance in
Muslim society due to the central importance attached by Islam to
learning.	 God commanded the people to learn. 	 'Recite:	 In the
name of thy Lord Who created' 11 were the first words of God's first
revelation to the Prophet.	 The Prophet was instructed to pray '0
my Lord, increase me in knowledge'. 12 'God will raise up in rank
those of you who believe and have been given knowledge.' 13 So the
believers were informed.
The paramount importance of learning is further
strengthened as tradition of the Prophet struck deeper roots.14
Therefore there is 'no higher distinction for a Muslim than to be
credited with knowledge'.'5
The 'ularnã'played multiple roles in the past which varied
with time in accordance with political and social conditions. But,
their primary role has always been as educators and purveyors of
religion in general. How did they preserve religion?
Islam possesses neither a church nor a priesthood.
	 No
particular person, body, group or institution is vested with
special powers of religious leadership.	 Any Muslim of decent
character with enough knowledge can lead the congregational prayers
and perform the rites connected with birth, marriage and death. No
one has the right of mediation and intercession between man and his
creator (God), therefore there is no need for a priesthood.
4
But Islam does recognise the need for guidance. Prophets
were inspired by God to guide humanity and they were sent to the
people from time to time. Muhammad was the last such. 16 The door
of the Prophethood being closed, who would guide the Muslims after
Muiammad? The answer is simply: 	 'the persons having knowledge,
e.g. the men of learning ('ulama5 . They are the legatees of the
Prophet's religion.	 The 'u1amã being the accepted guides and
interpreters in matters of religion, occupy a higher status than
laymen.
Without any fixed organisation in modern terms, the 'u1rnã'
do not form a formal class, especially in the Sunni tradition.
Even during the Ottoman period, with its elaborate hierarchy of
religious offices, the 'ulamã'as a whole could not constitute itself
into a coherent group. There were numbers of 'ulamã'who were averse
to the idea of serving the state. They continued to impart
instruction privately or turned to the süfI circles. This is why
the response of the 'u1am'to any given situation was not always
unanimous.	 It is often the case that the 'ulamä'are on different
sides of the same issue. 	 The 'ulanià'are not bound together by
considerations of 'class' identity but rather by loyalty to a
common teacher or school of thought. 	 Nevertheless, a sort of
'class' characteristic did emerge among the 'ularnã' of the Shih
tradition. They are distinguished by their dress, though this is
not formally prescribed.	 With a large turban and a flowing robe,
an 'him in Iran is easily differentiated in a crowd of laymen.
The 'u1am have been associated with the mosques which are
an essential part of Muslim society. The mosque has always been
revered as a place of ritual worship and the community centre for
5
believers. In early Islam, it was the place where state policy was
declared, and therefore became a centre of political activity.
Besides the daily five prayers, Friday prayer at noon is obligatory
for every adult male Muslim, preferably to be offered in a single
mosque in any locality before a large gathering.
	 Following the
tradition of the Prophet, a khutbah ( address) is made at the
gathering.	 Khutbah had been, and is a medium of social and
political communication. 17 A mosque generally has an imim who is
entrusted with the duty of organising the prayers and leading them.
The larger mosques may have khatibs'for delivering Friday khutbah.
Pertinent to the growing activism of the 'ularná' is the
revitalisation of the political role of the mosques. 	 They want to
revive the mosque as a centre where influence on state politics is
exercised.	 Mosques are also convenient centres for maktab
(elementary school) where children are taught to recite the Qurän
and the method of performance of obligatory prayers. The education
of Islamic fundamentals is also a part of the maktab's curriculum.
Through mosques and maktabs the 'ulaznã'propagate the message of
religion.
1.2	 The tU.Zamä'under Muslim rule
Let us turn to a consideration of the 'ularnä"s role in
South Asia under Muslim rule.
According to a number of research monographs, tracing the
history of Muslim expansion in South Asia, Islam entered this
region through Arab traders who settled along the southern coast of
India even before the Muslim conquest of Bind in 712 by Muhammad
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B. Qsim. 18 But it was not until the beginning of the 13th century
that the Turks established a proper 'Sultanate'. Through centuries
from one reigning family to the other, the Muslims retained
political power until 1857, though a sharp decline in their actual
control had started with the death of the last great Mughal emperor
Awrangzeb (1707).
Muslim political institutions had already developed to a
considerable degree by the time the Turks consolidated power in
South Asia. With the death of the fourth 'rightly-guided' Khalifah
(Caliph) 'Alt, the Khilãfah (Caliphate) lost its basic democratic
characteristics and the Muslim government turned into a monarchy,
while retaining the title of 'Khil5fah'. 19 The governments under
the Umayyads and the Abbasids were essentially secular rather than
religious in character. The Abbasids who relied on Muslim converts
of non-Arab origin for overthrowing the Arab-dominated Umayyads'
rule, adopted Persian etiquette and ceremonials at court.
	 By the
time the Abbasids caine to power, the 'ulainã'had already established
themselves as the sole authoritative exponents of Islamic law.
Religious and quasi-religious institutions remained in their hands,
whilst the supreme power, the Khalifah, shaped government policy
with the assistance of his secular courtiers. The Turks of Central
Asia were no different from their contemporary Abbasids, in their
adoption of Persian customs. Demographic factors, among others,
rather than the zeal to convert heathens, drove them to South Asia.
They were not much concerned with Islamic ideals of peace and war.
Their wars were no more religious in motivation than their
political ideals were Islamic in character.
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The anecdotes, recorded in chronicles, show the personal
religiosity and piety of some of these rulers such as Sultan
Iltutmish (1211-1236) and Nãsir-ud-din Mahmüd (1246_1266).20	 They
did show deference to the 'ulamã'and süfis but did not practise the
Sharih in a strict manner. It was the higher class of nobles that
formulated the policies of the Sultanate. In the words of Nizânii:
The religious leaders played the part of a
second fiddle. The political authorities tried
to bind them to the state chariot in order to
win public support through them, but they were
not allowed to determine the course of
political developments.21
Despite his personal religiosity and great regard for the
religious divines, Iltutmish nominated his daughter Razyah as his
successor. There was not a single 'aiim who could exert pressure in
order to make him change the decision which ran contrary to
Sharih.
Why did the 'iiiam'accept such a position? They did not
challenge the absolute monarchy of the hereditary rulers. 	 One of
the factors contributing to their support of the monarchy was their
fear of anarchy which is never far from the surface even tn the
Muslim world of today. 22 An autocratic ruler, but religious in his
personal life, would be tolerated by the 'uiamä	 Ziya-ul-Haq of
Pakistan (1977-1988) was a perfect case in point.
The traditions of the Prophet forbade revolt against the
rulers as long as they managed the performance of the obligatory
prayers in society.23 Thus, absolute rulers who enforced Shari'ah
were tolerated.	 From this perspective, the 'uiam'may, correctly,
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be held responsible for bestowing the stamp of Islamic legitimacy
on a variety of different political and economic structures.
In the last quarter of the 16th century, the ¶ilamã' became
actively opposed to the Mughal emperor Jalãl-ud-din Akbar
(1542-1605) whose eclecticism led him to propagate a self-made
religion, i.e. Din-i-I1h.i (divine faith) in his capacity of the
'most just, most wise and most learned'. 24 The S.zlamä'felt bound to
protest against the emperor's attempts to replace Shari&h with a
new din. Their power was undermined as Akbar introduced changes in
religious institutions of the state.	 The two most outstanding
'ula.rnã' - Makhdüm-ul-mulk'Abdullãh Sultãnpuri (d.1583) and Shaykh
'Abd-un-Nabi (d.1584), connected with the state, were banished.
Mull Muhammad Yazd. issued a fatwa (religious ruling) to the
effect that Akbar was an apostate, and therefore it would be lawful
to rebel against him. 25 Shaykh Jamãl-ud-din preferred to emigrate
to Hijaz rather than give his approval to the Din-i -Ilähi.
Din-i-Ilähi was a hotch-potch of symbols and propositions
picked up from various religions with which Akbar was superficially
acquainted. It was confined to the ruling circles, but it provoked
the 'ulamä	 Even Vincent Smith, known to be sympathetic towards
Akbar, concluded that
the whole scheme was the outcome of ridiculous
vanity, a monstrous growth of unrestrained
autocracy... The Divine Faith was a monument of
Akbar's folly, not of his wisdom.26
The 'u2am'and also those amongst the noblemen who were
staunch Muslims,	 realising the danger that Akhbar's policy
contained, stepped up their activities to counter the effects of
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Din-i -Ilãhi.	 Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi (1563-1624) wrote long letters
to the noblemen, known for their religious sympathies.	 He
discussed the problems confronting Shari'ah at length in a lucid
style in his maktübat (letters). 27 These letters had the desired
effect and the Mughal emperor JahãigIr (1605-1627) felt compelled
to discard some of the practices of court, repugnant to Sharih.
Shaykh Ahmad, once imprisoned under the orders of Jahángir,
distinguished himself as the most revered scholar of the time. The
influence of the "ulamä'was restored as Akbar's influence waned fast
following his death.
The successors of Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi developed close
personal links with the rulers. 28 Their role in the war of
succession between the sons of Shãhjahãn - Dãrã Shikoh and
Awrangzeb - is worth noting.
	 They favoured the latter.29
Awrangzeb's religious policy was formulated under the influence of
the 'ij1arnä°	 The 'ulamä'under Awrangzeb more than regained the
influence that they had lost under Akbar.
1.2.1	 The 'Ulamä'in State-Service
The 'uiainä under Muslim rule, either devoted themselves
to preaching and to a peaceful and independent pursuit of
knowledge, or joined the service of the state.	 They were usually
employed in the religious institutions of the state. These were:31
1) Diwin-i-Sadárat (Department of Religious Affairs)
It was controlled by an officer named Sadr-us-sudür or
Shaykh-ul-Isl.3.m32 who was chosen from amongst the outstanding
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scholars of the time. The department used to control government
grants and appoint judicial officers, religious functionaries and
teachers.
Khatibs and imäms were religious functionaries who led
the daily prayers, and delivered the sermons on Friday and !ds.
They performed rituals pertaining to marriage and funerals.
Normally, only well-educated scholars were appointed to these
offices (especially in big cities) because public opinion demanded
that only men of acknowledged distinction should be khatibs and
.imárns.
Guided by religious and political considerations, the
rulers appointed some of the more eloquent 'ularnã' as muzakkir (who
remind the people of their religious duties towards the state) in
their personal service.	 They delivered sermons before the rulers
and the nobles, reminding them of their religious duties and
obligations.	 Their liberty of speech was limited and dependent on
the goodwill of the ruler.
Khatibs or mazakkirs were often called upon to deliver
sermons before the rebels in order to pacify them.
	 Similarly, in
moments of crisis, they were expected to inspire and encourage the
masses.
Education also constituted an important function of
Mwãn-i-Sadärat. The 'ulamã'were appointed as teachers in madrasahs,
established and managed by the state.
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2) Diwãn-i-Qazã (Judiciary)
The head of the judiciary was Qäzi-ul--qzát (Chief qazi).
Qazis were appointed for the provinces as well as for smaller
jurisdiction.	 All the important cities, towns and even smaller
settlements had their own qãzis.
The Qazl-ul-quzãt was appointed by the emperor. 	 He was
the highest judicial authority after the emperor.	 The qäzis of
smaller jurisdictions (e.g., provinces and cities) were appointed
either on the recomiriendation of Qäzi-ul-quzãt or Sadr-us-sudür.
Being a 'technical' and professional job, only those u1amä' were
appointed as gãzis who were well-versed in uiqh.
Writers such as Nizãini 33 count the mufti (the official
posts held by 'ula.mã') as an integral part of the judicial system.
Nevertheless, Saran, in his detailed study on Mughal provincial
administration,	 concludes that the mufti was not a regular
government official. 34	According to Khlid Maid, scholars who
claimed that the mufti was a government official, 'have not
properly documented their conclusions... mufti was not a regular
official' .35
3) Diwãn-j-Iht.isãb
(Department for the Suppression of Disorderly Conduct)
The Diwãn-i-Ihtisãb was supervised by a Chief muhtasib.
The need for the creation of this department originated with the
Quranic injunction according to which a Muslim ruler is enjoined to
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perform the prayer, [to] pay alms and [to] bid to honour and [to]
forbid dishonour.36
The Chief muhtasib was appointed by the Emperor himself.
The muhtasihs of the various towns and cities were appointed by the
state on the recommendation of the Sadr-us-sudür.	 The department
was charged with the supervision of moral standards, social
behaviour and public security.
	 The religious side of	 the
department's functions consisted of enforcing the Islamic code of
conduct, whilst the municipal side consisted of safeguarding the
interests of the people and keeping an eye on the market.
1.3	 The Süuis and the State
The efforts of the süfis in the propagation and
preservation of the faith were equally important.	 The growth of
the Muslim community in South Asia is generally attributed to the
activities of the süfis involving a peaceful penetration of the
country. 37	The creed of süfis (e.g., tasawwuf) had been fully
developed in Muslim societies where an institutionalised form of
süfl orders (silsilahs) had arisen well before the 12th century.38
1.3.1	 pplar SÜE1 Orders in South Asia
Four sü.fi orders, in particular, gained popularity in
South Asia.	 The earliest of these four orders was the Qãdiriyyah,
founded by Shaykh 'Abdul Qãdir Jilãni of Baghdad (1077-1166), one
of the most revered figures in the history of tasawwuf. References
to him are frequently found in the early süfi literature of South
Asia, but his works as well as the order that he led did not reach
13
the region until the 15th century. 	 It was first introduced by
Muhammad Ghaws of Uch (d.1517), who set up a khãnqãh (hospice) at
Uch (Punjab) in 1482.	 This order rose to prominence in the 17th
century when Shaykh 'Abdul Haq Dihlawl (1551-1642) introduced the
writings of and on 'Abdul Qãdir Jiläni. 	 Muhammad Mir (1550-1635),
popularly known as Miyan Mir Lähori, the preceptor of Därã Shikoh
(1615-1659), was the chief qàdiri sufl of that period. At present,
Qädiriyyah is the most widespread süfi order in South Asia.
The other order is Chishtiyyah. It was founded in Chisht
(a small village near Herat, Afghanistan) by Khawäjah Abu Izhäq
(d.940), and brought into South Asia in the 12th century by
Khawjah Miin-ud-din-3ijzi (1143-1236), who set up a khänqãh at
Ajmer. His successors propagated the order far and wide. A chain
of khanqähs came into being from Pakpattan (Punjab) to Lucknowti
(Bengal).
Suhrawardiyyah was another order which flourished,
simultaneously with the Chishtiyyah. It was founded by Shaykh
Najib-ud-din Suhrawardi (d.1169) in Iraq and was elaborated by
Shaykh	 Shahb-ud-d1n Suhrawardi	 (1145-1234).	 Bahã-ud-d1n
Zakariyyã, one of the disciples of Shahäb-ud-din Suhrawardi, firmly
established the order in Multan (Punjab) and Sind.
The fourth popular order in South Asia is Naqshbandiyyah,
named after Shaykh Bah-ud-din Naqshband (1317-1389) who developed
it.	 It was the last to reach South Asia (the late 16th century).
Khawãjah Bäqibillãh (1563-1603) was the süfi who introduced it
there, and his disciple Shaykh Ahniad Sarhindi made it popular.
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The süfi khãnqãhs were the nuclei for the propagation of
the faith.	 Each khãnqãh had a 'shaykh' as its pivotal figure,
around whom the whole system was built. The elaborate
administration of the khânqh evolved with the passage of time.
These khãnqähs were visited from time to time by people seeking
religious guidance. 	 The visitors were provided with meals and
lodging.	 Some of the khanqahs had maktabs or madrasahs. The
social and religious services rendered by the khãnqãh3 were
financed from voluntary contributions. The rich, having regard for
the shaykhs, made endowments of agricultural lands, buildings and
handsome amounts to their khänqãhs. Nor did the state lag behind
the rich in providing endowments to the khãnqãhs as long as the
shaykhs were prepared to accept them.
Among the various orders, Chishtiyyah adapted itself
better to local conditions. It adopted many Hindu fashions such as
the custom of bowing before a spiritual leader. Music, an integral
part of the Hindu religious ceremonies, was adopted by the
Chishtis. The qawwáli (ecstatic singing with instruments) is a
characteristic feature of Chishti khãnqãhs.
1.3.2	 Süfls' Attitude towards Rulers
The attitude of the süfis towards temporal power varied
from 'order' to 'order' and 'Øfi' to 'üf1'.	 Chishtis by and
large made no contact with mundane authorities.	 Shaykh
Farid-ud-din (1175-1265) warned his adherents against developing
contacts with kings and princes. He advised a certain süfl who was
leaving Ajodhan (Pakpattn nowadays) for Delhi in the following
words:
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I give thee a bit of advice, which it will be
well for thee to observe. Have nothing to do
with maliks and amirs, and beware of their
intimacy as dangerous; no darwesh ever kept up
such an intimacy, but in the end found it
disastrous39
Shaykh Farid-ud-din used to convey similar advice to others as
well. 40	Nizäm-ud-din Awliyã' (1238-1325) strictly adhered to the
tradition.
Jal1-ud-din Khalji (1290-1296) sent some presents along
with a message seeking his consent to endow the income of a village
for the maintenance of the khãnqäh.	 Nizãm-ud-din Awliyã' declined
the offer. The Sultan then asked for an interview which was also
refused.	 When Nizãm-ud-din Awliy'came to know of the Sultan's
visit, he avoided him by undertaking a journey to Ajodhan. 41 The
Chishtis generally declined the sultans' endowments.	 They thought
the acceptance of such offers would curtail their freedom and make
them subservient to the whims of the rulers. 	 The Chishtis also
discouraged their adherents from seeking state service. 42	Nizãmi
observed that
almost all the notable saints of the Chishti
order in India scrupulously avoided the company
of kings and nobles.43
Unlike the Chishtis, the members of the Suhrawardiyyah
consorted with kings and princes.	 Shaykh Bahã-ud-din Zakariyyi
mixed freely with the rulers, took part in political affairs and
accepted court honours. 44 Unlike the Chishtls,	 too, he amassed
wealth.	 The practice of Niz.m-ud-din's khãnqãh was to give away
everything in the store, every Friday evening, to the needy. 45
 By
contrast, nothing was disbursed from Suhrawardi khãnqäh of Multan
among the poor. Bahãud-din Zakariyyä was bitterly criticised for
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his wealth as it was seen as a hindrance to spiritual progress. He
left no stone unturned to convince his critics that it was not so
much the wealth as its improper use that was detrimental to
spiritual progress.	 But the critics went on to tell him: 	 'Two
opposites - wealth and spiritual progress - cannot meet at one
place. '46
The profound religious influence which the sufis and
their khänqahs wielded over the masses stimulated the rulers, for
spiritual as well as for political reasons, to develop contacts
with süfis. The slifIs were won over with endowments of large
jäglrs (estates), reservation of revenue of certain areas for the
maintenance of public kitchens of the khänqãhs, and contributions
to the building of shrines. 	 State support to the khãnqh
institutions was a way of ensuring the legitimacy of the ruler. It
is also noteworthy that the disciples of the süfis, belonging to
the nobility, constituted a link between the ruler and the
khânqãhs. The system of endowments to the khaThqaThs was first
adopted by the SultIns of Delhi, and the practice was followed by
the Mughals.	 The Sikhs, during their rule over Punjab and North
West Frontier Province (NWFP), continued the tradition.	 Their
successor, the British colonial power, found it convenient not to
deviate from it.
1.4	 The 'Ulamâ'and the Pirs under British Colonial Rule
With the introduction of English education and the
abolition of Muslim judicial administration, the tulainä'suffered a
setback during the colonial period.
	 They turned to establishing
madrasahs, and continued to perform the religious functions as
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usual.	 Economically, they were more or less deprived of earning
their livelihood by seeking employment in government institutions.
They had to depend on public contributions.	 These 'ulamã' were
largely affiliated to the süfi orders, 47 and contributed a great
deal to explaining the importance of the practices of 'tasawwuf'
through their writings.
Apart from the süfis, 'u1am'and süfl-1ulainã,' there were
hereditary pirs who controlled the khãnqãhs of the great süfis of
the past and the vast landed estates attached to them. 	 It was
normal practice for the hereditary pir to pass on his authority to
his nominated relative (usually his son) who became the
sajjädah-nashln ( one who sits on the prayer rug). The role of
these sajjädah-nashins in society was determined not only on the
basis of their religious influence but also on the strength of
their landed interests.	 The colonial authorities treated them as
though they were chiefs, controlling vast lands. 48
	They, for
their part, remained loyal to the temporal pbwer irrespective of
the policies of the rulers. 	 On the whole, while the 'ulamã'played
the role of activists, the hereditary pirs persuaded the people to
obey the temporal power.
1.5	 Religious Divisions Amon g Muslims in Pakistan
We have so far discussed the 'ulamä'and slifis as a body of
religious leaders in the Muslim society of South Asia. 	 Though the
'uiamä share common ground in essential matters of religion, they
are divided among themselves along sectarian and sub-sectarian
lines.	 We shall turn our attention to the sectarian structure of
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the Pakistani Muslim society underlying the divisions among the
'ulamä
The total population of Pakistan is 83.78 million
according to the 1981 census, 49 out of which 81 million are
Muslims (96.68 per cent of the total population). 5 °	 The Muslims
are divided into two major sects and several sub-sects (divisions
of a sect and then further division) (see figure 1.1).
Population figures by sect and sub-sect are not
available.	 There has been no census on the basis of sects since
1921, as the Muslim leaders discouraged it in order to maintain a
semblance of Muslim unity. 	 In the absence of authentic figures,
each and every sect and sub-sect (especially minority sects and
sub-sects) is given to exaggerating its ratio in the whole
population.	 The statements of different leaders even of the same
sect are often contradictory on this matter.
The majority of the Muslim population is Sunni.	 What is
the ratio of Shihs in the population? Opinions vary on this
question.	 Freeland Abbot estimated them as 'perhaps ten per cent
of the population'. 51 In a recent study, they are presented as 'a
substantial minority of 20 per cent' of the total population.52
The Shih leaders themselves reckon that their community
constitutes 30-40 per cent of the total population.
	 But their
claims are in fact exaggerated. 	 They form no more than 3.13 per
cent of the Muslim population.53
The Muslim community became divided almost immediately
after the death of the Prophet on the question of his successor.
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The majority of the companions of the Prophet took the view that
the community as a whole was vested with the power to select the
successor of the Prophet as the leader of the community, because
the Prophet had issued no specific instruction to the community on
who should wear the mantle of the head of state. 	 So AbÜ Bakr was
elected by a majority as the Prophet's immediate khalifah
(successor).
The other group, which proved to be a tiny minority, held
the view that the Prophet had in fact designated a particular
person as his successor, and that was his cousin and son-in-law 'All
B. Abi Tãlib. According to this group, the designation had been
made public by the Prophet during a journey from his last hajj
(pilgrimage to Makkah) at a place called the ghadir (pool) of
Khurnrn, on 18 Zul-hijjah 11 A.H./632.	 The Prophet's proclamation
had, according to them, been reported in the following words:
'He for whom I was the master should hence have
Au as his master'54
This group caine to be known as the Shi'ah (partisans) of 'All.
The majority group, democratic in orientation, succeeded
in creating the institution of Khilãfah/Khilãfat. The Khalifahs
were elected by popular support, but the institution could not last
long.	 Thirty years after the Prophet's death, the Khilafah was
turned into a kind of monarchy. 55	The Sh.ihs, rejecting the
doctrine of the Khiläfah developed a theory of Imämah/Imãrnat,
according to which the leadership of the Muslim society and state
was vested inAli and his Fatimid descendents.
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This earliest division of the Muslim community has its
origin in politics rather than in dogma.	 This is not to say that
theological questions no longer form part of this division.
However,	 the issues which contributed to the division were
political to the extent that they were basically concerned with
statecraft. 'Ali caine to power after the assassination of the third
Khalifah'Usmàn, but his four year rule (658-661) which ended in his
assassination was punctuated by civil strife. After his death, the
Umayyads took power.	 The Shi'ahs revolted against the established
power on several occasions, but in vain. The Abbasids who followed
the Umayyads in 750 were descendants of the Prophet's uncle, Abbas.
They caine to power with the help of the Shihs, but abandoned the
Shi'ahs and reverted to the original political form of rule guided
by Sunnl religious belief.
1.5.1	 The Sub-sects of the Shi.hs
The Shihs are divided into several sub-sects.
Shahrastãni, a 12th century writer, divided the Shi'ahs into five
major sub-sects: 56 Kaysãniyyah; Zaydiyyah; Immiyyah (the Inä
tAsharis); Ghu.Zt
	
(the extremists); and, Ismäi1iyyah.	 Each of
these sub-sects was further divided into smaller groups.	 It is
not necessary here to trace the long history of the splits among
Shi'ahs. We are concerned only with those sub-sects of the Shihs
which are a part of Muslim population in Pakistan.
1. Isna 4sharis
The main point of difference among Shih sub-sects was
the actual number and succession of the Imäms.	 Some count Al1 as
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the first Imãin, while others (considering him as the wasi-yi-rasül)
do not include him among the Imärns, and start counting the Imãms
only from Hasan B. 'All onwards. 57 The next Imàrn, Husayn B. "All
(the younger brother of Hasan B. 'Ali), along with his tiny band of
companions, was killed in a skirmish with Umayyad's army (10
Haharram 61 A.H./680), when he was on his way to Kufah (Iraq) in
order to raise military support. 58 'All Zayn-ul-'Abidin, the son of
Husayn, was declared as the next Imm.
After the death of Zayn-ulAbidin, the ShThhs underwent a
division.	 Before his death (in 712 or 713), he was said to have
nominated Mohaimnad Bãqir, his eldest son, as his successor. 	 A
section of the Shihs gave their support to Muhammad Baqir's
younger half brother Zayd instead of the designated Imàm.	 Zayd
pursued an activist policy against the Umayyads and was killed with
many of his followers in an unsuccessful revolt (740).	 The
followers of Zayd (known as the Zaydis) continued to pursue a line
of action different to the mainstream of the ShThhs and developed a
theological basis for their identity.59
Muhammad Bãqir was followed by Jafar Sãdiq. A new
cleavage occurred on his death (765), when a group refused to
accept his younger living son Müs Kázim as his legitimate
successor.	 The dissident group claimed that Ja'far had already
chosen Ismã'l, his elder son, as his successor, and that prior to
his (Isml's) own death, the latter in turn nominated his son
Muhammad.
The Shl'ahs who owed allegiance to Ismil are known as
Ismãi1is. They are sometimes known as 'Sevener&, since, according
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to them, Muhammad B. Ismil ought to have been the seventh Imäzn.
The main body of the Shihs accepted Müsà Kãzim as the
Imäzn and the chain of hereditary Imäins continued down to Mulianuuad
al-Muntazar.	 He was the last of the Imärns, and in accordance with
the counting of the mainstream of Shihs (including 'All B. Abi
Tãlib as the first Imäm), he became the 12th Imãm.	 The last Imãni
was believed to have disappeared rather than died like any other
mortal (940) and would reappear as the Mandi before the Day of
Judgement. The Sh.ihs, believing in the Imãmah of the 12 Imäras are
known as Imârniyyah or Isnã 'Asharis (Twelvers).
Isnã shari, the 1arget brartch o th Shihs thtoo'3.t
the Muslim world remained a minority, lacking political power until
the 16th century, when the ShLh Safvid dynasty (1501-1722) was
established in Iran.
	
In the contemporary world, the Islamic
Republic of Iran is a country with Isnä tAsharsl Shiahism as its
state religion.
The Isnä sharis' beliefs are as follows:
1. There are twelve Imäms. The first Imãm was Ali whom
the Prophet himself designated. Every Imm deputed his
own successor. The twelfth went into occultation, and
will reappear before the Day of Judgement.
2. All the Imãrns are infallible, and to obey them is to
obey the Prophet himself.
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3.	 During the period of occultation of the last Imäm,
the masses must follow Shih 'u1amä	 These 'ularnã' in
Shi'ah terminology are mujtahids (literally, those who
exert their mental faculties).
	 Technically, mujtahids
are jurists who are qualified to derive the legal norms
from the basic sources of Islamic law.	 These
'ulamãYrnuj tahids are reliable by dint of their piety and
learning. The most learned and the pious must be
emulated. It is up to a person to tate omor 1io tht
mujtahids as his source of emulation (marja'-i-taqlld).
2. Ismâ'ilis (Aghã Khãnls and Bohrahs)
The Ismài1i Imãrns propagated their message through a
network of dã'is (missionaries) and succeeded in establishing
themselves as the real defenders of the faith among the masses in
far-flung areas of the Abbasid Khilafah. By 909, they were strong
enough to establish a new state and dynasty in North Africa and
Sicily.	 They were known as the Fatimids, in accordance with their
descent from Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet.	 The Fatimid
state, at its peak, included Egypt, Syria, North Africa, Sicily,
the Red Sea coast of Africa, the Yemen and the Hijaz in Arabia60
with the holy cities of Makkah and Nadinah. With the death of
Fatimid Khalifah and 18th dã'i-i-mutlaq (the supreme missionary in
the theological terminology of the group) al-Mustansir in 1094, a
new split occurred which divided the sect vertically from top to
bottom.
On the one hand, there was Nizãr, the eldest son and the
designated successor of al-Mustansir; on the other, there was his
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younger brother al-Musta'll.	 The latter became the ruler with the
assistance of the army chief, and Nizr was killed in the revolt.
The Ismäi1is in Persia refused to recognise al-Musta'li as
the rightful Imäin. They adhered to Nizr and were therefore known
as Nizäris. The millionaire potentates - the Aghã Khãns - have
been the living and .azir (present) Imãms of the sub-sect,
therefore the Nizäris are commonly known as the Agha Khãnis. In
Pakistan, they are also known as Khojahs. The word Khojah is
derived from khawä jab which carries a connotation of business. An
overwhelming majority of the community is in business.
The Agha Khanis consider the word of God to be incarnate
in the living Imm. The word has the status of the holy farmãn of
the Imim. It is the one and only obligatory word for the
followers. The Imãm instructs the followers through farmãns.
Farmãns contradicting each other could be issued over a period of
time. Nothing is regarded as permanent. 'The concept of the Imãmat
and belief in the Imi.m alone are unchangeable.'61
The Aghã Khänls do not maintain mosques. They assemble
in their jaint-khànahs (social clubs) and pray three times a day.
Their prayer neither resembles the Sunni prayer nor the Isnã
'Asharis'. In form as well as in spirit, it is a homage to the
living Imãm. At the same time, Aghã Khanis do not hesitate to join
the 'Id prayers with Sunnis or mainstream Shihs. They may join the
congregational prayers of Sunnls as well as of Shihs, at which
they are prone to imitating their physical movements, without
reading the prescribed texts of the prayers.
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The Aghã IChän2 population of Pakistan is estimated at .06
per cent of the total. 	 It is concentrated in big cities, and in
the northern areas of Pakistan (especially Hunza and Chitral). The
Agh Khänis are on the whole a close-knit and prosperous community,
well looked after by the Imam's administration.
By virtue of the role that he played during the formative
phase of Muslim League politics, Agha Khãn III is regarded by his
followers and official historians of Pakistan as a leader of the
Pakistan movement; his son Prince 'All Khãn was, until his death,
the head of Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations.
	 Prince
Karim, Aghâ Khãn IV, who was installed in October 1957, is received
during his visits to Pakistan with the formalities due to a very
important personality.
The followers of al-Musta'li are known as Bohrahs in South
Asia. The name Bohrah is derived from the Gujarati word 'vohorou'
(literally, 'trade').	 Trading is in fact the main occupation of
the community.	 The term does not reflect any religious or
sectarian position, but rather shows the social and occupational
standing of those belonging to the Bohrah community.	 There is a
minority of Sunnl Bohrahs, who use the term jafari as a part of
their names in order to distinguish themselves from the Shih
Bohrahs.
The Shiah Bohrahs are divided into three distinct groups,
namely Dawffdis, Sulaymãnis and 'Alias. The first split occurred
among the Bohrahs over the succession of the 27th däi-matlaq in the
16th century.	 The majority in South Asia followed Dawild B. Qutb
Shah and were called Dawüdis. The followers of Shaykh Sulaymn,
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known as the 27th dI-i-mat1aq, remained in a small minority and
were referred to as the Sulaymanis. The majority group of the
Bohrahs (i.e. Dawüdis) further split in 1627 or 1628, on the
occasion of the succession of the 29th dä'i-i-matlaq. A splinter
group departed from the main body, under the leadership of 'All.
They were referred to as 'Au Bohrahs or 'Alias.
In all these three groups, Dawüdis are in a majority.
Sayyidn Burhän-ud-din is the present d'i of Dawüdls; he presides
over a closely-knit hierarchy, the members of which are chosen
personally by him.	 According to one source, there are 30,000
Dawildis in Pakistan; 62 25,000 of these live in Karachi.	 An
overwhelming majority of them is engaged in middle-scale business;
a few families such as the Walikas are running big industries and
trading corporations.
The other two groups of the Bohrahs are mainly
concentrated in Vadodara (India); they have a nominal following in
Pakistan.
All the three groups of Bohrahs derive their theological
and esoteric interpretation of the faith from the Ismãili
literature. They follow the Isna 'Asharls in certain rituals (e.g.,
the celebration of the 'Id-ul-ghadir, commemorating the designation
of 'All to the Imãrnah according to the Shi'ah narration).
The original schism among the Bohrahs took place on the
question of succession and not on any theological ground. 	 The
beliefs and rituals of all the three sub-sects are more or less
identical, except for the lineage of the dã'is.
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1.5.2	 The Relative Importance of the Sub-sects of Shihs in
Pakistan
Numerically the Isnã 'Asharis are important. They are
mainly in the Punjab and Sind. There are a few pockets of
_ g	 -influence of the Isna Asharis where sectarian feelings play a part
in the political game. The importance of the Agh Khãnis and
Bohrahs in Pakistan's commerce and industry is far in excess of the
minuscule proportion of the total population that they represent.
The Agha Khãnis who constitute only .06 per cent of the total
population of Pakistan control S per cent of its total industrial
wealth. 63 	 Bohrahs control another 5 per cent of Pakistan's
industry with an even smaller population (.02 per cent). 64
	The
industrial houses of Walika and Fanci belong respectively to the
Bohrah and Aghã Khãni sub-sects.
1.5.3	 The Sub-sects of the Sunnis
The majority of the umrnah which accepted the theory of
Khiläfah became known as the Ahl-us--Sunnah or Sunnis, the followers
of the Sunnah of the Prophet. The Sunnis take the first four
Khalifahs - namely, Abü Bakr, 'Umar, 'UsmAn and 'Ali - as the
Khualãfa-ar-Rãshidffn (rightly guided caliphs) and idealise this
period (stretching over 30 years or so) as the best time subsequent
to the death of the Prophet. 	 The basic stand of the Sunnis is to
follow the Qurãn and the Sunnah of the Prophet.	 The schism among
the Sunnis arose out of differences of interpretation and
adaptation of the Sunnah.
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After the death of the Prophet, the wa))I (the Quranic
revelation) which used to be the guiding principle in any given
situation during his lifetime, ceased to exist. 	 At the same time,
the Prophet's own intuitive intellect was no longer available. The
companions of the Prophet, including the Khalifah, took the advice
of the prophet to Mu'áz [the governor of Yemen] as a fundamental
principle.	 If the Qurãn had explicit instructions on a specific
matter, that was final.	 If not, the Sunnah was followed.	 If
neither the Qurän nor the Sunnah contained any direct instruction,
then a course was to be adopted such that the injunctions of
neither the Quiin nor the Sunnah would be violated. 65 With the
passage of time a number of new legal problems did crop up, mainly
due to the extension of Muslim rule beyond the Arab peninsula and
the accompanying proselytisation on an extensive scale of non-Arab
peoples.	 In this context, Muslim scholars in the great centres of
the conquered lands devoted themselves to the collection, scrutiny
and compilation of the sayings and practices of the Prophet
(hadls), and study of hadls became a subject in its own right with
specific principles and a vast literature. In order to resolve the
problems that arose due to changes in space and time,
jurisprudential interpretations accumulated and developed into a
Muslim legal system. A number of juristic schools of thought
appeared, but only a few of these crystalised into definite
systems.
Four juristic schools of thought stand out prominently in
Muslim history.	 These are the schools of AhÜ Hanifah (d.767),
Mãlik B. Anas (d.795), Shãi (d.820) and Annad B. Hanbal (d.855).
These schools of thought as well as their followers are known after
the names of the founders.
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The vast majority of the Muslims in Pakistan are the
followers of Abil Hanifah (i.e., the Hanafis). The first conquerors
of north-west India (now a part of Pakistan) were the Ghaznavids,
who were Sunnis of the Shãf'i school of thought.	 But the Hanafl
school of thought had started to gain ground and to replace Shf'I
influence in the court of Ghazni,
	
under	 the Sultan
Mü'id(1030-1040).	 The ShãEi school of thought remained strong in
north-west India until the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi
(1206).
The Sultans of Delhi and the political lite of the
Sultanate adhered to the Hanafi school.	 The Sultans' code of
administration 'was strongly (anafi in character, an4 the judicial
system was based entirely on Hanafl jurisprudence. It is said that
Muhammad B. Tughlaq had a thorough knowledge of ffidäyah, the Hanafl
t	 _(juristic manual.	 The ulama, during the Sultanate period, placed
greater emphasis on fiqh than on any other branches of Islamic
learning. Subsequently, several books of fiqh (that is, on Hanafi
fiqh, of course), were compiled according to need.66
The Mughals were staunch Hanafi Turks from Central Asia.
Under them, the Hanafi school of thought continued to flourish.
Fatãw Bãhuri, a Hanafl manual compiled in 1519, was a token of
Babur's attachment to the Hanafi juristic school of thought.67
Akbar's eclecticism did not penetrate the legal and judicial
practices, in spite of the changes that he introduced in his
administration. During Awrangzeb's reign (1658-1707) one of the
largest Flanafi manuals, Fatãwà 4lam1ri (known in the Arab world as
Fatäwl Hindiyyah), was compiled under his direction by a group of
leading jurists in the years 1664-1672.
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Hanafism was the only religious law that applied to the
Sunnis who constituted a majority of the Muslims during the latter
part of the Mughal period. But a trend, setting aside jurist's
opinion in favour of the I2adis, began to develop because of the
emphasis given to the had.is studies by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762).
From the very beginning of Muslim rule in South Asia,
fiqh constituted a main focus of the 'ulainã's pursuits; and it seems
to have over-ruled the I)adis at certain times, as experienced by
the eminent süfl Nizm-ud-din Awliyã 68 ' The hadls texts were not
readily available to the scholars and students of the Sharfah.
Shaykh 'Abdul Haq Dihiawi (1551-1642) introduced hadis studies by
making compendia and writing commentaries on llishkät-ul-Masãbih,
the hadis classic. But the efforts of Shaykh bdul Hag did not
result in a movement to advance hadis studies.
Shah Waliullah's writings on a variety of subjects
initiated a movement to reform the Muslim society in South Asia,
which had religious as well as political dimensions.	 We shall
discuss the political aspect of the movement in Chapter 2, but in
order to trace the schism among the Sunnis we consider here the
reformatory aspect of the Jihäd (holy war) movement under Sayyid
Ahmad Barelwi's leadership.
	 One of its main objectives was to
eliminate those practices prevalent among Muslims that were
believed to be contrary to the injunctions contained in the Qurán
and the Sunnah. Shah Ismã'il (1781-1831), the grandson of Shah
Waliullah and a spokesman of the J.ihäd movement, was a scholar of
Islainics. 69 	 A number of books in Arabic, Persian and Urdu,
criticising the beliefs and practices of the masses not in
conformity with the Islamic tenets, were written by him. 	 His
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books,	 and especially the most circulated 	 one	 i.e.
Tagwi yat-ul-Imãn, became a source of heated debate.	 Refutations
and counter-refutations based on it still continue to be added to
the polemical literature.
	 Shah Ismäil and other writers of his
viewpoint criticised the excessive veneration of pious persons,
devotion to shrines, attribution to his messengers and others of
the qualities wholly characteristic of God. Strict tawhid (oneness
of God) was the message carried by the movement, and anything which
was not practised by the Prophet or his companions was absolutely
bidh (innovation), no matter who . introdticed it and for how long it
had continued in practice.
The advocates of Islam popular in South Asia accused Shh
Ismàil and his associates of being unduly influenced by the Wahhãh'i
movement of Arabia. There was a strong bias against the Wahhãbis
in South Asia as they had turned against the Ottomans. The beliefs
and practices attributed to Muhammad B, 'Abdul Wahhb (1703-1787),
the founder of the movement, by the official Ottoman 'ulamã,1
depicted him as one who destroyed Islam. 	 With the circulation of
such views, when the reformers - Shah Ismã 'il and his associates -
were dubbe4 'Wahhábis', the masses became reluctant to listen to
them. On the other hand, neither the writings of Muhammad B. 'Abdul
Wahhäb, nor any impartial study of his movement was available in
South Asia at the time.	 The opposition to these reformers was so
great that they were unable to influence the masses. 	 They were
wrongly referred to as Wahhãbis, 7 ° but the label so firmly stuck
to them that such British colonial policy makers as W.W. Hunter71
and others used it unquestioningly.
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As a result of the controversy over the writings of Shah
Ismà'il and his followers, the Sunnis of South Asia became divided
into the reformers and the propagators of the popular Islam. 	 Both
these schools of thought developed in the South Asian environment.
1. Deobandis
A larger group of the reformers (who had retained their
affiliation to Hanafism, and tasawwuf as well), founded a rnadrasah
(later known as Där-ui-'ulüm) on 15 !luharram 1283 A.H./1866 at
Deoband. 72
	Among the founders of the Där-ui-'uiüm were I:Iáfiz ¶Abid
Husayn (d.1913), Mawlänã Mahtab 'All and Shaykh Nihl Aimad. 	 But,
the men who shaped the policy of the Där-ui-'uiüm were two old
friends - Rashld Ahinad Gangohi (1828-1905) and Muhammad Qásim
Nãnawtawi (1832-1880).
The Dir-ui -'uiüm had its modest beginnings in the old
Chhattah Hasjid under a spreading pomegranate tree.	 By
coincidence, the first teacher and the first pupil were both named
'Mahmüd'.	 Mulla Mahmüd was the teacher, and Mahmüd Hasan was the
pupil. The latter subsequently became the madrasah's most famous
teacher and was commonly known as Shaykh-ui -Hind.
Within half a century, the Dir-ui -'ul urn became a central
religious institution for the Muslims of the whole of South Asia.
The 'tilarni'of Deoband established a system of branch madrasahs in
the North Western Provinces, with the common goal of the
propagation of the faith for which the 'uiarnã'were to be trained.
By 1880, there were 15 madrasahs in the North Western Provinces,
affiliated to Deoband. 73
 The largest and most successful of these
was the Hazihar-i-'uiüm (Saharanpur).	 In size and reputation, it
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was to be second only to Deoband itself in the whole of South
Asia. 74 It was founded only six months after the madrasah at
Deoband (1866).	 The Mazãhar-i-'ulüm was modelled on Deoband.
Mawlãria Ahmad A1i Sahranpuri, a well-known scholar of hadis and
publisher, who had taught many Deobandi 'iiiamã was the first
'sarparast' (rector) of the madrasah. Upon his death, Rashid Abmad
Gangohi became the sarparast. He had already held a similar
position at Deoband.
The 'u1am'of Deoband, not necessarily taught at Deoband,
but sharing their views, were strict adherents of Hanafi fiqh, and
were inducted into one or the other of the süfi orders.	 They
propagated hadis studies with special emphasis on Hanafi fiqh.
Even in writing the commentaries on hadi classics, they tried
their best to authenticate the practices of Hanafism.	 At the same
time, they struggled to purify popular Islam from the un-Islamic
practices which had crept into it.
2. Ahl-i-Hadis
A smaller group of reformers believed that they should
not give strict adherence to any particular juristic school of
thought.	 Shah Waliullah had accepted some of the rulings of Mälik
B. Anas contrary to AbÜ Hanifah in respect of the offering of
obligatory prayers.	 Shah Waliullah was interested in the
propagation of the hadis text NUWattä (compiled by Imãm Nãlik). He
contributed two commentaries - Husawwa and Nussaf (the former in
Arabic and the latter in Persian) - on it. 	 He accepted the
practice of raising hands (raf'-ul-yadayn) before and after every
rakü' (position of bowing down) in daily prayer. Shah Ismil, the
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grandson of Shah Waliullah, wrote a booklet which emphasised this
practice.	 A large section of the 'ulamä,' involved in the Jihãd
movement of Sayyid Ahinad, began to practise it, Nawb Siddiq Hasan
Khãn (1833-1889) and Nair Husayn of Delhi (1810-1902) gave this
group an intellectual basis.	 Its distinctive view was not to
adhere strictly to any juristic school of thought, and it was
therefore known as ghayr-muqallid ( non-adherents).	 Nevertheless
the group chose for itself the title of Ahl-i-Hadls (i.e., the
followers of hadis).
Until the turn of the 19th century, this group did not
constitute itself into a separate sub-sect with its own mosques.
It was considered a part of a larger reform movement, although with
its own viewpoint regarding Hanafism. 	 In the early part of the
20th century, two 'ulamã'from the Punjab - Muhanunad Husayn Batãlawi
(1840-1920) and Sanãullah Amritsari (1870-1948) - gave the group a
specific character and identity through their organising skills and
scholarship.
3. Ahl-i-Qurãn
At the beginning of the 20th century, Ahl-i-Qurän emerged
as a group.	 Ahl-i-Hadis claimed to follow the hadls and not be
bound by the juristic deductions of the established schools. 	 The
new group went a step further and rejected the vast literature of
had.is.	 According to them, the only authority to be obeyed was the
Qurän.	 A number of 'ulamã'accepted the idea and tried to guide
society, but they were unable to agree among themselves on the
question of why one is bound to a certain interpretation of the
Qurän put forward by an 'aiim when he is not at all bound to follow
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the interpretation of the Prophet himself? Their attempts to find
rational proof for the fundamentals of Islam (shahãdah, salãt,
zakãh, sawm and hajj) in all their minute detail from the Qurãn (as
practised by the ummah) were derided by those who had a basic
knowledge of the Arabic language. The novel interpretations of the
Qurän aroused some interest in the modern educated sections of
society, but carried no conviction to those who had already
accepted the idea. The Ahl-i-Qurän, under different names, worked
especially in the Punjab but could never command a strong
following.
The place of hadis in Islam had been a subject of
controversy.	 Scholars who wished to interpret Islam liberally,
always negated the importance of hadls, as the hadis literature
leaves no room for unorthodox interpretations. In the recent past,
Ghulãm A1?mad Parwez was an outstanding spokesman of this school
which does not take hadis as a source of Islamic law.	 Though
Parwez did not support the interpretations of Ahl-i-Qurän, he in
effect thoroughly propagated the spirit behind their ideology.
Ahl-i-Qurän received no support from any section of the 'ulamã' in
contemporary Pakistan.
4. Bareiwis
Another section of the Sunnis is known as Bareiwis.	 The
name is derived from an 'aiim Mawlãn Amad Razã Khãn (1856-1921) of
Bans Bareilly (Barabanki district, Uttar Pradesh, India) who gave
it coherence intellectually and socially as a distinct group. 	 He
was brought up in an atmosphere of bitter opposition to the
reformers, i.e. Ahi-i-Hadis and Deobandls. His father, Naqi Ali
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Khãn (d.1880), was an opponent of the reformers. 	 Among his
writings there exists a refutation of Taqwiyat-ul-Imán of Shah
Ismil. He attacked the views of Shah ismãfl on the issue of
.imkãn-i-nazlr (possibility of the existence of an equivalent to
Muhammad) in another treatise (published in 1876).75
Ahmad Razã Khän was a prolific writer. A large number of
books and tracts on jurisprudence, theology, ethics and other
Islamic sciences are to his credit, but his real interest was in
strictly adhering to the Hanafi school of thought and in staunchly
opposing the reformers. 	 He did not like to co-operate with the
fellow 'ulamã'of other schools of thought, even in matters which
were outside the realm of theological controversy.	 He was among
the i1am'who gathered at the platform of Nadwat_ul_'ulan(a76 (April
1894) but soon launched an attack against the movement. 	 The
presence of modern educated people in the ranks of the movement
provided him with an easy opportunity to discredit it as a
political gimmick of the followers of Sayyid Alunad Khan.
	
At the
same time, he felt uneasy working with the 'ularnã' who were not
giving any importance to the differences between the Ah1-i-jadis
and the Hanafis. 77 He issued fatwis against the reformers, wrote
letters, engaged in debates and sent his associates and students to
debate as well.	 He left no stone unturned to discredit the
reformers in front of the masses. By the turn of the 19th century,
he had gathered a group of adherents around him who made his
writings a touchstone for judging whether or not a particular
belief or practice was in conformity with the doctrines of Sunnism.
The followers of Ahmad Razá Khän claimed to be so true to Sunnism
that they identified themselves as the Ah1-us-Sunnah-w-Jamâh
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In 1902, Mawlänã Aimad Raz Khãn declared four leading
Deobandi 'ularnã'- Rashid A1?mad Gangohi, Muhammad Qãsim Nãnawtawl,
Khalil Ahmad Anibethaw and Ashraf 'All Thãnwi. - as kãfirs
(infidels), assigning some un-Islamic beliefs to them. 78	Three
years later, during a hajj visit, he obtained counter-signatures of
35 scholars in Makkah and Madinah to his fatwa' as proof of his
right judgement concerning the Deobandis. A new version of his
earlier fatwa, along with comments from these scholars, was
published under the title of Hisäin-ul-Harama yri (19'l?	 Ttti	 s
complemented by another collection of similar fatwas with a view
to discrediting the Deobandi 'ulam.E Out of the four Deobandi 'ulamã'
who became targets of Akunad Raz Khãn's wrath, two were still
alive. The Deobandis approached the scholars of Makkah and Madinah
to clarify their positiofl.80 They raised the question as to why
the 'izlamä'of Makkah and Madinah did not hesitate to countersign the
fatwa of Ahinad Razã Khän, when they were unable to check the
references of the Urdu writings of the accused 'izlamã'in question?
Perhaps it was sufficient for them to know that the accused were
alleged to be Wahhbis - the followers of Muhammad B. 	 bdul Wahhãb
(who were the political opponents of their masters, the Ottomans).
The estrangement, produced by the fatwà between the Deobandis and
the Barelwis continued and their bitter animosity appeared in the
political sphere as well.
On taking a close look at the policies of Mawlnã A1inad
Razä Khãn, it would appear that he wanted to preserve Islam
unchanged; not Islam as it was idealised in the Qurän and the
Sunnah, but Islam that had evolved through centuries in the South
Asian context. The following beliefs and practices of the Bareiwis
distinguish them from the reformers - Deobandis and Ah1-i-1jadi:
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1. The Prophet was created from light; therefore, he
threw no shadow. He was human, but his humanity was
not like that of others. He was and continues to be
omni-present and all-observant, even after his
worldly life.
2. The Prophet had the knowledge of ma kãna w ma yakün
(each and every thing which had been and which would
be).
3. The celebration of the Prophet's birthday - milãd,
with the rituals evolved in South Asian context.
4. The saints after their death can hear and their
powers of tasarruf (control over world) and karãmat
(miracle) continue as they had in their lifetime.
They are alive in body even after death, they are
just out of sight. They could be approached for
help, by visiting their tombs and from any other
place as well.
On account of the reverence that the great silfis and
pious persons command, emphasis is placed on
visiting their shrines which are centres of ardent
devotion.	 The furs (annual death ceremony) is
observed for a süfi.	 The grave is usually covered
with cloth and flowers are offered.	 The tombs are
illuminated.
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5.	 Making of na_zar (votive offering) in the name of
süfis and pious people is lawful.
The Barelwis enjoy support largely among the rural and
poorly educated masses, who practise popular Islam.
1.5.4	 Comparison of the Sunnis' Sub-sects
Among the three sub-sects of the Sunnis, the Barelwis
constitute the overwhelming majority, the second largest group
being the Deobandis.	 Ahl-i-Hadis constitute the smallest Sunnl
sub-sect. Though all the three sub-sects are running their own
religious institutions (mosques, madrasahs, etc.), the most active
among these are the .Deobandis. The Deobandi u1amáe have several
organisations in the specific field of religious activity. 	 The
'u1amã with their own special predilections, join these. 	 A few
such organisations are briefly described below:
1) Tab1Igh3.Jamaat (Party for Preaching of Islain)(TJ)
Mawlãnã Mubammad Ilyás (1885-1944),	 a süfl-'álim of
Deobandi-orientation, founded the Tabliqhl Jamà'at (TJ) organisation
in 1926 for the propagation of the faith in Mewat.	 The
organisation's mission was to give a call to the Muslims to pursue
the knowledge and practice of the fundamentals of Islam. With the
passage of time TJ propagated its message beyond the confines of
South Asia. According to the policy of TJ, preaching is not linked
to a deep study of Islamic learning.	 It is a duty of a Muslim to
convey the message of Islam however little he knew of it. 	 People
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in groups, duly controlled by a Tablighi centre, would go from
door to door, inviting fellow Muslims to perform the basic
religious fundamental practices and to join the mission.
TJ's workers have no interest in the theological
differences among Muslims. 	 There are no political discussions
among the preaching groups. It is basically an apolitical movement
which is open to all Muslims.
	 As in India and Bangladesh, it is
also quite successful in its appeal in Pakistan.8°
2) Najlis-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i-Na.buwwat (Society for the
Protection of Finality of the Prophethood [of Muhammad])
This organisation (founded in Multan, 13 December 1954)
follows the sole aim of making people aware of the dangers of
A4!imadiyyah (Ahmadism).	 Through speeches, pamphlets, posters and
dialogues with Ahmadis,	 its full-time workers/czlama' campaign
against the Ahmadiyyah.
3) Tanzim Ahl-i-Sunnat (Organisation of Sunnis)
This organisation (founded on 12 December 1943) is
especially influential in those areas in which the Shi'ah community
is seen as posing a threat to the influence of the Sunnls.	 Its
74•
preachers, well-versed in Shiah theology, usually lecture on issues
that differentiate the Sunnis from the Shifhs.
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4) Jam'iyat-i-Ishä 't-ut-Tawhid-Was-Sunnah (Association
for the Propagation of One-ness of Allah and the Sunnah)
The sole purpose of this organisation is to revive the
Sunnah and to implore Muslims not to follow anything which has no
proof from the Qurãn and the Sunnah.	 In short, it upholds the
teachings of Shah Isml and his followers in a 20th century
context.
The relative dynamism of the religious sects and
sub-sects can also be gauged by the number of madrasahs controlled
by each of them. Table 1.1 shows the number of madrasahs against
each sect and sub-sect in the years 1959-60 and 1971.
Table 1.1 shows that the Deobandis were running almost 50
per cent of the madrasahs (233 out of 472, 49.35 per cent) in
1959-60.	 During the interval of 11 years, the Shihs and the
Ahl-i-Hadis lost eight and three madrasahs respectively.
Deobandis added 58 more to their strength and their share of the
total number of the madrasahs increased further (291 out of 563;
51.58 per cent). Even in 1971 the Deobandis were in control of a
greater number of madrasahs than the Bareiwis, the largest group of
the gunnls.
Not only are the Deobandi religious periodicals more
numerous, but the subject matter that they cover and their
presentation are better than the periodicals published by other
sects/sub-sects.
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Table 1.1
Sect-wise number of madrasahs in 1959-60 and 1971
Sect!
	
Number	 Number	 Increase or Decrease
sub-sect	 of	 of	 in Number over a
Hadrasahs	 Nadrasahs	 period of 11 years
1959-60	 1971
Bareiwis	 98	 124	 26 (26.5%)
Deobandis	 233	 291	 58 (24.9%)
Ahl-i-Hadis	 55	 47	 -8 (-14.5%)
Shi'ahs	 18	 15	 -3 (-16.7%)
without
specific	 68	 86	 18 (26.5%)
affiliation
TOTAL	 472	 563	 91 (19.2%)
[Source: Ahmad, Hâfiz Nazar, Jã'izah-i-Pfadãz'is-i-4ra.biyyah
Islãi'n.i yyah Macthribi Pakistan (Lyallpur: JamTh Chishtiyyah Trust,
1960), pp.796-811; Alimad, Hãfiz Naar, Jã'izah Jladãras-i-'Arabiyyah
Nacthribi Pakistan (2) (Lahore: Muslim Academy, 1972), p.688]
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Deobandis are more active than Others in the spheres of
organisation and communication. Though individual voters are not
unduly influenced by religious/sectarian affiliation, Deobandis and
Ah1-i-Jadis are better placed than the Barelwls to persuade their
followers to vote according to their sub-sects because of their
superior organisation.
1.6 The Madrasah Education Curriculum
The 'ularnä'go through a process 'of study and examination,
originally formulated during the medieval period. The curriculum
followed in the madrasahs of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
(including the Där-ul-'ulüm at Deoband) is known as Dars-i-Nizãznl.
It was drawn up by Nul1 Nizm-ud-din Sihà1w1 82 (d.1748), a leading
'aiim during the reign of of Awrangzeb; and was consistent with the
curriculum developed in South Asia over a long period of time.83
Originally, Dars-i-Nizárnl consisted of 11 subjects with texts
prescribed for each, as shown in column 2 of Table 1.2.
	
With the
passage of time, some other subjects were also included, whilst
texts prescribed earlier were deleted and new ones were added. The
curriculum nowadays consists of 16 subjects with the text books
shown in column 3 of Table 1.2.
The Shi'ah madrasahs follow different texts for fiqh,
usüi-i-fiqh, hadis, usüi-i-hadis and tafsir since the Dars-i-Nizãmi
is basically designed for the madrasahs of the Sunnis.	 The Sh1hs
interpret their beliefs and practices according to their own
standard texts.
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Table 1.2
The Curriculum of Hadrasahs, as prescribed by
Nizãm-ud-din Sihlwi and the present curriculum
Subjects	 Books prescribed	 Books included in
by Nizãjn-ud-din	 the present day
curriculum
1	 2	 3
Sarf	 Hizan, Hunsha'ib	 Hizãn, Hunsha'.zJ,
Conjugation and ?arf-i-Hir, Panj Ganj, Sarf-i-Hir,Panj Ganj,
Declension)	 Zubdah, Fusül-i-	 Zubdah, Fusül-i-
Akbari	 Akhari, .DastUr-ul-
Hubtadi, 'Ilm-us-Sighah
Shfiah
Nahw	 Nahw-i-Nir, Sharab	 Nahw-i-Hir, Sharah
(Grammar and	 Hi'atah 'l4mil, Hiday- 	 Mi'atah 'Amil, Hiday
Syntax)	 at-un-Nahw, Kãfiah,	 at-un-Nahw, Käf.iah,
Sharah-i-Járnl 	 Sharah-i-Järnl
Han tiq	 Sughra', Kubra',lsaghawji, Sughrà', Kubri,
(Logic)	 Tahzib-ul -Han tiq, 	 isaghawjL
Sharah Tahzib, Qutbi, 	 Hizän-ul-Hantiq,
Hir Qutbi, Sullam-ul-	 Tahzib-ul-Hantiq,
'ulüm	 Shara-i :Tah!ib,
QuIbi, Hir Qutbi,
Hullä Hasan,Hamdullah,
Qãzi Hubärak, Risalah
Hir Zâhid, Hullä Jalãl
Hikmat	 Hebzl, ,adrã, Shams-i- Hebzl, qadrã, Shams-i-
(Philosophy)	 Bazighah	 Bãzighah
Riyäzi-w-Hayat Khulãsat-ul-Hisäb, 	 Khu1ã.at-u1-Ijisãb,
(Mathematics)	 Tahrir Uqlaydas, 	 Tahrir Uqlay&is
Risalah-i-Qawshajiyyah, (Naqãiah-i -üla')
Sharah-i -Chaghmini	 Tashrll?-ul -Afläk,
(Báb Awwal)	 Tasrih, Sharah-i-
Chaghmini
Balãghat	 Hukhtasar-al-Ha 'ãnl, 	 Hukhtasar-al-Ha 'ãni,
(Rhetoric)	 Huawwa1 (up to ma aná Hutawwal
qultu)
Fiqh	 Sharah-i -Waqäyah,	 Khu1ä.ah-i-Kaydãni,
(Jurisprudence)	 Hid.yah	 Nür-ul-izah, Hunyat-ul-
Hussali, Qudüri,
Kanz-ud-daqã 'iq,
Sharah-i - Waqäyah,
Hi däyah
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Table 1.2 (contd)
The Curriculum of Hadrasahs, as prescribed by
Nizain-ud-din Sihaiwi and the present curriculum
Subjects	 Books prescribed	 Books included in
by Nizam-ud-din	 the present day
curriculum
1	 2	 3
Usül-i-Fiqh	 Nür-ul-Anwir, Tawz.ih 	 Usül-ush--shãshi, Nür-
(Principles of
	
Talwih, Mussallarn-	 ul-Anwãr, Husäini,
Jurisprudence)	 us-Sabüt	 Tawzih Talwih,
Mussallam-us-Sabüt
Kaläm	 Sharah-i--'Aqä'id-i-	 Shara-iAqa 'id-i-
(Scholastic	 Nasafi, Shara.i-i-	 Nasafi, Khayalr,
Theology)	 'Aqa'id-i-Jalãli,	 M.ir Zähid
M.ir Zãhid, Sharah-i-
Mawãqif
Tafs.ir	 Ja11ayn, Bayzawl	 Jalälayn, Bayzãwi
(Exegesis
of Quran)
Had.is	 Mishkät-u1-NasbTh	 al-Sai2ih-ul-Bukhãri,
(Traditions of	 al-Sahih-ul-Muslim,
the Prophet)	 Jarni'Tarmazi, Sunan
Jib! Däwüd, Sunan
Nisã'i, Sunan Ibi-i-
Mãjah, Muwwattä
(Imãzn Hãlik)
Farãz	 -	 Siräji
(Distribution of
inheritance
Munäzarah	 -	 Rashldiyyah
(Science of
debate
Usül -i -Hadis	 -	 Sharah-i -Nukhba t- ul -
(Principles of	 Fikr
the Traditions)
Usffl-i-Tafslr	 -	 al-Fawz-ul-Kab.ir
Adab	 -	 Nafichat-ul--Yaman,
(Literature)	 Mu 'a11aqât-us-sabah,
Diwãn-ul-Nutanabbi,
Maqämãt (HarIrl),
Hamasah
[Source:	 Rhi, Akhtar,	 Tazkirah-i-Musaniffin-i-Dars-i-Nizârn!
(Lahore: Naktahah-i-Rahrnãniyyah, 1978), pp.7-15]
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The following shortcomings of the curriculum of the
madrasahs are striking.
1. Arabic is the language of the Qurän and the Sunnah. A
number of books on Arabic grammar, conjugation and
declension are included in the curriculum but the
students remain unable even to write a few sentences
correctly.	 So far as the texts on literature are
concerned, it seems that the texts are selected to
increase the vocabulary of the students rather than to
develop their literarj qa1it'j.	 t
significant that no text from modern literature is
included.
2.	 The texts on philosophy and logic, produced during
the medieval period are out of date.
3.	 The texts on fiqh are selected solely from the
Hanafi literature.	 The contribution of other schools of
thought is not touched upon. The result is a strict
adherence to the Hanafism.
4.	 The social sciences (economics, political science,
sociology, history, etc.) are not studied at all. 	 There
is not even an introduction to the pure sciences, i.e.
chemistry, physics, biology, etc.
5.	 The comparative study of religions is not a part of
the curriculum.
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6.	 English or any other European language is not taught
on the premises of madrasahs.
To make the curriculum appropriate, according to the
needs of the day, efforts have been made from the last quarter of
the 19th century. Nadwat-u1u1ama'adopted a revised form of the
Dars-i--Nizãnii, but it could not persuade the majority of the 'ulamä'
to give up the traditional curriculum. 	 With the passage of time,
even Nadwat-ul-'ulamã' had to water down its initial scheme of
reform.	 Dãr-ul-'ulüm Nadwat-ul-'ulamãs only contribution was to
develop a taste for Arabic language and literature, and some of the
well-established madrasahs are following the pattern set by it in
this direction.
Several attempts, on an academic level as well as on the
official level, have been made to improve the syllabus of the
madrasahs, but nothing has been achieved due to the attitude of the
'ulamä	 A Shaykh-ul-Hadis (the teacher of had.is) in a Deobandi
madrasah rejected the idea of including new subjects in the
curriculum. He wrote:
There is a type of madrasah which combines the
religious and worldly Arabic/English education
The founders of these rnadrasahs aimed to
make use of the worldly education along with
the religious one. So Nadwat-u1-u1amä' at
Lucknow was established for this very reason.
The texts of the religious subjects were
greater in number than the texts of the worldly
subjects in the syllabus, so that the din
(religion) might be dominant, and the dunyã
(worldly subjects) subordinate. But the net
result of these madrasahs is neither the
achievement of din nor of mundane affairs. The
money of Muslims earned through hard labour was
wasted in supporting such madrasahs.84
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The most recent attempt to modernise the curriculum of
the madras.hs is embodied in the Report of a Committee consisting
of the 'ulamä'and scholars with modern education. 85 But, it was
rejected by the 'ulamã86 and this exercise proved to be as futile as
the previous ones.
	
While the 'u1arnã"s approach to curriculum has
been static, they have shown vigour in setting up madrasahs,
establishing central control over them, and in mobilising an
effective system of funding for the buildings as well as for
teaching and equipping the libraries.	 Before the emergence of
Pakistan, there were 137 madrasahsin the area covered by it. 	 The
'ulamä' migrated to Pakistan from the Muslim minority provinces of
India and established many madrasahs in Pakistan. Within a period
of three years (1947-50), the number of madrasahs in Pakistan rose
to 210.	 After a decade (in 1961),	 the total number of madrasahs
was 401. In 1971 a total figure of 563 was reached.87
The madrasahs are generally affiliated to the federations
of the schools of thought that they represent.	 The Shihs,
Deohandis, Barelwls and Ahl-i-Hadis have their separate federations
of the madrasahs which are responsible for suggesting syllabi and
for unifying the examination system.
All these madrasahs are run through the voluntary
contributions of the public and the obligatory tiths-zak.It, fitrah
and 'zshr under the injunction of the Qurän and the Sunnah.
1.7	 Conclusion
The 11an1ã'occupy a unique position in Muslim society due
to their Islamic learning, piety and the religious services
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rendered by them. They have always enjoyed respect among the
Muslim masses.	 On account of their influence over the people,
their importance was recognised by the Muslim rulers of South Asia.
The 'u1am	 as guardians of Sharih, had been affiliated to the
organs of state power; but, their role remained peripheral in
political affairs.
	 Whenever a ruler openly defied established
religious practices and followed a policy of suppressing the 'ulamä
he had to face stiff resistance. 	 And, on certain occasions, the
'ularnä' proved to be so strong that the state had to change its
policy in order to placate them. 	 Under colonial rule in South
Asia, the 'iilamä'were no longer affiliated to state organs.	 Their
role became confined to the preservation of the Muslim faith and
culture on the one hand, and to resistance to the colonial rulers
on the other.
In the context of South Asian Muslim history, the 'ulamã'
had never been hierarchically organised. They are bound together
on the basis of common sectarian beliefs or of student-teacher
relationships.	 In the absence of a hierarchy, the Sunni 'ulamã'
often find themselves in disagreement on several issues; and,
different stands on the issue are justified by different groups.
In spite of such diversity of approach, the 'ulamâ'are united in
their determination to uphold Sharih. In this sense, they share a
common attitude on the problems facing society. By orientation and
conviction, they would like to seek solution of economic, social
and political problems in Sharih, as interpreted by classical
jurists, strictly in accordance with the traditions of the Prophet.
During the second half of the 19th century, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khãn's
theological approach under the rubric of 'Islamic Modernism' was
opposed by the 'ularnä'of all shades of opinion. 	 Similarly, Mirz
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Ghulm Ahmad Qãdiyanl, the founder of Ahmad.iyyah, was uniformly
opposed by the 'u1amã
In Pakistan, the Sunni'ularnä' played a more significant
role than their Shia'h counterparts. And, among the Sunnls, the
g	 -,Deoband.z ulania have been more vocal than the Barelwi and
Ahl-i-Hadis 'uiamä	 The '1am'control a large network of mosques
and madrasahs throughout the country. This network is, by and
large, beyond the reach of the state. Therefore the ¶.zlamä'are more
or less free to express their views.
The 'ulamä'exercise considerable influence on the Muslim
masses, and especially on the lower and middle classes of the
society. The upper stratum of society is generally modern educated
and less responsive to religious appeals. 	 With the passage of
time, the 'ulamã especially since independence (1947), have been
able to penetrate the modern educated niiddle classes to a certain
degree, thus diluting the legacy of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khãn. 	 The
conflict between the 'izlainã'and the Islamic modernists is still
alive, with the middle classes playing a major role on both sides.
The 'ulamä'are regarded as experts in matters of Sharih, but their
credentials are challenged on issues of a political nature such as
the economy, banking and commerce, and foreign relations. The
curriculum of madrasah education does not include these subjects
which would provide an understanding of the contemporary world.
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p.380].
al-Fatir: 28 so only
those of His servants fear God who have knowledge.
Ibid., p.447].
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CHAPTER 2
THE INDIAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM: 1803-1947
In order to understand the political role of the 'ulamã'in
Pakistan, it is essential to study the nature and characteristics
of their participation in politics during the period of struggle
for freedom. The ru1amãs role during that period continues to be a
source of inspiration to succeeding generations. At the same time,
the roots of the divisions among the 'ulamã' stretch back to the 19th
century.
2.1	 The 'Ulamã"s Response to East India Company Rule
With the death of Awrangzeb (d.1707), the Mughal Empire
rapidly disintegrated into petty autonomous regions.	 Political
forces emerging on the periphery of the 11ughal Kingdom (e.g., the
militant Narathas, Jãts and Sikhs) turned into serious threats to
the decadent Mughal rule. Apart from these politicised groups, the
East India Company (EIC), already increasingly implicated in
Bengal's affairs and exercising control over the administration,
matured into a political power.
	
It is worth noting that Muslim
intellectuals did not grasp the situation and took no notice of the
Company's increasing involvement during the early stages of its
penetration.	 A leading intellectual of the time, Shah Waliullh
considered the Marathas as the strongest threat to Muslim rule. In
view of that he invited Ahmad Shh Durrãni (1747-1773), the ruler
of Afghanistan, to invade India in order to crush the emerging
power of the !larathas. 1 Durni attacked India and defeated
Narathas (the Third Battle of Panipat:	 1761).	 But the Mughal
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rulers had by then become too enfeebled to consolidate their
position after Durrâni's success. The resulting political vacuum
was filled by EIC.
By the end of the 18th century, the collapse of the
Mughal rule was almost complete. All the Hindu Rãjs had become
independent and Shãh'Alam II (d.1806), the Mughal ruler, was a
pensioner of the Marathas. The Sikhs were the rulers of the
Punjab. EIC, with the consolidation of its power in Bengal, moved
to expand its territories, and the Naràthas were successfully
driven out from Delhi (1803). 	 EIC let the name and shadow of Shah
'Alaxn, the Mughal ruler, continue in existence, but assumed de facto
control of the Mughal state from 1803 onwards.
Control of EIC over political power made Shah ¶Abdul AZIZ2
(1746-1824) issue a fatwà, declaring India dãr-ul-harh, a territory
of war. 3
 Most of the followers of Shah 'Abdul Azlz sought in the
fatwa'a source of legitimacy for jihãd4 against the usurpers with a
view to re-establishing Muslim rule, albeit Shah 'Abdul Aziz himself
gave no call to military action, or to emigration from the
territories under EIC's occupation. 	 He wanted the Muslims to
recognise that the political power of the state was no longer in
the hands of the Muslim rulers. He did not suggest abandoning the
congregational prayers on Friday and 'Ids which were, under the
classical juristic interpretation, not obligatory in dãr-ul-harb.
He allowed his co--religionists to learn the English language and to
take employment under EIC so long as they did not, thereby, commit
'mdsiyat-i-kubrà' (grave disobedience), by fighting against their
Muslim brethren.
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The subsequent religious-political movements, initiated
by Hãji Shari'atulläh (1781-1840) and Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi
(1782-1831) upheld the view that India was dãr-ul-harb. The
movement of Hájl Shari'atullãh, started in (circa.) 1820, is
popularly known as the Farà'izl movement, 5 because of its emphasis
on the observance of the obligatory religious functions - farã'iz
(plural of farlzah). The Farä'izi leaders instructed their
followers not to observe public prayers on Fridays and 'Ids since
these prayers ceased to be obligatory due to the disappearance of
Muslim rule.	 In spite of this clear stand, the Farä'izis did not
resort to armed struggle and were busy reviving the pristine purity
of Islam among the Muslims of Bengal. Haji Sharitullãh was
succeeded by his son Muhsin-ud-din Ahinad alias Düdü Miyan
(1819-1862), who organised his followers into a well-knit and
powerful organisation. From 1838 onwards, the Farã'izi leaders
caine into conflict with the Hindu zamindãrs and European indigo
planters in an attempt to uphold the rights of the Farä'izi
peasants.
The movement started by Sayyid Ahntad in the early 1820s,
known as the Jihãd movement, explicitly regarded India as
dãr-ul -barb. 6 His armed struggle was initially directed against
the Sikhs in the Punjab which he intended to extend to EIC. With
the death of Sayyid Ahinad Bareiwi in 1831 while fighting against
the Sjkh forces, the first phase of the movement was brought to a
close.	 It subsequently went underground in territories under EIC
control. The remnants of the movement continued guerrilla warfare
on the north west frontier for a long time afterwards. 7 Mir Niár
di alias TItü Mr (1782-1831), a disciple of Sayyid Abniad, devoted
himself to the Jihd movement in Bengal.
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The 1857 Insurrection8 was the last military effort to
get rid of the EIC's rule. 	 It was not solely based on a religious
call but,	 undoubtedly,	 religion was a strong factor which
aggravated the situation.	 The 'ulamã' adopted the stance that
opposition to EIC's rule was a matter of religious duty to be
performed without regard to any other interest. Mawlãnã Alynadulläh
Shah Madrãsi (1817-1858), 'the maulvie of Fyzabad' 9 was the leading
figure in the Insurrection, who 'fought manfully, honestly, (and]
stubbornly in the field against the strangers' 10 who had forcibly
taken possession of his country. The tni,1arnaprovided a political
basis and a philosophy for the Insurrection by issuing fatwa's which
were then in circulation. 1 ' The Shi'ahs, led by Hazrat Mahal joined
the Sunni' 'ülamä'in a declaration of jihäd12 against EIC's rule.
Hji Imdadullah (1817-1899) organised jihãd in the district
headquarters of Shamli. The mujãhid forces were commanded by Háfiz
Zamin 'All who had the support of YiawXän 	 iamma O.m
and Mawlãnâ Rashid Ahmad Gangohi.' 3 Similarly, other centres of
the Insurrection also received support from the 4ulamã
Rabmatullãh (Kairanah), Mawlãnãbdul Jall (Aligarh), MawlãnA
Liyaqat kiI (Allahabad), Muft'Inàyatl (Kakori), Kifãyat Ali
Kf I (Moradabad) and many others in Delhi gave active support to
the leaders of the Insurrection.14
The 1857 Insurrection failed. The last nominal Mughal
emperor was dethroned, and that was the end of even nominal
political control of India by Muslims.	 The Muslim community was
accused for its role in the Insurrection in an exaggerated manner.
It was characterised as having been 'more aggressive and militant,
possessing memories of recent rule in India and therefore more
dangerous' 15
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The effects of the Insurrection and its suppression were
registered in a strong manner in the ruling circles in Britain.
British policy-makers decided to place India directly under the
Crown in November 1858. Thenceforward, a Viceroy with an Executive
Council was entrusted with the task of administering the country.
2.2	 The Introduction of En glish Education
The most effective instrument shaping politics after 1857
was the system of education introduced by the colonial power. 	 The
attitude of the Hindu and Muslim communities (and different
sections within each) towards English education differed. 	 The
diversity of their attitudes and the inequalities between them of
their ability to benefit from English education led to sharp
conflicts.
During the period when EIC consolidated its power, the
Christian missionaries played a major role in introducing English
education. They thought that it would provide an effective means
of evangelisation. The Danish Lutheran missionaries established
two schools in Madras as early as 1717. 	 The activities of William
Carey (1761-1834) of the Baptist Missionary Society have been the
subject of a number of academic studies. 16 But, in spite of the
encouragement given them by the administration, the success of the
missionaries was never very great, as the local population was not
eager to acquire English education at the expense of its own
religion.	 The Muslims, especially, were apprehensive and the
activities of these missionaries were widely believed to be among
the causes of the 1857 Insurrection.17
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Unlike the missionaries,	 EIC had been engaged in
fostering education in the classical languages of Oriental
learning, i.e. Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. 	 From 1823 onwards,
the grant for the enhancement of learning was administered by a
Committee of Public Instruction, and the issue concerning the
appropriate system of education for India was brought under
examination.	 In the beginning, the supporters of classical
learning had their way. The situation changed when the advocates
of English education gained ascendancy.	 They held that English
education 'would make the Indian people gladly accept the British
rule'. 18	Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859) was an ardent
protagonist of English education and had pleaded in the House of
Commons before he came to India as Law member in 1834. He was
responsible for shaping the education policy in his capacity as
President of the Committee of Public Instruction in 1835.
We must at present do our best to form a class
who may be interpreters between us and the
millions whom we govern; a class of persons,
Indian in blood and colour, but English in
taste, in opinions, in morals and in
intellect. 19
Subsequently, British educational policy was directed
towards promoting western literature and values among the natives
of India. This decision was prompted by political, administrative
and economic compulsions. 	 The educational institutions in India
produced clerks and subordinate officials who cost much less than
their English counterparts.
In addition to the efforts of Christian Missions and EIC,
the Hindu reformers were also eager to promote English education.
The Vidyãlà or Hindu College of Calcutta (established in 1816) and
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Elphinstone College, Bombay (established in 1827) were among the
institutions founded by Hindu reformers.
While the Hindu upper class wholeheartedly devoted itself
to English education, the Muslims, on the whole, did not avail
themselves of the opportunity, because of their historical memory
as rulers of India.
Table 2.1 shows the number of students in 1845 in
educational institutions maintained at public cost.
Muslim students constituted only 23.2 per cent of the
total in North Western Provinces and Oudh, whilst the Muslim
population was over 30 per cent. In Bengal and Bihar, they
constituted only 12.9 per cent, far below their ratio of the total
population.	 In Bombay, Muslim students constituted only 2.7 per
cent of the total strength.
2.3	 Hindu Response to Western Liberalism
Hindu intellectuals responded to English education and
western liberal ideas broadly along three different lines.
The first response of a section of the Hindu elite
consisted of an outright rejection of those rites and customs of
Hindu society, which did not conform to Western doctrines. The
outstanding figure representing such an attitude was Rãjã Rain Mohan
Roy (1774-1833).	 He was born in a High Brahman (Kuhn) family and
started his career in the service of EIC where he attained the
status of sarrishtandãr to the Collector of Rangpur (Bengal).
	 He
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Table 2.1
The Number of Students in Educational Institutions by Religion
Maintained at Public Cost in 1845
Number of Students by Religious Affiliation
Presidency
Christian	 Hindu Muslim Others	 Total
North-Western	 82	 1,597	 507	 -	 2,186
Provinces & Oudh
Lower Provinces	 154	 4,186	 907	 1,789	 7,036
(Bengal & Bihar)
Bombay	 -	 7,916	 222	 -	 8,138
236	 13,699	 1,636	 1,789	 17,360
[Source: B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle_Classes (Delhi: Oxford
University Press,1978), p.409]
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retired when he was still young (1814) and settled down in
Calcutta.	 In the same year he started an association known as
'Atm.iyã Sabhà' which was critical of popular Hinduism, and stressed
the necessity of discarding customs contrary to the teachings
contained in the Upanishads.
In 1828, this organisation was re-christened 'Brahmo
Sabhã', and adopted a congregational form of worship with hymns,
prayers and scripture readings. The Brahmo Sabh observed none of
the practices of popular Hinduism (e.g., idol worship, Brahman
priesthood, the caste system and the widow burning or sati).	 Roy
was foremost among the protagonists of English education.	 With
Dwara Kanath Tagore (1794-1846), his principal associate, Ram Mohan
Roy played a major part in launching the Hindu College at Calcutta.
The medium of instruction in the College was English and several
members of the Tagore family were among the original pupils of the
College. Ram Mohan Roy believed English education to be the main
instrument for reform.
The Brahmo Sabh. continued to function after the death of
its founder.	 In 1843, Debendranath Tagore (1818-1905) renamed it
as Brahmo Sa.mãj. His leadership was, however, challenged by Keshab
Chunder Sen (1838-1884), a more westernised Bengali Brahrnan.	 A
split in the Sa.maj in 1878 was followed by its decline.
The Brahmo Samj, reformist in character, was never a
popular movement.	 It embraced middle-class Bengali families.
Brahrno Samajists were keen on English Education.
almost all the pioneers of the next
generation, whether in besieging the British
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stronghold of the Covenanted Service, or in
political agitation, journalism, or the law
were, if not Christians, Brahmo Samajists.2°
A similar movement known as the Prarthanã Samaj (society
for prayer), took root in Bombay, under the guidance of Dr. Atmaram
Pandurang (1823-1898), its founder, and M.G. Ranade (1842-1901).
The movement was so close to Brahmo Samäj in its programme of
religious and social reforms that there was a move to name it the
Bombay Brahmo Samäj.21
The second general response to English education
consisted, not of trimming popular Hinduism in accordance with
Western ideas, but rather to transform it from a passive way of
life into an assertive and aggressive missionary religion. 	 A
revivalist movement was thus given practical shape by Dayananda
Saraswati (1824-1883), a Gujarãti Brahman.	 He founded the Aryä
Samãj (society of the Aryans in 1875 in Bombay.	 Its main aim was
to revive Hinduism as embodied in the four Vedas.	 In Satyãrtjj
Prakãsh, 22 his major work, Saraswati vehemently attacked Islam and
Christianity on the one hand, and Hindu orthodoxy on the other.
Aryä Samãj branches were established in different parts
of the country, but its main stronghold was the Punjab where the
Hindu community had been less caste-ridden and more open-minded due
to its co-existence with a number of other socio-religious groups.
The Aryã Samàj creed included many of the tenets of
Brahmo Samäj. Like the latter, it condemned idol worship and
Brahman priesthood. The re-marriage of widows was commended and
people of other religions were admitted into the fold of the Samäj.
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The Aryi Sarnãj, in its devotion to English education, 'rivalled the
Christian missionaries in the number of [its] schools'.23
A third response to English education opposed both the
reformers and revivalists and favoured the status quo. Dharmã Sabhã
was founded (1830) in Bengal with such an aim of countering the
activities of Brahino Sabhã. Hindu Dharmã Vyayasthapakã Handali
emerged in the 1860s in Bombay and the Sanãtanä D_harmã Sabjjã was
organised in the Punjab with the aim of opposing the doctrines of
the Aryi Sarnäj.	 The Theosophical Society, founded in Madras,
pleaded for the preservation and fostering of Hinduism in its many
varieties and forms.
In addition to the aforementioned three positions of
BraIvno Samj, Aryä Samãj and the Orthodox/Conservatives, Sri
Rajnakrishna (1836-1886) was a particularly notable personality. He
was a mystic.	 Like Dayãnandã Sarswatl he personified the rebirth
of the Vedic age in the midst of increasing Westerrisation; but, in
contrast to Aryã Sa.rnäj's aggressive stand, he preached a faith of
selfless devotion to God and ultimate absorption in Him. His
thoughts were propagated with greater clarity and in the English
language by Narendrãnath Dattä (1863-1902) (known as Swami
Vivekãnandá), 'an intellectual of very high calibre'. 24 Apart from
the exposition of Vedantä, he inspired his co-religionists to be
proud of their indigenous culture and way of life.	 He wanted to
protect the Hindu community from the materialist influences of
Western civi]. jsatjon and believed that 'the Hindu race .... with
[its] spirituality', 25
 could conquer the whole world morally.
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These soclo-religious movements, along with some other
smaller organisations, successfully aroused a feeling, especially
among the middle classes, of belonging to a large Hindu community
with a pride in its rich past.
	
Despite their diversities, all
these movements laid stress on English education, and produced
three different sets of political leadership - moderates,
extremists and the conservatives respectively.
2.4	 MuslimResponse to Western Liberalism
The initial response of the Muslims to Western doctrines,
as indeed of the British domination which preceded them, was one of
total rejection.	 Their resistance to British domination was
reflected in the movements initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Bareiwl and
HâjI Shà'riatullãh.	 They believed that the only way open to the
Muslims to stem the tide of deterioration was to revive the Islamic
faith in its pristine form. The leaders of Muslim revivalist
movements were, by and large, the 'ularnã who deeply resented
British domination. 	 The 'ulamã'had to suffer a great deal during
and after the failure of the 1857 Insurrection. 	 A large number of
them were killed during the suppression of the Insurrection. 	 A
large number of them were arrested and deported to the Andaman
islands.	 A few of them (e.g., Hãji Imdãdullãh and Rahmatullãh
Kerãnwi), emigrated to Makkah. Those who were fortunate enough not
to be arrested carried on their activities in the educational
field.	 The 'ulamä"s attitude, just after the suppression of the
1857 Insurrection may be summed up as follows:
1.	 The 'new' rulers were too strong to be physically
defeated by any insurrection.
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2.	 The	 Christian missionaries were	 preaching
Christianity as a world religion, with the aim of
proselytising Indians.
3. The new rulers were propagating Western doctrines
through education and the press.
4. Islam and its cultural traditions were in danger.
The Muslim community must therefore be protected
from the Western doctrines and culture.
This analysis of the situation culminated in the movement
of Dãz'-ul-izlüm Deoband. It was started with the foundation of a
madrasah (later known as the .Dãr-ul-'ulüm) at Deoband.26
Dãr-u1-'u1üm adopted the Dars-i-Nizãmi, a medieval system
of education.	 Its main aim was to provide religious guidance and
leadership to the Muslim community.	 Dãr-ul--'uliim propagated the
faith without coming under the influence of Western doctrines. 	 It
attracted students from far and near, and its fäzils (graduates)
functioned as teachers, jmj'ns and khatibs throughout the country.
The Deoband movement also made use of the powerful media of the
press.	 Its periodicals and the publications of the	 ulama
affiliated to the movement reached a farf lung readership.	 The
credibility of the movement can be gauged from the number and range
of enquiries received by Där-ul-'ulüm from different parts of the
country, looking for the 'ulamã"s guidance on various matters of a
socio-religious nature.
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In 1310 A.H./1892-93, when the burden of dealing with
such questions had increased by leaps and bounds, a separate
dãr-ul-iftã' was established.	 For nearly two decades from its
founding, dãr-ul-iftã' kept no record of the fatwâs that were
issued.	 During the period 1912-1974, a total of 4,15,857 fatw.s
were issued, 27 (amounting to a daily average of 18 responses to
queries).	 At one point al-Mufti, a monthly journal, was published
with the aim of giving a wider circulation to the fatwa's.	 The
muftis of the Dãr-ul-'ulüm were strict adherents to the Hanafi
school of thought.	 They rejected any deviation from the classics
of the Hanafi fiqh.
Dãr-ul-'uiürn set an example of humble living and devotion
to the learning of Islamics. Muhammad Qãsim Nãnawtawi, the first
sarparast of Dãr-ul-lzlüm,	 believed that the progress of
Där-ul-'ulüm should be measured in terms of its poverty. 	 He laid
stress on financial deprivation while drafting the basic principles
on which the institution was to run.
So long as the Madrasah does not have any
regular and definite source of income, it will
continue to exist - Inshã'Allãh provided there
is an honest reliance on and faith in His mercy
and compassion; and when it comes to possess a
definite source of income, e.g., some
substantial property in the form of land or
factory or a promise of permanent donation from
some rich person of honest intentions, then it
appears the Hadrasah will be divested of the
feelings of fear and hope - a perennial source
of submission to the will of Allah - and, with
this, will be deprived of the 'hidden' source
of unfailing assistance; and its workers will
start	 quarrelling	 amongst	 themselves.
Therefore, in matters of income and
constructions there should always remain a
certain lack of certainty of means.
The participation of government and rich
persons is also harmful.
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The donations of persons who want to remain
unknown, I believe, is a source of barakah.
Their sincerity seems a more permanent means of
income.28
This axiomatic declaration prevented Deobandi elders from
establishing contacts with neither the vested interests nor the
government administration.	 A network of public donors, who had no
expectation of achieving personal fame by making munificent
contributions, thus caine into existence.	 According to the annual
report of 1289 A.H./1872, the largest monthly donation promised was
to a value of 'eight rupees and five annas' by an anonymous
giver. 29
The colonial government did not recognise the certificate
of the Dãr-ul-'u.Züm; no-one with this certificate could hope to
enter government service; even though the Dãr-ul-'ulüra curriculum
was far more advanced than the syllabus prescribed for such
examinations in oriental languages as Nunshi Fizil and Mawlawl
Fãzil.	 It was much easier for the fãzils of Deoband to pass
examinations in the oriental languages in order to secure teaching
posts in government schools. The Dãr-ul-'ulüm teachers discouraged
such an instrumental attitude on the part of students. 	 They
likened their craze for teaching jobs in government schools after
receiving a good religious education to using their precious shawls
to clean shoes.30
The Muslim middle classes, stripped of their privileges,
were ready to co-operate with the British rulers, and to welcome
English education. 	 In this respect, the Deobandl 'ulamã who were
essentially contra-colonialist, were radically different. 	 A large
section of the Muslim middle classes secured employment under EIC
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before to the 1857 Insurrection.	 Realising that the decadent
Mughal monarchy was a sinking ship, they looked to their future
under EIC.	 During the Insurrection, they remained loyal to EIC.
Sayyid Amad Khãn (1817-1898) was the most outstanding
representative of this section of the Muslim intelligentsia.
Sayyid Ahinad Khãn was born in an aristocratic family
which had long been linked to the Mughal court. He was brought up
by Farid-ud-din, his maternal grandfather who was a minister unfer
the Mughal emperor.	 Sayyid Alunad Khãn joined EIC's service as a
minor officer in a court of sadr-i-a.min from which he rapidly rose
to the position of a judge. His loyalty never wavered during the
1857 Insurrection.	 He saved many British lives despite threats
from Muslim freedom fighters. 	 He persuaded some of the local
chieftains to give up their support for the Insurrection.	 As a
mark of recognition of his services, he was awarded, among other
honours, a Knighthood.
Not only did Sayyid Ahmad Khn give his wholehearted
co-operation to the 'new' rulers, he also accepted their ideas in
the religious sphere. 	 He initiated a movement whose aim was to
interpret Islamic teachings in the light of Western ideas. 	 He
developed the basic notion that between the word of God (the Qurän)
and the work of God (nature) there can be no contradiction. 	 He
advocated that the Qurãn should be so interpreted as to be in
conformity with the rules of nature.	 He thus neglected the hadi
literature which did not permit the liberal interpretation of the
Qurän. He doubted the concept of revelation through Jibril. He did
not believe the accounts of the miracles of the Prophets contained
in the Qurän and hadi literature on the grounds that they were in
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contradiction with the laws of nature. The concept of j.ihád was
totally transformed by Sayyid Ahinad Khãn into a defensive war. The
existence of malã'ikah (angels) as distinct creatures, endowed
with sense perception, was dismissed. Sayyid A1imad Khãn developed
a school of thought commonly known as 'Islamic modernism'.31
His ideas were bitterly criticised by the 'izlamã'and his
followers were referred to as 'necharis'	 because they gave
importance to the role of 'nature' in their interpretation of the
Quran.
2.5	 Sayyid Ahmad Khán and Ali garh College
In the aftermath of the 1857 Insurrection, British
hostility towards the Muslim community was so intense that even the
loyalty of Sayyid Abinad Khân and his followers could not staunch
it.	 It was further strengthened upon the disclosure of the
existence of a network of conspiracies against the government. A
series of trials against the so-called Wahhãbis was started,
commencing with the Mibala Trial (1864) and leading to the Patna
Trial (1865), the Malda Trial (September 1870), the Rajmahal Trial
(October 1870), and yet another trial (1871).32
In addition to his official engagements, Sayyid Ahmad
Khän devoted his energies to the spread of English education among
the Muslim community. 	 He retired in 1876 and permanently settled
down in Aligarh.	 He was subsequently appointed as a member of the
Governor-General's Legislative Council (1878-1883).	 His career
after retirement was aimed at fulfilling two broad purposes:
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1) the development of cordial relations between the
Muslim community and the British government;
2) the spread of English education among the Muslim
community.
In order to achieve the first end he worked on two fronts. He used
the power of his pen [in his writings such as The Loyal Mohaminadans
of India (1860) and A Rejoinder to W. W. Hunter's 'The Indian
Musalmans' (1871)) to defend the Muslims against charges of
disloyalty to the colonial government.
He deployed his theoLogica.L diLL a	 i'c t	 tcc.
of persuading Muslims that it was in their interest to cultivate
good relations with the British rulers. Citing Quranic injunctions
in Risãlah-Ahkam-i-Ta'äin-i-Ahl-i-Kitâb' (1868), he argued that
there was no religious reason why Muslims should not dine with the
Christian British, provided that there was no food on the table
forbidden under Islamic rules.
	 He also argued that meals prepared
by Christians were permissible for Muslims to eat, irrespective of
the method adopted for the slaughter of the meat-giving animal.
He planned to write a commentary on the Bible with a view
to demonstrating that there was no disagreement between the
teachings of the Qurãn and the Bible.	 He did not complete this
project. Only a part of the work, Tabyin-ul-Kalirn, was published.
The Mohainmadan Anglo-Oriental High School (established in
1875) was upgraded to the status of a College in 1877.	 Its
foundation stone was laid by Rt. Hon. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy.
All members of staff were British.	 The Muslim youth were expected
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to make the best use of their presence and to learn their
etiquette, manners and mode of thought.
2.6	 The 'Ulamã'on the Learning of the English Language
There is a widely held belief that the 'iiiamã'were opposed
to Sayyid Aunad Khãn's policy of introducing English language
education at Aligarh College.	 In fact, however, the 'ularnã' had
ruled that there was no harm in learning any language. 	 Shah ¶1hdul
Aziz made such a ruling during the early 19th century. 'Adbur Rahlm
Dahri 33 (1785-1850), one of his students, emphasised the need for
the acquisition of Western learning. He spent the last days of his
life teaching English at Foit üli	 Cot	 'it
strongly advocated English in a booklet entitled 'Ar_4Asht Var
bãrah_j_Zarürat_ j_Tarwjj_j_Zubán_j_Angrezj_u!Ulüm_j_Faranq	 (An
appeal for the study and dissemination of English lan guage and the
Western Learning).
Nawãb 'Abdul Latif (1828-1893) founded the Muhammadan
Literary Society in Calcutta (April 1863).
	 Its aim was to
disseminate English language and the Western learning. 34
 Mawlawi
Karnat	 li Jawnpuri (d.1873), affiliated with the 'Society'
throughout the greater part of his life, implored the Muslims to
acquire a knowledge of the English language as well as modern
science.	 Mawlãnã 'Abdul Hay Frangi Mahalli 35 (1848-1886) and
Rashld Ahinad Gangshi, 36 the u1amä' among Sayyid Ahinad Khan's
contemporaries, held a similar view. The 'ularnã's objection was not
to the Muslims learning the English language, but to the cultural
impact of Britain on the Muslim people. 	 The wording of the fatwäs
is explicit on this essential distinction which the 'ulamä' made
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between learning the English language and learning the Western
ways.
Those 'ulamã'who condemned Sayyid Ahmad Khn's educational
ventures were under the impression that he was using them to
propagate his own views which were contrary to their understanding
of the Quran and the Sunnah. Sayyid Ahinad Khãn tried to placate
the 'u1amã'by, for example, appointing Mawlãnã'Abdullãh Ansâri, the
son-in-law of Nawläria ?iuhammad Oasiiu lnawtwi the rector o
Dãr-ul-'ulürn of Deoband) as head of the department of theology at
Aligarh.
2.7	 The Early Phase of Development of Indian 11ationalism
With the adoption of English education 'a new integrated
all-India class' came into existence. 	 Its background was varied
but it was linked together by nature of its 'knowledge, ideas and
values'. 37
	The language that this class shared was English.
Members were inspired by the reformist movements and the problems
that they reflected.	 They established organisations for the
protection of their class interests. 	 The 'Zamindãri Association'
(1837), Bengal British India society (1843) and the British Indian
Association (1851)38 represented the interests of Bengali landed
aristocracy and the newly-emerging middle class in composition as
in outlook.
The 'India League' (1875) and the Indian Association
(1876) were organised with a view to reflecting the aspirations of
middle-class Bengalis. The latter had branches in all major cities
of northern India.	 It voiced the demand of the middle class for a
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greater share of higher offices for Indians, and for handsome
representation in public bodies. 	 All the government posts with a
salary of more than £800 per annum were reserved for the civil
servants appointed in Britain.	 Although Indians were allowed to
compete for these jobs, the upper age limit of 19 rendered it
almost impossible for them to compete, especially because the
examination was conducted in Britain.
The Indian Association campaigned for raising the age
limit and for holding the examinations simultaneously in Britain
and India.
The Indian Association, was eventually overshadowed
when the Indian National Congress was brought into existence.
2.8	 The Indian National Congress (INC)
The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded on 27
December 1885 in a meeting held at Bombay.	 The meeting was
convened on the initiative of a retired Scotsman, Allan Octavian
Flume (1829-1912) with the full blessing of Lord Dufferin, the
Governor-General. 40
	Among the 72 delegates of the first meeting,
presided over by a pioneer Christian Bengali barrister, W.C.
Bonnerjee (1844-1906),	 more than half were principally from
English-educated elites. The language adopted by INC was English.
Flume conceived INC as a 'safety valve for the escape of
great and growing forces', 41 resulting from English education and
the general dissatisfaction of the educated classes with the
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conditions prevailing in India.
	
He defined the three main
objectives of the organisatiori as follows:
1. the fusion into one national whole of all
the different and till recently
discordant elements that constitute the
population of India;
2. the gradual regeneration along all lines,
mental, moral, social and political, of
the nation thus involved;	 and
3. the consolidation of the union between
England and India, by securing the
modification of such of its conditions as
may be unjust and injurious to the latter
country. '-
Like the Indian Association, its predecessor, INC too
demanded that the competitive examination 'be held simultaneously,
one in England and one in India', and 'the maximum age limit....be
raised to not less than 23 years'. 	 Among the main demands of INC
were:	 'expansion of the legislative councils by admission of a
considerable proportion of elected members'; 'a complete separation
of	 judicial and executive functions', 	 'reduction of	 army
expenditure and commission for the Indians'.43
INC in its early phase was dominated by zamindärs and
members of the legal profession. 44 It was committed to achieve its
objects through resolutions, deputations and petitions to the
Government of India and to the Parliament of Britain.
2.9	 The Muslims and INC (1885-1888)
With the emergence of INC, the division on a theological
basis between the two groups of the Muslim community - the 'ula.mä'
83
and the 'modernists' - caine to be reflected in the political arena
as well.
2.9.1	 Sayyid Ahinad Khãn versus INC
Sayyid Ahinad Khán believed that the Muslim community
could advance only by remaining on good terms with the British and
not by joining INC.	 In December 1886, the Ali garh Institute
Gazette warned the Muslims not to take part in INC activities. Two
important Muslim organisations of the time - the Central Mohammedan
Association45 and Mohammedan Literary Society - refused to send
delegates to the second session of INC. 	 Sayyid Aunad publicly
attacked INC in his speeches at Lucknow [28 December 1886] and
Meerut [14 March 18881. 46 He made three main points: (a) that the
Hindus and the Muslims were 'two nations'; (b) representative
institutions were unsuited to Indian conditions as this system
would end in the subjugation of the Muslims by the Hindus who
enjoyed numerical superiority; and (c) the Muslims must depend on
the British for the safeguarding of their interests.
In order to keep the Muslims away from 'the Bengalis in
their mischievous political proposals' (referring to INC), Sayyid
Ahinad founded the Mohammedan Educational Congress (December 1886,
changed to Conference in 1890), and 'United Indian Patriotic
Association'	 (UIPA) (August 1888) with the express aim of
countering INC activities.
In view of the fact that Sayyid Ahmad Khn mounted a
vigorous opposition to INC, special care was taken by INC leaders
to stress its non-communal character. Badr-ud-din Tyabji was
84
elected as President in 1887. 	 The following year (1888), it was
decided that no subject should be discussed by the subjects
committee or by the President at any session, to which either the
Hindu or the Muslim delegates objected unanimously or near
unanimously.	 If after the discussion of any subject, either the
Muslim or the Hindu delegates objected to a resolution on it in
large enough numbers, it would be dropped.
The number of Muslim delegates in INC sessions during
three decades from its inception to 1905 would suggest that the
Muslims as a community were not very interested in it. 47 	The
majority of the Muslim delegates were usually from the city where
the session was held. From all over the country, Muslim delegates
who attended INC sessions fell into two major groups. 	 The first
was composed of the editors of newspapers and lawyers, who through
professional ties or because of their interest in politics, joined
INC.	 The second group belonged to the 'ularnã'who were implacably
opposed	 to Sayyid Ahinad Khán's religious views. 48
	Several
booklets, pamphlets and posters were published by middle-class
Muslims with the aim of keeping their co-religionists away from
INC. 49 The virtual aloofness of the Muslims from INC was 'largely
due to the influence of Sir Sayyid Ahmad'.50
2.9.2	 The 'Ulamä', INC and Sayyid Ahmad Khãn
The 'ulamã' did not like Sayyid Ahmad Khãn's opposition to
INC and pro-British stance. Mawlän Muhammad and his brothers
issued a fatwà recommending that Muslims should join INC and
refrain from taking part in Sayyid Ahinad's UXPA.	 This fatwa' was
signed by about one hundred 'ulamä'including leading Deobandis.	 It
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was published under the title of 'Nusrat-ul-Abrär' (Assistance of
the Pious) in 1306 A.H./1888.
The 'ulamã, instrumental in issuing the fatwa, had a long
history of anti-British orientation. 51
 Mawlãnâ Muhammad's father,
bdul Qãdir had supported the Jihàd movement of Sayyid Ahmad
Bareiwi; he had also participated in the 1857 Insurrection along
with his sons who were the signatories of the fatwa.	 After the
suppression of the Insurrection, Sayf-ur-Rahmän, Mawlänã Abdu1
Qãdir's eldest son, migrated to Kabul. 	 The other members of his
family settled down in Ludhiana (Punjab) after experiencing many
difficulties. They maintained the family tradition of anti-British
feelings.
The 'ula'nã'advocated Muslim co-operation with INC on the
basis of its potentially anti-British stance. They also stipulated
that co-operation with	 INC should be conditional on its not
resulting in any defiance of Sharih or in any compromise affecting
the Muslim community. The choice was between the two organisations
UIPA and INC - in which membership was equally open to both
Hindus and Muslims. The Silaznä'felt closer to INC than UIPA. 	 They
did not pay much attention to the growing tension between the Hindu
and Muslim communities on the basis of the Urdu-Hindi controversy,
and the revivalism of the Aryâ Sarnãj. The main weakness in the
thinking of the'ulamä'lay in their 'serious lack of realism',52
especially in respect of the aspiration of the Muslim middle
classes.
86
2.10	 Nadwat-ul-'tJla.mã' (Council of the 'U1amã
In course of time the 'ulamä'realised that whilst Aligarh
graduates were at home in modern learning and proved to be good
subordinate officials in government offices, they were without
Islamic learning.	 By contrast, the fäzils of Deoband and of other
madrasahs were very well versed in medieval sciences but they had
closed their eyes from the modern world.
	 The educated class among
the Muslims was thus divided between the madrasah-educated and the
modernists.	 Mawlnâ Muhammadli Mongiri (1846-1927), who had
earned his reputation by writing refutations against Christian
missionaries and defending Islam against their onslaught, 53 put
forward the idea that the traditional and the English educational
systems should be brought together. It was well received amongst
the '.z1amã'of different theological persuasions. 	 Nadwat-ul-'ulainã7
(Council of the 'Ulaniã') was formed (Kanpur, 1893), with the object
of revising the madrasah curriculum.	 Subsequenlly, a curriculum
was drafted with a view to training graduates, both in mundane and
religious sciences.	 A dãr-ul-'ulU.m was established in Lucknow
(1898) to put the newly-drafted curriculum into practice.
In	 1905,	 Mawlãnã Shibli Nuajnãn1 (1857-1914), 	 an
acknowledged 'him, who had parted company with Sayyid A1mad Khan,
was appointed as Education Secretary.	 As a consequence,
Nadwat-ul--'ulamã' became suffused with an atmosphere favourable to
the dissemination of modern knowledge.	 Mawlnã Shibli's proposals
for radical changes in the madrasah system were, however, resisted
by the other affiliates of Nadwat-ul-'ulamã Shibli had to resign
from the post and retired to Azamgarh, his native town, where he
established Dhr-ul-Nusaniffin (1914), 4 a research institute.
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Dár-ul-"ulüm	 conceived as a meeting
point between madrasah education and English learning.
	 In the
event, however, the experiment was not successful. 	 The graduates
of Nadwat-u1-u1amã undoubtedly, acquired a better command of
Arabic language and literature than the fãzils of Deoband; they
also knew English, but they could not absorb the spirit of English
education.	 Nadwat-u1u1amã' developed more or less the same
attitude as that which the Deobandis projected.
The emergence of Nadwat-ul-'zilamã' was a siqjñficant
development.	 It provided f or the first tite a p1&tltt lot tt
interaction between the 'ulamã'and the English-educated elite.
Munshi Athar'Ali, a leading lawyer of United Provinces (UP), played
a leading role in orgarilsing the purchase o a 'buI'1ing Lor the
Dãr-ul-'uliim Nadwat-ul-'ulamã	 The seventh annual session of
Nadwat-ul-'ulamä' was held at Azimabad, Patna [5-6 November 1900].
It was attended by members of the university-educated elite, as
well as the 'u1amã.	 Mawlänà Shibli criticised the concept of
dividing Muslim society into t old t and 'new' sections.	 The
University-educated delegates expressed confidence in the
leadership of the 'ulamã.	 The 'ulamã for their part, were much
moved by the emotive speeches of the university-educated speakers.
The Azimabad session was regarded as an occasion for building
bridges between the 'ulamã'and English-educated elites. 55 	The
contacts established there further strengthened the interest that
the 'ulamä' had already begun to take in involving university-
educated Muslims in their religious aims.
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2.11	 Militant Hindu Nationalism: 	 Bâl Gangãdhar Tilak
(1856-1920)
The 'Cow Protection Movement' constituted an important
aspect of Hindu revivalism.
	 In 1882, Dayãnandã Saraswati formed
the first Gaurakshini Sabhã (Cow Protection Society) 56 and wrote a
book on the subject.	 As a sacred symbol, the cow had an appeal
that was equally strong in all sections of Hindu society -
conservative,	 revivalist and reformist.	 The cow protection
movement was particularly successful in northern India. 	 In order
to prevent cow sacrifice at 'Id-ui -azha, one of the two Muslim
festivals of rejoicing, the Cow Protection Society organised
boycotts of Muslims who were forced by large crowds to sign
agreements, promising not to sacrifice cows. 57 The activities of
the cow protection movement gave rise to Hindu-Muslim riots (e.g.,
the Azamgarh riot of June 1893).58 INC members took part in the
cow protection movement.59
In 1885, the year in which INC was founied, the Kttharrani
festival of the Muslim community (an occasion for public mourning)
coincided with the Hindu festival of Dasahrã (an occasion for
rejoicing).	 This coincidence between the two festivals was
repeated during four consecutive years (1885-1888), the dates of
Hindu and Muslim festivals being calculated from two different
calendars. Violent street rioting between the rival processions of
Muslims and Hindus took place at Lahore and Karnal in 1885, at
Delhi in 1886 and at Dera Ghazj Khan in 1889. Hindu-Muslim tension
continued in large parts of UP; in the city of Bombay 80 were
killed in 1893.60
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In spite of such Hindu-Muslim antagonism, revivalists in
INC such as Aurbindo Ghose (1872-1950) insisted 'that it was
through the religion of Mother that the masses could be effectively
reached. '61	 Bãl Gangadiar Tilak played a leading role in placing
religious emphasis on politics.	 He was a successful leader of the
Hindu masses. Kesari (lit, the lion), a Marathi-language weekly
under his editorship, became the mouthpiece of militant Hindu
revivalism. He strongly opposed The Age of Consent Bill (1891) and
The Compulsory Vaccination Bill (1891),	 both of which were
supported by Hindu reformists.
He was, however, not against social change, but objected
to the colonial government's interference in the affairs of the
Hindu society. Under his leadership, Ganesh Chaturthi62 came to be
celebrated publicly,	 thus contributing to the political
mobilisation of the mass of the Hindu people.	 Tilak also
inaugurated a movement in honour of Shivãjl (1627-1680), the
well-known !laratha hero. 63 Money was raised for the purpose of
repairing Shivãji's tomb in Raigarh.	 Shivaji's birth anniversary
was publicly celebrated. 	 Tilak's followers drew inspiration from
Shivaji's life and achievements.
Tilak's bold anti-British stand brought him into the
forefront of Congress politics;
'no single individual played a more important
role in the history of Congress during the
period [1892-19051 than Bal Gangadhar Tilak'.64
Sayyid Ahmad Khãn's advice to the Muslims, the
Hindu-Muslim rioting between 1885 and 1893, and Tilak's 'emphasis
on Hinduism bear a share of responsibility for the alienation of
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wide sections of Muslim opinion from the national movement'
(INc).65
2,12	 Hindu-Muslim Tension and the Emer gence of the All-India
Muslim League (AIML)
At the turn of the 19th century, the tension between the
Muslims and the Hindus increased even further, with the
introduction of Hindi in UP In Devãnãgari script as the court
language	 (1900).	 Under the influence of the thought of SayyId
Ahmad Khãn, Muslims naturally resented this as they viewed this
change as undermining the Urdu language. But Sir Antony MacDonnel,
the Lieutenant Governor of UP, ignored them.66
In addition to the Urdu-Hindi controversy, the partition
of Bengal and the agitation of the bhadrälok or upper-class Hindu
Bengalis for its re-unification widened the gulf between the two
communities.
2.12.1	 Partition of Bengal
On 16 October 1905, the largest province of British India
was partitioned. 	 Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, justified partition on
the ground of administrative necessity. Bengal, in his view, was
far too unwieldy to be administered effectively by one Lieutenant
Governor. 67 The argument did not appeal to the Bengali bhadrãlok,
who launched an agitation for the revocation of the partition. The
reaction of the Muslim aristocracy, which had assumed the role of
representing the interests of the Muslims, was in sharp contrast to
that of the Hindu bhadrãlok.
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From the battle of Plassey (1757) to the 1870s, the
British administration had depended upon the collaboration of the
bhadrälok class which was the chief beneficiary of English
education.	 Its members not only staffed government offices in
Bengal, but also penetrated other parts of India as British
colonial power spread, securing jobs in offices, teaching in
schools and working as lawyers (and magistrates) in courts. On the
other hand, the traditional Muslim aristocracy was simply pushed
beyond the pale of any preferment with , the extinction of Muslim
state power.	 Its members were reluctant to acquire English
education, whilst the Muslim masses, under the influence of the
'ulamã, joined such resistance movements as the Jihäd and Farã'izl
movements.
Moreover, the changes, introduced into the revenue system
of Bengal under the Permanent Settlement 	 (1793)	 conferred
considerable advantages upon well-off Hindus in rural Bengal. 	 Tax
collectors were given proprietorship over large land holdings.
	
In
1905, out of 2237 large land holders, only 358 were Muslim.68
The high social status enjoyed by the bhadrãloks and the
dominant position that they occupied in government service in
Bengal caused a feeling of restlessness among the other groups even
as early as the 1870s. At that stage, W.W. Hunter (1840-1900), a
civil administrator, pleaded in his book, The Indian Musalmans that
Muslims should be given greater opportunities for government
service.	 But no concrete steps in this sphere were taken before
the emergence of INC.	 In 1889, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal
decreed that recruitment to the Subordinate Executive Service would
no longer be through competitive examination. Two-thirds of the
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vacancies would henceforward be filled by nomination with the aim
of enabling the less educationally-advanced groups (i.e., Biharis,
Oriya and the Muslims) to derive some benefit.69
The main aim of the government in partitioning Bengal was
to encourage the less educationally advanced groups. But partition
was also aimed at providing a stimulus to the development of North
East India. 70 For nearly a decade, government officials debated
'not whether but where it tthe partition line') should be drawn. "n
Upon partition, the newly-formed province of 'East Bengal
and Assam' had a Muslim majority of 	 per cent Icf. its minority 	 I
status in united Bengal at 31.3 per cent). 	 The Muslims of East
Bengal quickly perceived the advantages of access to higher
education and an increased share in the services and administration
in the new province. At the same time, the vested interests of the
privileged classes of Calcutta were threatened.
	 The new province
would come under a separate judiciary beyond the jurisdiction of
Calcutta High Court.
	 This meant that Calcutta-based lawyers could
no longer hope to monopolise the legal profession in the region.
Businessmen based in Calcutta were opposed to the idea of
developing a rival port in Chittagong, not far away from Calcutta.
Above all, the bhadrãlok politicians were aware that they would be
adversely affected in the legislative council of the new province
in which seven out of eight villages had a Muslim majority and the
administration had already been encouraging the development of a
Muslim counterweight for over two decades.
The	 Indian Association, a bhadrälok	 dominated
organization, provided the platform for the agitation against the
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partition.	 INC also joined the agitation.	 The Swideshi (boycott
of British-made goods) movement was launched, in the expectation
that it would so 'injure British trade as to force the attention of
the authorities at home to . . . . grievances and thus ensure the
redress.' 72	Soon the movement assumed a communal colouration.
Hindu audiences in villages were told that imported sugar was
polluted with the bones of cows in the manufacturing process. Vows
were taken in front of the temples against the use of British-made
goods.	 Priests refused to perform religious ceremonies involving
the use of British-made goods. 	 The boycott made manufactured
goods, especially cloth, scarce and expensive.	 The agitators
insisted that ordinary persons should buy indigenous even though
they were more costly than machine-made goods. 	 The Muslim
population, by and large, did not sympathise with this stand.
Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in different parts of Bengal.
2.12.2	 The Simla Deputation (1906)
The Swãdeshi movement in Bengal coincided with attempts
on the part of the government to introduce reform in representative
institutions. The Muslims, disillusioned by INC's participation in
agitation against the partition of Bengal, followed Sayyid Abmad
Khãn's general line of safeguarding the interest of the community.
Nawãb Muhsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907), who had succeeded gayyid Ahmad
Khãn as Secretary of Aligarh College, organised a deputation to see
Lord Minto (1845-1914), the Viceroy. 35 'nobles, jagirdärs,
talukdãrs, lawyers, zarnindars, merchants and others', 73 under the
leadership of His Highness Sultan Muhammad Shah Aghã Khãn III
(1877-1957) called on Minto [Sixnla: 1 October 1906]. They said
that their purpose was to present 'our claim to a fair bare' of
94
representation in all elections, whether for the legislative
councils or for the local bodies.	 They asserted that the Muslim
members to the representative bodies must be separately elected
wholly by Muslim electors and the representation of the Muslim
community must be
commensurate not merely with their numerical
strength, but also with their political
importance and the value of the contribution
which they make to the defence of the Empire,
and .... to the position which they occupied in
India a little more than a hundred years ago,
and of which the traditions have naturally not
faded from their minds...
Minto assured the deputation that 'the political rights
and interests of the Muslim community would be safeguarded.75
2.12.3	 The Formation of AIML
After calling on the Viceroy, the Aghã Khn III and Nawãb
Muhsin-ul-Mulk conceived the idea of setting up a Muslim political
organisation for achieving the objectives of the Simla
Deputation. 76
	But,	 before taking any concrete steps,	 they
requested the government's approval. 77 In a few months' time,
All-India Muslim League (AIML) was formed on the occasion of the
annual meeting of the 'Mohainmadan Educational Conference' (Dacca:
29-30 December 1906), with the Aghã Khãn as its President.	 AIML's
objectives were:
1) to promote, among the Musalmans of India,
feelings of loyalty to the British Government,
and to remove any misconception that may arise
as to the intention of the government with
regard to any of its measures;
2) to protect and advance the political rights and
interests of the Musalmans of India,
	
to
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respectfully represent their needs 	 and
aspirations to the Government;
3) to prevent the rise, among the Musalinans of
India, of any feeling of hostility towards
other communities, without prejudice to the
other aforementioned objects of the League.78
2.13	 The Early Phase of AIML (1906-1912)
AIML came into being as an organisation loyal to the
British Government.	 The upper strata of Muslim society joined it.
The 'ulainã' and the masses remained aloof from it.	 AIML's
pro-British stance was sufficient to keep the ,1amä'(especially of
Deoband) away.
	
Nor did the Agha Khn, the living Imãm of the
Ismãi1is and close friend of the British, carry any appeal for
them.
The agitation against the partition of Bengal took a new
turn with the rise of terrorism through the activities of secret
societies.	 The agitators successfully undermined the colonial
power by seeking the support of the political opposition in
Britain, and especially of the Labour Party. 	 J. Keir Hardie, a
Labour M.P., observed during his visit to Bengal (1907):
Lord Curzon's autocratic method of forcing his
undigested and ill-advised scheme of partition
had been a great blunder, and that there
could be no peace until it had been rectified
in one form or another.79
The rectification was to await King George V's visit to
India (December 1911).	 In a new administrative arrangement East
Bengal and West Bengal were reunited with the exclusion of Bihar
and Orissa.
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A big segment of AIML realised that agitation and
terrorism rather than pronouncements of loyalty to the government
had yielded results.	 The government effectively silenced Nawb
Salimullàh Khãn and the Aghä Khãn by bribing them with titles
(G.C.I.E. and G.C.S.I. respectively). It was Nawb Wiqãr-ul-Mulk
(1841-1917), successor of Muhsin-ul-Mulk as Secretary to Aligarh
College, who commented as follows:
Gone are the days of reliance [on the
government]. What we should depend now upon,
after the mercy of God, is the strength of our
own arms, and for this the example of our
worthy compatriots is before us.80
The annulment of the partition of Bengal proved to be the
turning point in Muslim politics. AIML underwent a radical change.
The Agha Khãn resigned as President. 	 The AIML headquarters was
shifted from Aligarh to Lucknow. 	 Within a few years, the Muslim
'nobles' in positions of power in AIML were replaced by members of
the Muslim middle classes.	 AIML's aims also underwent a
transformation in accordance with the aspirations of the middle
classes.
2.14	 Pan-Islainism and its Im pact on Indian Ms1ims
The consolidation of Muslim power in South Asia was
followed by • the recognition, under the Delhi Sultanate, of the
Abbasid Khalifahs as de jure suzerains of the Muslim world.
However, the Mughals believed that they needed no external source
of legitimacy to sustain their suzerain power over India. From the
early 16th century onwards, the political map of the Muslim world
was dominated by three, almost equally great empires - the Ottoman,
the Safavid and the Mughal.
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The Ottomans considered themselves the successors of the
Abbasid Khal.ifahs, since they followed the Sunnl tradition, and
occupied the central Muslim lands. The Mughals in India subscribed
to the theory that every independent Muslim monarch was Khalifah
within his own territories. 81 With the collapse of Muslim power,
the feeling of being a part of the Muslim umrnah began to develop in
India. In 1785, Tipu Sultan of Mysore (1750-1799) reaffirmed his
subservience to the Ottomans.
These feelings were auginente auring the latter half of
the 19th century by the ideas of Pan-Islainism, to which
Jamãl-ud-din Afghanl (1838-1897) and his associates gave voice.
Afghãni had reached the conclusion that none of the Muslim
countries by itself could resist European colonialism. Therefore
the umrnah, despite the fact that it was split into definite
entities and states, would have to forge a common bond, internal
cohesion and unite itself in order to repel external aggressions.
Afghni visited India on four different occasions during
the period 1854-1882. Pan-Islamic ideas met with an encouraging
response from a large section of Muslim intelligentsia and from the
'u1amä	 Sympathetic feelings for the Turkish Muslim brethren were
aroused, since they were subjected to severe threats from the
European powers.	 But Afghãnl had to face the opposition of Sayyid
Ahined Khãn, who was bent upon securing the goodwill of the British.
The plight of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the
century merits some attention.
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Its decline had already started at the turn of the 17th
century but its survival for nearly two centuries was rendered
possible because of the rivalries between European powers and the
martial qualities of Turkish soldiery
The Ottoman Empire consisted of a conglomeration of
different ethnic and religious groups. The Ottomans made no
attempt to integrate them culturally. They had no policy of
proselytising the non-Muslims of the Balkans and Anatolia to Islam.
In the long run, the minorities identified themselves as different
nationalities. Each of them found a patron from among the European
states.	 These states often interfered in the affairs of the
Ottoman Empire under the pretext of securing justice for the
minorities.	 Russia's claim to the right to protect the interests
of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire was one of
the direct causes of the Crimean War (1853). Tsar Nicholas told
the British Ambassador that the Ottoman Empire was 'sick' and that
Britain and Russia must reach an agreement on its reconstitution
when its end caine.
By 1856 Greece gained independence from the Ottoman
Empire.	 In the same year, the European powers agreed among
themselves (Paris Conference) to observe the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.
But, with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) the
principle of non-interference was reduced to a dead letter.
The boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were steadily
shrinking. The Muslims in India came to believe that this sad
situation was due to the conspiratorial role that the European
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powers were playing against the Ottomans. Mawlänã Muhammad Qãsim
Nãnawtawi and the Deobandi 'ulamã'raised a fund to help their
co-religionists.	 An amount in excess of Rs. 2,00,000 was sent to
Turkey. 82 In 1897, during the Graeco-Turkish war, Indian Muslims
once again held meetings, and raised funds to demonstrate their
moral support for the Ottomans.
The role played by Mawlãnã Shibli Nu'mãni in the
propagation of Pan-Islamic ideas is worthy of note.
	 He not only
went through the writings of Afghãnl but also met Shaykh Muhammad
'Abduh (1849-1905), Afghãni's most trusted disciple, in Egypt. 	 He
came under the influence of Pan-Islamic ideas during his visit to
Turkey and Egypt (1892).	 Though Shibli Nu'mãni served as a staff
member of M.A.O. College in Aligarh for a long time (1882-1898), he
never adhered to the political and religious stand associated with
Sayyid Ahmad Rhãn.
Shibli Numãni exercised a profound influence on the
Aligarh students.	 Maw1nã Muliaminad 'A1i83 (1878-1931) and Mawlànã
Zafar 'Au
	
Khãn84 (1873-1956) were among his students.	 Shibli
Numn did not join any political organisation.	 He devoted his
energies to literary activity and to religious education. 	 His
Pan-Islamic ideas were expressed in vivid terms in the journals
under the editorship of Zafar'Ali Khän (Zamlndãr - Lahore),
Muhammad Ali (Comrade and Hamdard, first from Calcutta and then
from Delhi), and Mawln Abul Kalãm Azãd (al-Hiläl and al-BaThgh -
both from Calcutta), all of which were started during the period
1910-15.	 Not only political activists but also literary figures
such as Muhammad Iqbàl (1877-1938) were deeply influenced by
Afghãni.	 In fact, Iqbãl regarded Afghãni as the greatest renewer
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of Islamic faith of the whole century. 85 Later Iqbl made Afghãnl
his mouthpiece for expression of his own ideas on Muslim state.86
Against such a background a veritable spate of
Pan-Islamic literature came out during the period of the Balkan
wars (1912).	 They appealed to the religious sentiments of the
Indian Muslims and aroused their sympathy for the Ottoman cause.
2.15	 Inter-connection	 between	 the	 '(llama'	 and	 the
English-educated Muslims
The annual conferences of Nadwat-ul-'ulamã' provided a
platform for the 'ularnã' and the English-educated Muslims to
communicate with one another.	 The gap between these two groups
narrowed down by the beginning of the 20th century. 	 Pan-Islamic
ideas contributed to bringing them closer together.	 The 'ulamã'
could not afford to neglect the English-educated Muslims, and it
would seem that they were keen to enlist their support. 	 Our
attention should now be focused on the organisations which
undertook the task of reconciling the interests of the 'ularnã' with
those of the English-educated Muslims.
2.15.1	 Jam'iyat-ul-Ansär (Association of Friends) (1910-1913)
The Deoband-based Jam'iyat-ul-Ansär was one of the
earliest organisations of the 'ulamã'to be interested in seeking the
support of English-educated Muslims. It was basically an
association of the old boys of .Där-ul-'ulüm Deoband. It was founded
by Mawlãn Mabmüd Hasan (1851-1920) in a 'jalasah-i-dastärbandi'
(convocation ceremony) at Deoband on 27 Ramázãn 1337 A.H./12
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October 1910. Mawlná 'Irbaydullãh Sindhi (1872-1944) was deputed as
the organising secretary of the Jam'iyat.	 The	 jalasah-i-
dastärbandi was attended by a delegation from Aligarh led by Aftãb
Ahmad Khãn (1867-1930), who subsequently became the Vice-Chancellor
of the Muslim University of Aligarh. 	 This development represented
the culmination of the process set in motion by Sayyid Aknnad Khn's
political heirs of establishing links with the anti-British
Pan-Islamist Siiam	 Muhsin-ul-Mulk, himself an author of a number
of religious works, had agreed to start a department of Arabic at
Aligarh. 87 Wiqãr-ul-Mulk, his successor, increased the religious
content of the college syllabus. A paper on 'Islamic Religion' was
made compulsory for all students. Aftãb Ahmad Khãn suggested in
jalasah-i-dastãrhandi the exchange of students between Deoband and
Aligarh, in the expectation that students belonging to both would
benefit from 'worldly' as well as religious education. 	 This
suggestion was accepted.88
The Jam'iyat-ul-Ansär was a religious and cultural body
which denied having any political motives. 	 Its activities were
focused on promoting Arabic language, the publication of cheap
editions of religious tracts, the arrangements of well-trained
'ulamä' for mosques, and on imparting Quranic instructions to
English-educated Muslims.
The founders of the Jarn'iyat solicited donations for the
purpose of setting up branches in different parts of the country.
It was not difficult for them to find a handful of .Veobandl 'u.zamã'
in most cities and towns.	 The activities of the Jam'iyat were
ostensibly religious and educational. 	 It wanted to review and to
reform the curriculum of the .Där-ul-'ulüm Deoband.	 At the same
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time, it also suggested some changes in the administration of the
Där- ul -'ul im.
Maw].ãnã Muhammad Ahmad, the muhtamim (administrator) of
Där-ul-'ulüm, regarded the Jara'iyat as a rival organisation which
sought to curtail his power. 	 The Deobandi 'official' historians
[viz., Manãzar Ahsan Gilni, Qãri Muhammad Tayyab and Mahbüb Razwi]
were averse to undertaking the task of de-mystifying the
personality of Mawlãnä Muhammad Ahmad. He accepted the title of
Shams-u1-'u1am' conferred on him by the British government.	 It
would appear that he was keen to prevent anti-British ideas
penetrating the Dãr-ul-'uliim's academic staff and students.89
Mawlãnã Sindhi was already looked upon with suspicion by the
teachers of Dãr-ul-'ulüm - Anwar Shah Kshiniri (1875-1933) and
Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmãni (1885-1949) - due to certain of his ideas
which were not in conformity with the Dãr-ul-'uliim's general
orientation. 90	Against such a background, Mawlãnã Sindhi felt
compelled to move from Deoband to Delhi (May 1913).
2.15.2	 Nizärat-ul-Ha 'àrif-il-Quräni yyah (Academy of Quranic
Learning)
Nawlãnã 'Ubaydullh SiniI organised another institution
in Delhi, Nizärat-ul-Ha'ärif-il-Quräniyyah, with Mawlãn Mahniüd
Hasan, Hakim Ajmal Rhan (1863-1928) and Wiqr-ul-Mulk as its
patrons. 91
 Its basic purpose was to promote Quranic studies among
English-educated Muslims.
	 He was able to attract a group of
persons which undertook the task of interpreting the Qurin in
political idiom, with special reference to the struggle for
independence. 92 Mawlãnä Sindhi lectured in Delhi for about two
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years, but his main contribution lay in mobilising a strong
following for Quranic Studies which has flourished to this day.
2.15.3	 Anjman-i-Khuddm-i-Ka'bah_JAssociation of the Servants
of Ka'bah) (AKK)
Anjuman-i-Khuddãm-i-Ka'bah (AXK) was another important
organisation in which the 'ulamä'and the university-educated people
worked together.	 Mawlãnã'Abdul Bri of Farangi Maial (1878-1926)
founded this society (6 May 1913).
	
He was already directing the
Majils Nuid-u1-Is1äm ( founded in 1912) which pursued the objective
of propagating the knowledge of Shar'iah in the Muslim community.93
A1CK's establishment was in major part inspired by the
events surrounding the Balkan wars, and in particular the serious
threat that was believed to be posed to the holy city of Makkah as
a consequence of the hostilities between the European powers and
the Ottoman Empire. The basic objective of AKK was to maintain the
honour of Ka'bah by defending it from occupation by non-Muslims,
and by serving it in every possible manner.	 It was spelled out as
follows:
(a) to prepare such a group of Muslims
which could be ready to sacrifice life
and wealth for venerated House (of
Allah) with pleasure;
(b) to carry on the preaching of Islam,
which is really a service of Ka'bah, and
to	 send the missionaries of Islam
wherever in the world they are needed;
(c) to establish madrasahs for	 basic
Islamic teachings, and orphanages; and
(d) to strengthen the affiliation of
Muslims to Ka'hah, and to develop the
means of transportation for Ka'bah.94
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At the time of ARK's inception, six members, 95 including
Mawlãnã bdul Ban, the President, were given the responsibility
for its organisation throughout the country. Four out of these six
members had been university-educated, but ARK had the blessings of
the	 renowned 'ziamä.'	 Shibli	 Nu'mâni	 helped	 draft	 its
constitution, 96
	to which 'Ubaydullãh Sindhi,
	
Shh Sulaymãn
bulwãrwi and leading Shih mujtahids of Lahore and Lucknow gave
their support.
ARK also had a mass appeal. Its membership rose to 9,000
within a short period. 97 The opposition of Mawlãnã Ahmad Razã Khn
and some others proved to be futile amidst the strong feelings
aroused by the Balkan wars and the publicity that ARK received in
Pan-Islamist journals.98
ARK was able to collect a large amount of money from its
members and sympathisers.	 The question of how the money should be
used became a subject of internal controversy. It is not clear how
the money was actually spent, 'although a part of it went to
establish Shawkat 'Au
	
in business as a pilgrimage broker in
Bombay'. 99 	ARK lost its reputation as a consequence of such a
misuse of public money. From 1916 onwards, only three years after
its inception, it degenerated into a mere paper organisation.
Within such a short period, ARK achieved little for a
variety of reasons including internment of Muhammad'Ali and Shawkat
'All (May 1915), its leaders; lack of organisational skill among its
leaders; the fact that Zafar-ul-Hasan klawi (Office Secretary of
ARK) proved to be a secret agent of the colonial government; and
the propaganda against it of the pro-British lobby. 	 ARK,
105
nevertheless, did make a stir in the public arena and attracted the
attention of the British government.
2.16	 The Kanpur Mosque Incident
The sad incident of the demolition of the Kanpur Mosque
brought the 'ulamä'face to face with the government. 	 On 1 July
1913, the Kanpur municipal authorities demolished the washing place
of a mosque (located in Machbli Bazar) in order to widen the road.
The local Muslims condemned the administration for desecrating
their place of worship.	 The municipal authorities tried to pacify
them by offering payment for the land and compensation for the
damage caused.	 But, it was not lawful according to the fatwi of
the 'ulamã' to sell the mosque as every part of the premises was
integral to the mosque and no part could be detached from it. 	 The
Muslims demanded that the demolished portion should be restored to
its original condition.
Mawlãnã'Adbul Qãdir Subhãni (1873-1957), a local 'alim and
the founder of Madrasah-i-Ilàhiyät (Kanpur), addressed a public
meeting at which he appealed to the Muslims to show the genuineness
of their emotions by being ready to sacrifice their lives for the
cause of the faith.	 Instead of dispersing after the meeting, the
crowd proceeded to the damaged portion of the mosque to rebuild the
damaged walls.	 The armed police opened fire and several persons
were killed.
The Pan-Islamic press vehemently attacked the government
for its unwarranted interference in religious matters and for its
brutality. As a result of the publicity thus given to the incident
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in the press and from pulpits, the Kanpur Mosque incident was
raised to the level of a major issue involving a direct
confrontation between the government and the Muslim community.
Lord Harding, the Viceroy, who was of the opinion that the
municipal authorities had acted unwisely, paid a visit to Kanpur. A
settlement was reached; the damaged portion of the mosque was
restored	 and those detained were set free. 10 °	 The Muslim
community, especially the 'ulamä were jubilant.
2.17	 The 'Ulamä'durin g World War I
On the eve of World War I (1914-1918) a strong current of
anti-British feeling spread among the Muslims as a result of
domestic and international developments.
	 Turkey joined the war on
the side of Germany.	 It was obvious that Britain and its allies
would use military force as well as diplomacy against Turkey as an
enemy and that Turkey would suffer as a consequence.
	 Muhammad Ali
expressed the feelings of the Muslims, in a leading article in the
'Comrade' (Delhi) under the title of The Choice of the Turks,101
He stressed that British diplomacy had left no option for Turkey
but to join Germany.	 Outstanding Pan-Islamists such as Mawlãn
Abul Kalãm Azãd (1889-1958) and Muhammad 'All were interned.
British diplomacy helped the Arabs to fight against the
Ottoman Empire. In the early 1916, a treaty was signed between the
British authorities and Iusayn,	 Sharlf of Makkah. 	 At the
instigation of British agents, Husayn led a revolt against the
Ottoman authorities (June 1916).	 This served as a pretext for the
occupation of Palestine and Syria by British armed forces. 	 The
Muslims in India regarded Husayn's treaty with Britain as an act of
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disloyalty towards the sacred institution of Khilãfat.	 In a
telegram addressed to the Indian Viceroy, Mawlanã 'Abdul Ban,
President of AKK, expressed his anger and grief.102
Through a pamphlet entitled Tahgi g-.i-Khilafat (July 1919)
(compiled by Fayz-ul-Karim and attested by a number of pirs and
pro-British 'ulama' of Sind), the British authorities tried to
justify Husayn's revolt. 	 But this pamphlet proved to be a futile
exercise in view of the Abmadi origin of its author.	 It was
rejected by the 'uiama: Mawlãnã Muhammad Ibrhim, a leading 'aiim of
Sind, exposed Fayz-ul-Karim, and declared him as käfir on account
of his beliefs. 103 A refutation of the pamphlet was produced under
the signatures of the mainstream 'uiainá'of Sind.1O4
2.17.1	 Silk Letter Conspiracy
During the war, the 'ziamã'of Deoband had conceived a plan
to get rid of the British government. Mawlãnã Mahmüd Hasan,
commonly known as Shaykh-ui-Hind believed that the British
government was so fully entangled in the war that a popular
uprising in India, orchestrated with an attack by Afghan forces and
tribes belonging to the NWFP border, would result in the collapse
of the colonial administration.	 To implement such a programme he
mobilised the'uiam'in the NWFP tribal belt through his Deobandi
disciples and associates. 	 He also dispatched Mawlãnä 'Ubaydullãh
Sinbi to Afghanistan (July 1915) to establish contacts with the
Afghan government of Amir Habibullah Khn.
Maw1nã Mahinüd Hasan himself had left for Makkah in 1914
ostensibly on hajj.	 He met Ghlib Pash, the Ottoman governor of
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Makkah.	 The 'ulamä'were organised in the tribal belt of NWFP.105
When the 'ularnã' were engaged in executing their plan, a new
development took place. A political mission of the Indian National
Committee106 reached Kabul.
Without	 loss of time, Mawlnã Sindhi met the
representatives of Indian National Committee. However, their plans
differed to such an extent that no close co-operation between them
could be achieved in the beginning.
Mawlãná SinJii and the representatives of Indian National
Committee approached the Afghan authorities. The latter, however,
transmitted a verbatim record of their discussions with the 'Indian
fellows' to the Viceroy in Delhi. 	 Superficially, however, the
Afghan government appeared to be willing to co-operate with the
Indians in Kabul,
	 by allowing them to form a 'provisional
government' in exile.
Mawlãn Sindhi sent a report of his activities in Kabul
(9-10 July 1916) to Mawlãnã Mahmüd Hasan in Makkah. The report was
written on a piece of silk cloth, meant to be handed over to Mahxnüd
Hasan personally.	 The silk cloth letter was however intercepted
[15 August 1916].
	
Mawlãnã Mahmüd Hasan and his associates -
Mawlänã Husayn Ahmad Madanl (1879-1958), MawlãnãiJzayr Gul, Wahid
Ahmad and Haklm Nusrat Husayn were arrested in Makkah and
imprisoned in Malta. A number of Deobandi 'ulamà'and collaborators,
involved in the conspiracy, were arrested or put under police
surveillance in India.	 In subsequent years, this abortive scheme
of the 'u1am' was given the name of 'silk letter conspiracy'.107
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Throughout the war years, the British government tried to
subdue Pan-Islainism through the support of the landed Muslim
aristocracy and hereditary p11-s.	 In spite of threats from the
government and resistance from within their ranks, the 'ulamã'
gradually came to the forefront of the political arena.
2.18	 Rapprochement between INC and AIML
Political developments in India and abroad made the
Pan-Islamists dominant in Muslim politics. 	 They were equally
active in INC.	 Aghã Khãn found the policies of the Pan-Islamists
unacceptable, and subsequently left AIML. AIML, under a different
type of leadership, included in its demands a 'suitable government'
for India in 1913. MuhammadA1i Jinnãh (1876-1948), ambassador of
the Hindu-Muslim unity at that time, joined AIML in October 1913,
after making it absolutely clear that his loyalty to AIML would in
no way undermine his association with INC. 109
 Due to the connec-
tion of Muslim leaders with both parties, AIML and INC drew closer
together.	 Both parties managed to hold their annual sessions in
the same city on consecutive dates and discussed the same issues.
The AIML leaders used to attend INC sessions and vice versa.110
The close links between AIML and INC were also reflected
in a jointly formulated constitutional scheme, popularly known as
the Lucknow Pact (1916). 111
 Under its provisions Muslims would be
1) represented through special [separate] electorates
on the Provincial Legislative Councils;
2) given weightage in Muslim minority provinces (i.e.
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U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Madras and
Bombay) whilst Muslim representation in the Punjab
and Bengal would be less than their ratio of the
whole population.
Furthermore,
3) 1/3rd of the Indian elected members in the Imperial
legislative Council would be Muslims,	 elected by a
separate electorate.
4) No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution
would be passed in opposition to the wishes of
3/4ths of the members of either community.
The Muslim community was thus accepted by INC as a
separate political entity, on the basis of religion; and AIML was
accepted as its representative.
The main features of the 'Lucknow Pact' were subsequently
incorporated into the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform (1919). 	 The close
co-operation between INC and AIML was further strengthened during
the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill (1919), aimed at extending
control on political activities after the war. 	 The Jallianwala
Bagh massacre (Amritsar: 13 April 1919), where 379 people were
killed and a large number of others were wounded in the course of
firing by soldiers to disperse a political gathering, drew the
parties, as well as the Hindu and Muslim communities in general,
closer to each other.
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2.19	 The Khilãfat Issue
During the war, the sympathies of the Indian Muslims were
with their co-religionist Ottomans. 	 They desired to see the
Ottoman territories remain intact. They made no attempt to conceal
their feelings, and, for its part, the British government gave
assurances to the effect that their sentiments would not be ignored
as a token of its appreciation of the steady support given to the
war aims of the Allies by the Muslim comniunity in India. In actual
fact, however, as early as in 1915, secret treaties had been
concluded between Britain, France, Russia and Italy. 	 Under these,
the signatories undertook that in the event of their emerging
victorious in the war, they would partition the Ottoman territories
into four spheres of influence, instead of directly annexing them
jolntly. 112	During much of the wartime, the existence of these
secret treaties was not publicly known, and the (British) Indian
government was therefore able to secure Muslim co-operation.
With the Bolshevik Revolution (October 1917) in Russia
and the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Germany and
Russia, a big change occurred in the international scene affecting
the war.	 The Bolsheviks not only made the secret treaties of its
allies public, but also disrupted all the wartime arrangements by
signing a separate treaty with Germany.
Upon learning of the secret treaties, the Indian Muslims
were deeply shocked.	 Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister,
proclaimed on 5 July 1918 that the Ottoman Empire would not be
challenged in the lands of the Turkish race. 	 President Wilson's
'Fourteen Points' also included much the same promise. 	 The
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Jazirat-ul-'Arab, 113 with the holy places of the Muslims, did not
fall within the land of the Turkish race. 	 Husayn, Sharif of
Makkah, was in control of a part of the JazIrat-u1-4ra.b with the
full support of the British diplomacy. 	 The 'ulamã' saw in the
situation a message from a hadis which commanded:
Expel the non-Muslim from Jazirat_u1_4rab.114
They were anxious to free Jazirat-ul-'Arab from any non-Muslim
influence.	 It was the desire of the faithful to achieve this aim
as a faiL accompli, in fulfilment of the dying behest of the
Prophet. How would political developments actually take shape? was
the question which occupied the attention of the Indian Muslims.
The 'ulamä remained doubtful that the Ottoman Khiläfat would be
treated honourably by the victorious powers.
In November 1918, the war ended with the victory of
Britain and its allies.	 The fate of the Ottoman Khilãfat was no
longer in doubt.	 Hungary-Austria, the other defeated state, had
been divided and the Ottoman Khilãfat seemed destined for a similar
fate.
The zealous Indian Muslims regarded it as their religious
duty to join the struggle for the honourable treatment of the
defeated Ottomans, at the hands of the Allied Powers. 	 They were
anxious that the institution of Khilafat should be kept intact,
with JazIrat-u1--4rab under its control.	 But, they had no idea of
the extent to which nationalist secularist trends had taken a grip
of the Ottoman Khi1fat.	 Arabs were averse to being ruled by the
Ottomans.	 Arab nationalism had gained a considerable footing in
several parts of the Ottoman Empire.115 The ideology of Turkish
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nationalism had also developed.
	 Its aim was to build a nation of
Turks on the basis of secular ideas.
	 The young generation of
Turkish-speaking people had no interest in preserving the decadent
institution of the Khiläfat.116
The religious character of the Khilãfat issue brought the
'ula.mã' to the forefront of the political stage.	 They manifested
greater vigour than before and their authority increased. The
annual session of AIML (Delhi:
	
December 1918) was attended by a
number of the 'ularnã 117 It was the first session of AIML in 12
years to attract such a number of 'bla.rnã They were warmly welcomed
and given a prominent place on the platform.
Within a month of the Delhi session of AIML, Mawlãnã
'Abdul Ban drafted a reply to an istiftä'(questionnaire), designed
to test the opinion of the 'ulamã'on the issue of Khilãfat.	 He
emphasised the importance of the Khilãfat institution in the
religious and political life of the Muslims. 	 His reply was
countersigned by the 'ulamä largely of the Farangi Hahal group.118
2.19.1	 Intimate Co-operation between the 'Ulaznä'and the English-
educated Politicians
The 'ulamã's pronouncements about the importance of the
Khiläfat in the religio-political life of the Muslims stirred
Pan-Islamic sentiments; and public meetings with special reference
to this issue were held. One such meeting, presided over by Yaüb
Hasan, was held in Madras (17 January 1919); another, under the
presidentship of Mawlänã'Abdul Ban, was convened in Lucknow (26
January 1919).	 An organisation 'Khilâfat Committee' caine into
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being in Bombay (March 1919) with M.M. Chhotãni, one of Mawlãn
kbdul BãrI's disciples, as its President.
There was no organisational link between the activities
of various individuals involved in the Khiläfat agitation.	 They
acted on their individual heads of steam in different parts of the
country.	 The AIML leadership convened an 'All-India Muslim
Conference'	 (Lucknow:	 22 September 1919) to integrate the
activities of the various individual leaders of the Khiláfat.l19
This Conference called upon the people to observe 17 October as the
Khiläfat Day, a day of fasting and prayer.	 Gandhi (1869-1948)
advised his co-religionists (the Hindus) to join with Muslims to
show solidarity with their countrymen as 'the best and the easiest
method of promoting unity between Hindus and Muslims'.120
The Conference appreciated the work done by the
Bombay-based 'Khilãfat Committee' and resolved to transform it into
an all-India organisation.	 N.M. Cbotãni remained the President
with the headquarters of the organisation at Bombay. 	 Hãji Siddiq
KJatri (1873-1938) was appointed as the Secretary of the Khilãfat
organisation.	 The main task to which the new organisation
Jam'.iyat-i-Khilifat-i-Hind (All India Khiläfat Committee, AIKC)
addressed itself was the mobilisation of the masses with the aim of
pressing the British government to refrain from doing anything that
was likely to cause damage to the interests of the wnmah.
17 October 1919 was widely observed as the Khiläfat Day and marked
the beginning of the Khilãfat Movement.	 The first All-India
Khiläfat Conference was called in Delhi on 22-23 November 1919. It
was attended by Muslim leaders and Hindu politicians alike.121
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2.20	 Jarn'iyat-ul--'Ulamä-i-Hind 	 (Association of the	 Indian
'(llama') (JUH)
The 'ulamã122 attending the first All-India Khilãfat
Conference held a separate meeting amongst themselves (24 November
1919). Mawlãn'Abdul Ban had been stressing the importance of the
organisation of the 'ulamã'since the end of the War, laying stress
on the distinctive role of the ulamã' in the religio-political
sphere.	 He chaired the meeting of the 'ularnã	 The role of the
'ulamä' in the religio-political life of the um,nah and a number of
aspects of their organisation were discussed in detail. The
meeting ended with the decision to organise the 'ulamã'under their
own organization, namely Jailiyat- ul-4Jlamã-i-Hind (JUH). Mawlanã
Kifãyatullah (1875-1952) and Mawlãnã Abmad Sa'id (d.1960) were
elected provisional President and Secretary respectively. 	 A
committee consisting of Mufti Kifãyatulläh and Mawlãnã Muhammad
Akrain Khän was constituted to draft the constitution of JUT!. 	 It
was decided that JUH would meet again in December 1919 at Amnitsar
to discuss the draft constitution. A large number of the 'ulamã'was
expected to be present at the proposed second All-India Khilãfat
Conference.
The objectives of JUH, as passed and declared at the
proposed session (28 December 1919-1 January 1920) were 'to guide
the Muslim community in the following political as well as
non-political affairs from a religious point of view:
1) To - defend Islam, Centre of Islam
[Jazirat-ul-'Arah and the place of Khilãfat],
customs of Islam and Islamic nationality,
against the shortcomings that are meant to harm
them, in accordance with the injunctions of
Shari fh;
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2) To safeguard the religious rights; and to
struggle for common religious and national
interests;
3) To bring the 'ulamà'to one platform;
4) To organise the Muslim community; and to work
f or its moral and social reform;
5) To maintain unity with and sympathy for
non-Muslim countrymen in accordance with
Islamic Sharih;
6) To struggle for national independence;
7) To establish SharThh courts, according to the
needs of Sharih;
8) To propagate Islamic faith within the country
and abroad;
9) To maintain and to strengthen relations based
on Islamic brotherhood, and unity with Muslims
outside India. '123
Even though 3W! was meant to represent the viewpoint of the 'ulamã,
its membership was not limited to the 'ulamã	 Ordinary Muslims
could join it, but, constitutionally speaking, the decision-making
powers were vested almost wholly in the 'uilamã	 The President,
Vice-President and Secretary were to be elected only from the
'ularnã.	 Similarly, of the working committee of JUH which consisted
of 132 members, 88 were from the 1z1amã124
The emergence of JUH indicated that the 'ulamä' were
consciously asserting their own identity; and were not willing to
be camp-followers of AIML, INC or AIKC.
2.21	 Hindu-Muslim Unity durin g the JChiläfat Movement
In 1919 the three All-India organisations - namely INC,
AIML and AIKC - held their annual sessions at Amritsar, one after
another.	 The similarity of tone and content of the speeches at
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these sessions were indicative of the fact that in India at that
time there was a coherence in the political demands of different
sections of the population. 	 AIML resolved to protect the
'religious' interests of the Muslim community in addition to its
political and cultural interests.125
The Muslims were in need of the collaboration of the
Hindus in order to increase the strength of their agitation.
	 The
Hindu leadership from the INC platform gave strong support to the
Muslim cause; and the Hindu masses accepted the lead given by
Gndh in order to ensure that the Hindus felt 'bound to stand by
the Musalmans in their demand for the redress of the Khilãfat
wrong.' 126
 The Hindus were equally in need of Muslim participation
in the national struggle in order to make it an all-embracing
movement.	 The aims of both the communities coincided within the
ambit of the prevailing spirit of co-operation. Hindu-Muslim unity
reached its crescendo within a short time. Gandhi played a crucial
role in forging Hindu-Muslim unity.
Gandhi returned from South Africa in 1915, after a
21-year stay.
	 During that period he had a fruitful association
with the Muslims.
	 He had been on the payroll of a Memon firm.'27
He worked so closely with the Muslim-dominated 'Natal Indian
congress' 128
 that it provoked opposition from Hindus.' 29
	Working
with the Muslims, Gandhi asserted (as early as in September 1909)
that his life was devoted to the task of evolving co-operation
between Hindus and Muslims in India as an 'indispensable condition
of the salvation of India'.130
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Gandhi's attitude to the West was an important factor in
his acceptance by the Muslims, and especially the 1ulamã	 He
referred to himself as 'an uncompromising enemy of the present-day
civilisation of Europe' 131 and he had abandoned the Western style
of life.	 His simple living and dislike of Western civilisation
were threads that were common to his and the 'ulamã"s thinking.
Tilak's death in August 1920 removed Gandhi's strongest
rival in INC and the Hindu community. 	 He was thus able to assume
the leadership of the Hindus and Muslims during the early '20s
without any great difficulty.
The first Khilafat Conference (Delhi:
	
November 1919)
passed a resolution calling for a cessation of co-operation with
the government in the event that unfavourable terms of post-war
settlement affecting the Ottomans were to be concluded.	 It was
during the Khiläfat movement that the seeds of	 the
7{on-co-operation movement' of subsequent years were sown.
Deputations to the Viceroy (19 January 1920) and to Lloyd
George, the British Prime Minister (3 March 1920), proved futile.
The Viceroy was in no position to accede to the demands because he
had no authority to settle issues relating to the War. 	 The Prime
Minister, as well as British public opinion, had no sympathy for
the Ottoman Khiläfat. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Treaty of
Sevres (July 1920) by the Ottomans virtually guaranteed the
extinction of the Ottoman Empire.
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2.21.1	 The 'U1amãon the Non-co-operation Movement
The idea of non-co-operation developed gradually. It was
first suggested at the first All-India Khilãfat Conference (Delhi:
November 1919).	 AIKC endorsed the idea in May 1920. 	 Gandhi
assured AIKC of the support of INC in the matter of non-violent
non-co-operation.	 Consequently, AIKC issued a scheme calling upon
the masses to 'withdraw co-operation from the government and
continue to do so until justice is done'. It further added that in
case non-co-operation failed, the Muslims reserved the right to
take such other and further steps as may be
enjoined upon them by their religion for the
purpose of securing a satisfactory solution to
the Khilafat question •132
A memorandum, signed by 82 leading public figures, was addressed to
the Viceroy (22 June 1920), which gave expression to the bitter
feelings of the Indian Muslims over the harsh terms imposed on
Turkey in the peace settlement; and urged the Viceroy to secure the
revision of such terms from the British government; and implored
him to make common cause with the people of India in case he failed
to persuade the British Government. If the Viceroy was unwilling
to adopt the suggestion contained in the petition, the signatories
of the memorandum would
be obliged as from the first August next to
withdraw co-operation from the Government and
ask [their] co-religionists and Hindu brethren
to do likewise •133
The Non-co-operation movement was launched on 1 August
1920 with observance of a one-day general strike. 	 INC decided to
take part in the movement at its special session (Calcutta:
September 1920). Mawlãnã Mahmüd Hasan gave non-co-operation a
religious basis first in a fatw, 1 34 and then in his presidential
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address at the 1920 JUH session (Delhi: 	 19-21	 November).
Referring to the statement of Lloyd George in which he had equated
the war against the Ottomans to a crusade, to the injustices done
to the Ottomans, and to the Muslim population's forced migration
from Smyrna [Izmir],
	
he described mawãlãt (friendship) with
non-Muslims harãm (unlawful) who were at war with Muslims, were
responsible for rendering the Muslims homeless and for
collaborating with others in such actions. 135 He based his opinion
on the following Quranic verse.
God only forbids you as to those who have
fought you in religion's cause, and expelled
you from your habitation, and have supported in
your expulsion, that you should take them for
friends. And whosoever takes them for friends,
those - they are the evil-doers.136
A resolution supporting the Non-co-operation movement was passed;
and the refusal of Dãr-u1u1ürn Nadwat-ul-'iilamã'to accept government
grant-in-aid, was appreciated. 137
 A mitafaqqah (unanimous) fatwä,
signed by 474 'uiamã was issued by JUH. 138
 It declared any form of
co-operation with the enemy of Islam,
	 the (British) Indian
Government, harãrn. It appealed to the Muslim people
i) to resign from the membership of the Legislative
Councils;
ii) to withdraw their dependents from government
schools or institutions getting grant-in-aid from
the government;
iii) not to practice law in courts;
iv) not to serve in the police and army;
v) not to pay taxes;
vi) not to use the enemy's manufactured goods; and
vii) not to retain titles conferred by the government.
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On the matter concerning co-operation with Hindu
countrymen, the fatwi proclaimed that whilst Muslims could obtain
advice from friendly Hindus, they could not accept non-Muslim
leadership.
During the Khiläfat and Non-co-operation movements, the
'ularnã'- affiliated to JUH and generally of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadis
affiliations - took active part in politics. 	 The participation of
Shi'ah 'ulamä'was, however, sporadic, because the Khiläfat issue was
of relevance only to Sunni schools of thought.	 Mosques were
convenient meeting places and Friday sermons constituted the best
medium for rallying support for the cause.	 The 'ulamä were mainly
responsible for the victory.
They tried to put the movement in a radical
direction... They originated the idea of
non-co-operation and put constant pressure on
the Central [All-India] Khiläfat Committee to
adopt it and put it into practice •139
The majority of the 'ulamã was in line with JUH.	 Mawlãnã
Ashraf Aii Thãnwi14 ° ( 1864-1943), Mawlánã Ahinad Razã Khãn
Barelwll4l and Mufti Muhammad Mazharulläh Dihlawi, l42 however, were
discordant voices.	 The disciples of these figures contributed to
theological discussions refuting the JUH fatwa'. 143	 The Quranic
verse,	 upon which JUH's fatwâ was based, was differently
interpreted by the opponents.	 According to them, the verse
prohibits the mawãlät, not the ma'äinalãt.	 Hawãlät means affection
and friendship; ma'ärnalät refers to exchange dealings; though
friendship with all non-Muslims was prohibited, ordinary day-to-day
dealings and transactions affecting social life were allowed.
	 It
was also pointed out that if mawalãt was wrong for the British, the
same should be applied to the Hindus.
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The pro-Khilãfat forces were so strong that anti-JUH
'ulamä' could not influence the masses.	 Mawlawi Hãkim 'All
(1869-1925), a follower of Mawlänã Abmad Razä Khãn, who lectured at
Islamia College (Lahore), sided with the lobby which insisted on
retaining grant-in-aid from the government against students'
wishes.	 Hãkim 'All was eventually forced to resign his post in the
College. 144
AIKC passed a resolution (Karachi:	 July 1921) advising
Muslims not to serve in the British army which would amount to
killing their co-religionists in the event of their fighting in the
Middle East under the orders of the British. 	 The 'ulamà'and AIKC
leaders who were behind the passing of this resolution were
arrested.	 The 'ulamä'were becoming more and more radical in their
anti-British stance. 	 By the end of 1921, they were not content
with mere non-co-operation; they visualised complete independence
as their goal.145
The 'ulamä'and modern educated leaders of the Khiläfat and
Non-co-operation movements were interned one after the other. The
leadership of the movement fell into the hands of Gandhi. who called
it off in February 1922 as a consequence of the Chauri Chaura
(District Gorakhpur) incident in which an enraged mob set a police
station on fire and 21 policemen were burnt to death. Gandhi was
severely criticised by the leaders of the movement, especially the
'ulamä; to them it seemed that Gandhi had dashed their hopes.
While all this was happening in India, the new political
leadership in Turkey was successful in its efforts to get the
post-war treaty affecting the political future of the country
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revised.	 The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) was accordingly
signed.	 Turkey was declared a Republic (29 October 1923). 	 The
dignity of the institution of the Khilãfat had no other importance
for the new rulers of Turkey than that of 'an historical
memory', 146 and the institution of the Khilãfat simply disappeared
(3 March 1924).
It was the supreme irony of the Khilãfat movement that
Indian Muslims struggled to preserve an institution over the
existence of which they had no direct influence.
2.21.2	 Hijrat (Emigration) Episode
The Non-co-operation movement was in full swing when the
idea of the emigration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan, the
nearest dãr-ul-Islãm (land of peace), was mooted. 147
 This idea was
given a religious basis by Mawlän Abdul BAn and MawlAnA Abul
Kaläin Azãd through their fatw.s. l48	 Pmir AniAnullãh Khãn
(1892-1960), the ruler of Afghanistan, stirred up the feelings of
Indian Muslims by issuing welcoming statements. The Afghanistan
Government's pronouncements were meant more to scare the British
than to show goodwill to Indian Muslims.
Thousands of Muslims from the NWFP, the Punjab and Sind
sold their moveable property.	 Some of them even divorced their
wives who were unwilling to emigrate, arranged their dependents'
weddings on the roadside, and headed for the Afghanistan border in
the scorching heat of July (1920). The number of emigrants soon
reached 30,000.	 It was beyond the financial resources of the
Afghanistan Government to absorb such a huge influx; therefore,
124
restrictions were imposed on the emigrants.	 That was the end of
the Hijrat.	 Hundreds died en route and several thousands returned
penniless and disillusioned. 	 The movement, not tempered by sober
thinking, was the cause of the ruin of hundreds of Muslim
families.149
2.22	 The Aftermath of the Khläfat and Non-co-operation
Movements
The Mappilla Rebellion (1921) 150 came as a blow to the
Hindu-Muslim unity,	 even when the Khiläfat and Non-co-operation
movements were at their peak. The trouble stemmed from agrarian
unrest of the Mappilla tenants and landless labourers against their
Hindu landlords and money lenders; but it soon assumed the form of
jihäd, resulting in forcible conversion to Islam and large-scale
massacre, under the prevailing ideology of the Khilãfat movement.
Whilst not supporting the so-called conversion of Hindus by the
Mappilla, 151 JUH nevertheless exploited the general sympathy of
Muslim masses for the Mappilla as another avenue for the
ventilation of anti-British feeling when government forces
ruthlessly suppressed the rebellion.
The sufferings of the Hindu victims and forcible
conversions, widely publicised, gave rise to Hindu-Muslim tension.
In this tense situation, the Shuddhi ( Conversion to Hinduism) and
Sanga than (Unification or Consolidation) movements were launched by
the militant Hindu nationalists.
Whilst some 'ulamä'accused JUH of sacrificing Islamic
tenets in order to please Hindus, the conservative as well as some
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other sections within INC criticised Gandhi for ignoring Hindu
interests for the sake of promoting co-operation between the two
communities. They believed that such compromises could only result
in larger Muslim demands. 152 The Mappilia Rebellion made the
ground fertile for militant Hindu nationalists. V.D. Savarkar, in
his treatise Hindütvã (1923), systematically formulated for the
first time the creed of the Hindu nation. Hindütvã (Hinduness) was
defined as that which embraced 'all the departments of thought and
the activity of the whole of our Hindu , race'.153
The Hindu NahàsabhI held its first important session in
1923 (Belgaum) after almost 16 years of its formation (1907). 	 It
specifically dealt with social, cultural and religious questions
which had been outside INC's area of concern.	 The Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Corps) was formed with the
aim of organising the indoctrinated and physically fit among the
Hindu youth (Nagpur: 1925).
2.22.1	 Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements
There is no explicit provision in Hindu orthodoxy for the
conversion of an individual or a group of individuals into the
Hindu fold.
	 The Aryä Samàj, however, introduced the element of
proselytisation into Hinduism. 	 The Aryã Samajists of the Punjab
were the first to respond to the alarm raised by Hindus against
alleged conversion during the Mappilla Rebellion. 	 Funds were
raised and scholars were sent to Malabar for the reclamation of
Hindus alleged to have been forcibly converted into Islam. 	 After
his release from jail, Swami Shraddhãnandã (1856-1926) devoted his
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life to the ShudJ21 movement.	 He made UP his centre of
activities. 154
Hindu society, fragmented by sect and caste cleavages,
was considered to be vulnerable.
	 The militant Hindu nationalists
focused attention on the creation and consolidation of an
organisation with a clear political consciousness. This scheme was
known as the Sangha than. The San gha than movement popularised
war-like exercises with the ostensible aim of making Hindus capable
of defending themselves against the Muslims.
2.22.2	 Tabligh and Tanzim Movements
The 'ulamã despite their accommodative role during the
Khiläfat and Non-Co-operation movements (in an inter-communal
sense), responded to these Hindu initiatives by establishing
counter- organisations. The Deobandis, Bareiwis and the moderates,
not willing to be associated with a definite sect, set up separate
organisations for the single purpose of tabligh (the preaching of
Islam). Anjuman Razä-yi-Hustafa, Jar,(iyat-i-Da'wat-w-Tabllgh,
Anjuman Tabligh-ul-Islãm, TablighI Jarnã'at and several other similar
organisations worked independently to check the proselytising
activities of the Aryã Samãj. Dr. Sayf-ud-din Kichiew (1884-1963)
formed Jan(iyat-i-Tanzim with the aim of counteracting the
activities of the Hindu Sangha than.
Throughout the period when proselytising movements were
at the peak of their activities, street fights and riots were
reported from most of the principal cities. 	 Hundreds were killed
and thousands were injured. 	 Within five years (1923-1927), 88
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riots had taken place in UP alone, resulting in 81 deaths and 2,301
injured. 1 " The situation was even worse in the Punjab. During
the period 1922-1927, 474 riots were recorded.156
The explanation for Hindu-Muslim antagonism during the
'20s is generally sought by Indian nationalist writers in terms of
the dubious character of Swami Sharddhãnandâ and the evil designs
of the (British) Indian government which was bent upon shattering
the Hindu-Muslim unity built during the Non-co-operation
movement.' 57
 British writers generally interpreted the antagonism
between the two communities as stemming from the Government of
India Act, 1919.158 Under this Act, franchise was considerably
enlarged. The Hindus in the Punjab were politically conscious of
the power of numbers and the role of the majority. The 1921 census
caused alarm among the Hindus because their population had
decreased during the inter-censal period leading up to it.159 The
Mappilla outbreak simply added fuel to the already smouldering fire
of inter-communal tension. Without doubt there were many sincere
religious men on both sides (i.e. adherents of Shuddhl and Tabligh)
who were active only in a purely religious sense (without any
political motivation), but behind them were the politicians engaged
in planning election strategies.
The Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the Punjab after 1923 can
be traced to the enactment of the Munici pal Amendment Act, 1923,
which was designed to benefit the Muslims. The balance of power in
several niunicipalities was tilted in favour of the Muslims due to
the provision of extra Muslim seats. The resentment felt by the
urban Hindus on account of this led to an intensification of
antagonism between the two conimunities.160
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2.23	 From 'Non-co-operation' to 'Co-operation'
After the Non-co-operation movement was called off, INC
split into factions.	 A faction led by C.R. Dãs (1870-1925) and
Motilal Nehru (1861-1931) advocated that Indians should join the
legislatures, ostensibly with a view to bringing them to a
standstill.	 Since INC was committed to a creed of
non-co-operation, they formed the Swarj (self-rule) Party (January
1923).	 Those Muslim politicians, who had been critical of
Non-co-operation movement, were pleased with this new development.
Sir Mupammad Shafl' (1869-1932) noted in his diary:
I am glad non-co-operation is now dead and the
future struggle has re-entered the
constitutional arena.161
AIML, overshadowed by AIKC, decided to show its political strength
by taking part in the 1923 election.
Non-co-operation for INC was a strategic move which could
be suspended or even changed in favour of co-operation. 	 But the
'ulamã'of JUH made non-co-operation a creed of religion. They were
not in line with the Swaràj Party. Hakim Ajmal Khãn, close to JUH,
failed to persuade the 'ularnã'to amend their fatwà, issued in
1920. 162	Some 'ulamã'were in favour of reconsidering the fatwi.
For example, Mawlânã Habibur Rahmn (d.1929) put forward a case for
doing so in his presidential speech at the annual session of JUH
(Gaya:	 24-26 December 1922). 163
 The 'u1amä by and large, did not
pay any heed to klablbur Ralimãn and preferred to uphold the fatwa in
its original form.l64
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In the 1923 election, the Swaräj Party could win 41 out
of 101 elected seats in the Central Legislative Assembly.	 It was
absolutely clear that the Swarãj Party with such strength would not
be able to bring the Assembly to a standstill. 	 The election
results forced the Swarãj Party to work with the Assembly rather
than make it ineffective.	 The other solid group inside the
Assembly consisted of 17 Independents, led by Muhammad 'All Jinnãh.
Neither the Swaräj Party nor the Independents were grouped along
religious lines.	 Out of 41 affiliates of the Swaräj Party, eight
were Muslims. The Independents, 14 of whom were non-Muslims, were
led by Jinnah who was a Muslim. After the death of Ghulãm Mutlammad
Bhurgari (1881-1924), Muhammad 'Aij Jinnáh and Muhammad Ya'qüb
(1879-1942) were the only two Muslims among the Independents.	 In
spite of their different view points, the Swarãj Party and the
Independents co-operated with each other on certain points.
Together the two groups were referred to as the Nationalist
Party. 165
Under the mounting Hindu-Muslim antagonism of the '20s,
the Swaräj Party and the Independents faced a truly difficult task.
Their chief aim was to maintain harmony between Hindu and Muslim
communities, even though this went against the popular mood.	 In
the 1926 election, they suffered heavy losses. Motilal Nehru wrote
to his son in disgust as follows:
The Malaviya-Lãlã gang aided by Birla t s money
are making frantic efforts to capture the
Congress.	 They will probably succeed as no
counter effort is possible from our side.
	 I
shall probably make a public declaration after
the Congress [session at Gauhati: December
19261 and with it resign my seat in the
Assembly though I am still acclaimed as the
leader of the strongest party in the country.
We can do no possible good in the Assembly or
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the Councils with our present members and the
kind of men we have. I fear there will soon be
defections from our ranks but apart from this
it is impossible to achieve anything.166
Muhammad 11 Jinnãh fared even worse than the Swaräj
Party candidates.	 In the outgoing Assembly the Independents held
the balance between the government and the Swaräj Party; but in the
new Assembly he was a leader with scarcely any following.
Entry into the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial
Councils in 1923 became a prelude to elitist politics involving the
design of constitutional schemes. 	 At AIML's annual session
(Lahore:	 24-25 May 1924) a committee was appointed to draft a
constitution in consultation with other organisations. 167
	The
Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924) (commonly known as the Muddiman
Committee), represented a step towards constitutional debate. But
the most spectacular step towards constitutional debate took the
form of the proposals put forward at the Muslim Legislators'
Conference (Delhi:	 20 March 1927). Muhammad Ali Jinnáh was the
moving spirit behind the Conference of Muslim Legislators.
	 The
Conference suggested giving up separate electorate for Muslims if
four proposals were accepted.	 These 'Delhi Proposals' were as
follows:
1) Sind should be separated from the Bombay
province and constituted into a separate province.
2) Reform should be introduced in NWFP and in
Baluchistan too on the same footing as in other
Provinces in India.
131
3) In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of
communal representation should be in
accordance with the numbers of Hindus and
Muslims in the population.
4) In	 the	 Central	 Legislature,	 Mohammedan
representation should be no less than	 a
third.168
INC accepted the proposals with two amendments. It made
reforms in NWFP conditional on the provision of a suitable
judiciary, and the separation of Sind conditional on the separation
of Andhra.
2.24	 The Nehru Report
In such a prevailing milieu of Indian political
development, the Conservative Government in Britain appointed the
Statutory Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon with
a remit to review the working of the Government of India Act, 1919.
The exclusively British composition of the Simon Commission evoked
protests from INC and a faction of AIML (led by Muhammad Ali
Jinnãh). The Simon Commission visited India. Despite some
co-operation extended to it by a faction of AIML led by Sir
Muhammad Shaf 1', it was more or less completely boycotted. Lord
Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, explained in the
House of Lords why no Indian was included in the Commission. In
his view no unanimous report could be expected from a Commission
which included Indian representatives!
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The All Parties Conference (Delhi:
	 11 February 1928),
which constituted an 11 member committee (under the chairmanship of
Motilal Nehru) 169 gave its response to Lord Birkenhead's statement.
The All Parties Conference included representatives of AIKC and
(the faction led by Jinnãh of) AIML but not of JUH. 	 The exclusion
of representatives of the 'ulamã'from the Conference had been due to
the following reasons:
i) The 'ulamã'did not possess the necessary training in
respect of the techniques of constitution-drafting;
and
ii) The 'ulamá's stand on issues tended to be based on
religious creed which they could not change.
The Committee,	 under Motilal Nehru's Chairmanship,
produced a Swarãj Constitution for India which subsequently came to
be known as the Nehru Re port (August 1928).
The Nehru Report rejected the principle of separate
electorate for Muslims, presenting the constitutional image of a
secular India as the only political remedy for inter-religious
antagonism. It suggested the reservation of seats for Muslims both
in the Central and in the Provincial Legislatures strictly in
proportion to their population, with the right to contest
additional seats for a fixed period of 10 years.
The Nehru Report gave rise to strong resentment in
different Muslim circles.	 A faction of AIML, led by Sir Muhammad
Shafi', JUH and AIKC were among those opposed to the Nehru Report.
They contended that the principle of separate electorate had been
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conceded under the Government of India Act, 1909 and duly accepted
by INC in the Lucknow Pact (1916).
INC accepted the Nehru Report in toto (3 November 1928)
and a meeting of the All Parties Convention was called (Calcutta:
December 1928) to achieve a broader consensus of the political
parties.	 Muhammad 1i Jinnãh as the leader of one of the factions
of AIML submitted a few amendments to the Report which were
rejected in their entirety by the Convention.	 Muhammad ¶Ali
Jinnãh's disappointment with the Convention led to a rapprochement
between him and Muhammad Shafi
The Nehru Report was also presented in the Central
Legislative Assembly (12 March 1929). 	 The effect of this was to
bring Muslim members of the Legislative Assembly together as one
bloc to the forefront of Muslim politics irrespective of their
political affiliations.	 All of them, with the singular exception
of Tasadduq Ahmad Khãn Sharwni, opposed the NehrU Report.
JUH strongly criticised the NehrU Report,' 7 ° lamenting
that it was biased against Muslims whom the Re port held responsible
for inter-communal disharmony in India. JUH made the point that
independence could not be achieved and no successful government
could be formed as long as the minorities remained dissatisfied.
JUH, however, expressed a commitment on its part not to
'demand unfair and unjust concessions for Muslims'.
	 Muslims must
be given their due share, legally and rationally justified. 	 With
respect to the religious rights of Muslims, JUH stressed the
importance of religious liberty,	 preservation of Muslim
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institutions and practice of Muslim law. 	 Its suggestions were as
follows:
1) Such a system of franchise should be adopted that
every community might have a number of voters
according to its proportion of the total
population.
2) A Muslim majority be preserved in the Punjab and
Bengal.
3) Reform be introduced in the NWFP and Baluchistan
without stipulating any conditions.
4) Sind be unconditionally separated from Bombay
province.
5) The Muslim representation in Central Legislature and
the Central Executive Cabinet should be no less than
one third.
6) No bill, resolution or amendment or any part thereof
should be passed in any legislature, if 3/4ths of
the members of any community in that legislature
opposed such a bill, resolution or amendment or part
thereof.
7) The concessions enjoyed by the Muslim minorities in
Hindu majority provinces would be similarly extended
to the Hindu minorities in the Punjab, Bengal and
the NWFP.
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8) The reservation of seats for minorities should not
be for only 10 years, but for a period to be
determined according to the wishes of the minorities
themselves.
9) Every community be given a share in the services of
the state in proportion to its population.
10) Every community be given grants-in-aid to propagate
its culture and education in proportion to its
population; and the responsibility for education
should be left in every community's own hands.
11) The delineation of constituencies for election be
performed in such a way that the majority community
in a province was not adversely affected.
12) The national language should be Hindustani with
both Urdu and Hindi scripts.
13) Representation, for all Legislatures, Central and
Provincial, would be in accordance with the communal
proportion of the population.
14) Muslims would not be willing to abandon the
principle of separate electorate until and unless
the above safeguards were accepted.
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2.25	 The All India Muslim Conference (19211 (AIMC)
The Muslim members of the legislatures were ready to make
use of the political opportunities against the background of
widespread Muslim dissatisfaction to which the Nehru Report gave
rise.	 They organised an All India Muslim Conference (AINC) with
the aim of 'bringing together on one platform all political
organisations in the country and representative active Muslims'171
in order to formulate a considered Muslim viewpoint with special
reference to constitutional issues. 	 The Conference was held in
Delhi (31 December 1928 - 1 January 1929). 	 His Highness the Aghã
Khân, the leader of the Simla Deputation (1906), a former President
of AIML and, above all, a 'valuable line of communication with the
British Government', 172 was invited to preside over the AIMC
meeting.	 The Agha Khãn was asked to preside for the main reason
that he had excellent personal relations with the colonial
power. 173	It also helped that he was in a position to provide
financial support for the conduct of the Conference.
AINC was organised on a permanent basis, but it was not a
political party in the strict sense of the term. 	 It was more of a
confederation of parties and individuals, than a disciplined
party.	 Three parties (i.e. AIKC, JUH and AIML Shaf i' group)
constituted the main components of AIMC.
His Highness the Agha Khãn's address was a reminder that
Muslim politics had taken a U-turn and reached back to the early
phase of AIML (1906-1911).	 His address began with a homage to His
Majesty the King Emperor, ending with the prayer 'May His Majesty
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live long to continue to shower the blessings of his beneficent
rule on his subjects'.174
AIMC enumerated the demands on behalf of the Muslims,
which were similar to JUH's proposals in response to the Nehru
Report. 175	JUH's participation was also reflected in the
resolution to establish 'night schools for secular and religious
education and instruction of Muslim adults'.	 The 'revival of
Islamic spirit' was emphasised by 'utilising mosques as centres for
social, moral and economic activities'. It was made an aim of this
Conference to save Muslims from 'following un-Islamic customs and
habits' •176
JUH, committed as it was to complete independence and
radical in its general political approach, thus became a part of
AIMC, perhaps due to its fear of total eclipse in the event of its
keeping aloof from such a platform.
	 The 'ulamã"s position had been
considerably weakened since the end of the Non-co-operation
movement.
2.26	 Dr. Muhammad Igbãl on the Hindu-Muslim Question
Despite the opposition of all Muslim parties, INC was
committed to a policy of putting the Nehru Re port into practice.
It warned the (British) Indian Government that INC would start a
civil disobedience movement if the Re port was not accepted by
December 1929.	 And eventually it did start such a movement. 	 At
the same time, INC scrapped the Nehru Report in favour of a much
more radical approach while launching civil disobedience (April
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1930).	 The bone of contention no longer existed. JUH caine out in
support of INC's civil disobedience movement.
The Report of the Statutory Commission was published in
May 1930 when INC was busy with its civil disobedience movement.
In continuation of the Statutory Commission, a series of Round
Table Conferences were organised. The first Round Table Conference
was in session (December 1930) while AIML's annual session was
taking place (Allahabad: 29-30 December 1930). Dr. Muhammad Iqbal
(1877-1938),'	 the Muslim poet-philosopher, was the President of
the Allahabad session of AIML.	 Against a perspective of the Nehru
Report and its denunciation by the Muslims, Iqbal spoke as follows:
• . . And as far as I have been able to read the
Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring
that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim
is entitled to full and free development on the
lines of his own culture and tradition in his
own Indian homelands, is recognised as the
basis of a permanent communal settlement, he
will be ready to stake his all for the freedom
of India. The principle that each group is
entitled to free development on its own lines
is not inspired by any feeling of narrow
communalism. There are communalism and
communities. A community which is inspired by
a feeling of ill will towards other communities
is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest
respect for the customs, laws, religious and
social institutions of other communities. Nay,
it is my duty, according to the teaching of the
Quran, even to defend their places of worship,
if need be. Yet I love the communal group
which is the source of my life and behaviour;
and which has formed me what I am by giving me
its religion, its literature, its thought, its
culture, and thereby recreating its whole past,
as a living operative factor, in my present
consciousness. . . India is a continent of human
groups belonging to different races, speaking
different languages, and professing different
religions. Their behaviour is not at all
determined by a common race-consciousness.
Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous
group. The principle of European democracy
cannot be applied to India without recognising
the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand
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for the creation of a Muslim India within India
is, therefore, perfectly justified...
I would like to see the Punjab, North-West
Frontier Province, 	 Sind,	 and Baluchistan
amalgamated into a single state.
Self-government within the British Empire, or
without the British Empire, the formation of a
consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State
appears to me to be the final destiny of the
Muslims, at least of North-West India.
	
The
proposal was put forward before the Nehru
Committee. 178
 They rejected it on the ground
that, if carried into effect, it would give a
very unwieldy State. This is true in so far as
the area is concerned; in point of population
the State contemplated by the proposal would be
much less than some of the present Indian
provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division
and perhaps of some districts [of the Punjab]
where non-Muslims predominate, will make it
less extensive and more Muslim in population so
that the exclusion suggested will enable this
consolidated State to give a more effective
protection to non-Muslim minorities within its
area. 179
2.27	 The Mailis-i-Ahrãr-i-Isläm (Society of the Free People of
Islam) (MAI)
Since the days of the Non-co-operation Movement, INC, JUN
and AIKC had worked together so closely that leading Muslim figures
seemed to occupy the centre of the stage in all three parties.
Among such figures were MawlAnã Abul Kalãm Azãd, Mu! ammad Ali,
Hakim Ajmal Khân, Hasrat Mohãni, Dr. M.A. Ansri and many others.
For instance, Mawlãnã Abul Kalám Azãd, a founder member of JUH,
presided over JUN session (1921), INC special session (1923), and
the Khilafat Conference (1925). Mawlnä Muhammad 'All led a
Khilãfat delegation to London (1920), presided over an INC session
(Coconada: 1923), and served on JUH's appointed committees (1925).
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The publication of the Nehru Report was a turning point
in Muslim politics.	 AIML emerged as a force again. 	 Muslim
supporters of the Nehru Re port defected from JUH and AIKC. They
either wholeheartedly joined INC or formed new groups/parties. The
major defection from AIKC occurred in the Punjab.
The Punjab branch of AIKC was largely dominated by
Ahl-i-Hadls and the Deobandi'u1amä They had greater respect for
an 'aiim (e.g., Mawlãnã Abul Kalãm Azãd) than for a modern educated
leader (e.g., Mawlânã Muhammad 'Ali). Discontented with the
policies of AIKC under Muhainmad'Ali, the Punjab branch supported
the Nehru Report.	 The Punjab branch was finally dissolved by the
top leadership of AIKC.
After a short spell in the wilderness, the erstwhile
members of AIKC Punjab branch organised themselves under the name
of Majiis-i-Ahrãr-i-Isiãm (MAI) (29 December 1929).	 The declared
objectives of the newly-founded party included (a) securing
'independence for the country'; (b) fostering 'better relations
with other communities'; (c) establishing 'an Islamic system'; and
working 'for the uplift of the masses, especially the Muslim
masses' 180
The leadership was still so intoxicated with the
enthusiasm of the Non-co-operation movement that it took MAI into
INC's movement of civil disobedience. Its radical religious
interpretation of Islam provided MAI with a comparatively
substantial base at the level of the masses. 	 It perceived social
change in the early history of Islam as consisting of the overthrow
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of exploitative classes, the restoration of the honour of the
depressed and the poor, and the practice of human equality.181
MAI attracted a considerable section of Punjabi poor and
lower middle-class Muslims to its rank and file.	 It came into
prominence during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931182 when a
determined band of 100 volunteers, led by Mawlãnã Mazhar li Azhar,
marched towards Janunu from Sialkot (Punjab). This bold step of
interfering with policies of a princely state brought MAI its
political reputation.
MAI had an explicitly religious appeal.
	 The leaders, a
number of them 'ularnã', frequently referred to the Qurãn and the
golden age of Islamic history which was free from oppressive and
exploitative classes.
With its strong hatred towards imperialism, MAI developed
a feeling of enmity towards the Ahrnadis. Mirzã Ghuläm Ahmad
Qadiyni (1839-1908), the founder of Ahmadiyyah, was a supporter of
the British and was proud that his father had helped the British
against his countrymen in the 1857 Insurrection. He always prayed
for the imperialism of the British. When he claimed to be a
prophet, the 'u1an' issued a fatwà declaring him käfir. The
grandfather of MAI leader Mawlãnã Habibur Rahinãn Ludhiyanawi, was
the first to mobilise the 'ulamâ'against the activities of Mirz
Ghulm Ahmad.	 Following the religious legacy of the z1aaiä'and its
own anti-imperialist stand, MAI stood against the Ahmadis.	 The
role of Ahinadis during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931 increased
MAI's bitterness towards them.
	
MAI made one of its policy
priorities to counter the missionary activities of the Ahrnaddiyyah
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movement. In 1933, it opened an office in Qadian, the headquarters
of the Ahmadiyyah movement.
2.28	 The Government of India Act, 1935
The Government of India Act, 1935183 was the product of a
number of deliberations that had taken place during the preceding
decade: the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission; the reports
of the three round-table conferences (December 1930 - December
1932); a White Paper on The Communal Award; constitution of a Joint
Select Committee of both Houses of British Parliament including 27
co-opted Indians.
The Government of India Act, 1935 envisaged a federation
of 11 provinces of British India and 560 princely states. 	 At the
federal level, a bicameral legislature was to be introduced.
Members representing the provinces of British India were to be
elected and those representing the interests of princely states
were to be nominated by their Mahärajahs or Nawábs. Matters
pertaining to defence and external affairs were to be placed under
the control of the Governor-General who would be responsible to the
Secretary of State for India and the British Government. 	 The
Governor-General would be empowered with special responsibilities,
among other subjects, for the preservation of peace, safeguarding
the legitimate interests of minorities, and looking after the
financial stability of the Indian Government.
At the provincial level, responsible government was to be
introduced.	 Governors of the provinces were to be appointed on
behalf of His Majesty by a commission.	 The provincial
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legislatures, bicameral for six provinces (i.e. Madras, Bombay,
Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam) and unicameral for
the others (i.e. the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, the
North-West Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind) were to be elected
for five years. The governors would be vested with special powers
in the provinces similar to those given to the Governor-General at
the federal level.	 The franchise was extended from seven million
[in	 1919] to about thirty six million voters
	 [in	 1935],
representing 30 per cent of the adult population.184
INC expressed its dissatisfaction with the Government of
India Act, 1935 with the comment that it represented a 'new charter
of slavery to strengthen the bonds of imperialist domination and to
intensify the exploitation of our masses'. 185
 AIML rejected its
federal part on the grounds that it was 'most reactionary,
retrograde, injurious and fatal ... totally unacceptable' but
notwithstanding the provincial part was seen to be utilised 'for
what it was worth'.186
Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by the two main
established parties in varying degrees, the (British) Indian
Government was determined to bring the Government of India Act,
1935 into effect. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, urged the Indians
to 'give these reforms [The Act, 1935] a fair and reasonable trial
and work the constitution in a spirit of tolerance and
co-operation, for the honour and good of their motherland'.187
INC, AIML and other political parties were persuaded to derive
whatever benefit they could by taking advantage of the provision of
the	 Government of India Act, 1935 relating to responsible
government.	 The federal part of the Act was held in abeyance
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pending the agreement of 50 per cent of the princely states to join
the federation; but the provincial part, relating to the provinces
of (British) India was to come into force with effect from 1 April
1937.
2.29	 The Central Parliamentary Board (CPB)
AIML authorised Muhammad 'Au Jinnäh to form a Central
Parliamentary Board (CPB) to take, charge of the provincial
elections.	 In 1936, AIML, an urban-based Muslim political party,
with little contact with or concern for the masses, was an 'All
India' organisation only in name. It had no proper primary
organisation. The provincial organisation, however, did exist; but
it was inactive. AIML had surrendered whatever influence it had to
AIMC.	 AIML's annual sessions had in the past few years failed to
attract the masses. 	 During the session of AIML in 1930, a quorum
of an average of less than 100 was maintained with the utmost
effort; and the position was similar in the 1931 session. 188
	No
annual sessions were held during 1934 and 1935. 	 Party discipline
was so poor that Nawãbzãdah Liyãqat 'Au Khàn (1895-1951), the then
Honorary General Secretary, aligned himself with the National
Agriculturist Party of the United Provinces, for the purpose of
contesting the election.
AIMC continued to be inactive and ineffective in 1936.
Its affiliates, in their individual position, were more interested
in contesting election from their parties of choice than from the
platform of AI!4C.	 Its executive board under the chairmanship of
'Abdullãh Hrün (1873-1942), after having a few sittings in the
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early months of 1936, decided not to use the AINC platform for
election.
JUH, one of the components of AIMC, was also in disarray.
It had become almost a party of the .Deoband.i 'u1arnã and Deobandis
were divided over the issue of whether or not they should support
INC. Mawlãnã Ashraf'Ali Thänwi resigned from the Rectorship of
Dãr-ul-'ulüm Deoband (1935) under the pretext that the pro-INC
element was preaching its political creed in Dãr_ul_'ulUm. 189 The
Pan-Islainist modern educated group was equally unhappy with JUH's
support of INC's civil disobedience movement (1930), and it tried
to set up a parallel body to JUH at Kanpur (1932). Nawlãnã Abul
Mahasin Muhammad Sajjãd, the JUH leader in Bihar, organised a new
party called the Independent Muslim Party. Its aim was to adopt a
policy dictated by provincial needs rather than in line with JUH's
overall policy.
There were other provincial parties which were led either
entirely or largely by Muslims. At the same time, the Justice
Party of Madras, the Unionist Party of the Punjab, the National
Agriculturist Party of the United Provinces and the Bind United
Party were formed to serve the interests of zarnindãrs in rural
areas irrespective of religion. The Khudãi Khidmatgãr Party of the
NWPP, the Azäd Party and the Muslim Political Party of Bind, and
the Krishak Proja Party of Bengal were parties which were led
entirely by Muslims. These parties of provincial importance were
reluctant to undermine their position by joining CPB. The Khudãi
Khidmatgár Party opted to make an alliance with INC instead of
AIML.
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As a consequence of the hostile attitude of the
provincial parties with a Muslim following and due to AIML's
inherent weakness,	 CPB could not even constitute provincial
parliamentary boards in four of the provinces (NWFP, Sind, Bihar
and Orissa), and candidates could not be found for all the
Muslim-reserved seats.
AIML failed to bring together the parties of the Muslim
majority provinces on to a common platform.	 CPB 'remained little
more than a paper scheme'.19°
MAI, one of the two parties backed by the i1amà'in 1936,
agreed to join CPB on condition that no Ahmadi would be given a
ticket, and that AIML should declare its objective as complete
freedom rather than dominion status. 191
 But soon, MAI parted
company with the leadership of AIML. According to HAl sources, the
bone of contention was the fee of Ps. 750/- imposed on each
candidate.	 HAl's meagre finances made the acceptance of such a
condition impossible.192
JUH had co-operated closely with AIML. It was proclaimed
in CPB's manifesto that in 'all matters of purely religious
character,	 due weight shall be given to opinions of
Jamiat-ularna-i-Hind and Hujtahids'. 193 Mawlãná Abmad SaId, the
Secretary General of JUH, was extremely active in the election
campaign. 194
	He was in constant touch with Jinnáh to take
appropriate steps for furthering AIML's campaign, and was the first
to use the title of 'Qa1d-i-Aam' (the great leader) to refer to
Muhammad li Jinnàh [Moradabad: 7 December 1936].195
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2.30	 The 1937 Election
The election for provincial legislatures was held in
April-May 1937. INC emerged as the majority party in six provinces
(Madras, Bombay, UP, Central Provinces and Berar, Bihar, and
Orissa) and was the largest single party in three others (Bengal,
Assam, and the NWFP). It captured 711 out of 808 general seats in
legislative assemblies.	 It also won 18 seats out of 38 reserved
for 'labour', four seats out of 37 allotted to landholders, and
three out of 56 reserved for 'commerce'.
The party position in the Muslim constituencies of
Legislative Assemblies and of the Legislative Councils is
respectively shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
INC could find only 58 Muslim candidates for 493 seats in
the Legislative Assemblies; it won 26 of these, mainly in the NWFP
(15 seats) where it had the solid support of the Khudái Khidmatgar
Party led by Khãn 'Abdul Ghaffãr Khãn. The remaining 11 seats won
by INC were in Madras, United Provinces, the Punjab and Bihar. 	 It
could secure no Muslim seat in six out of a total of 11 provinces
(Bombay, Bengal, CP and Berar, Assam, Orissa and Sind).
So far as Muslim seats in the Legislative Councils were
concerned, INC could not win even a single seat.
AIML won 108 seats out of 493 Muslim seats in the
Legislative Assemblies.	 In Bengal, out of 121 seats AIML won 39.
In the Punjab, the situation was extremely poor.	 Only one AIML
candidate won in the Punjab Legislative Assembly election. In the
148
Table 2.2
The Result of the 1937 Election for Reserved Muslim Seats
in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies
Reserved Mush. Seats
Asse.bli
	 -
Province Total General Vonen, Total AIML IIC Indepen- Other Parties
	
Seats	 others	 dents
Madras	 215	 28	 -	 28	 9	 4	 6	 9 [Justice Party 8, Muslin
Progressive 11
Bonbay	 115	 29	 1	 30	 18	 -	 12	 -
Bengal	 250	 111	 4	 121	 39	 -	 41	 41 [Erishak Proji Party 36,
Tippra Irishak Sanity 5]
United	 228	 64	 2	 66	 26	 1	 30	 9 [Jational lgricultunst
Provinces	 Party 9]
Pujab	 175	 84	 2	 86	 1	 2	 5	 18 [Unionist Party 74,
Kajlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islai 2,
Ittiid-i-Kh11at 2]
	
152	 39	 1	 40	 -	 4	 16	 20 [Najlis-i-Ahrar-i-IslIi 3,
United Party , Jo Part! 111
CP and	 112	 14	 -	 14	 5	 -	 1	 8 [Muslin Parlianentary Group
Aerar	 (Rauf Shah Group) 81
Assal	 108	 34	 -	 34	 10	 -	 -	 24 [Muslii Party 241
flY!	 50	 36	 -	 36	 -	 15	 2	 19 [Jo Party 19]
Onssa	 60	 4	 -	 4	 -	 -	 3	 1 [Jational Party 11
	
60	 33	 1	 34	 -	 -	 -	 34 [Muslin Political Party 15
United Party 11,
Azad Party 1, Doubtf vi 11
	
185	 482	 11	 493 108	 26	 116	 243
[Source: Return Shoving the Results of Elections in India: 1937 [Ciad. 5589] (London: Bin
Injeity's stationery Office, 1931) 1
lute The result, reported ii newspapers differed hon the official 'return', but the
official figures are preferred to the nutually contradicting unofficial figures. Official
figure; are anbiguous fur eacb province, a anther of tethers are shown as 'Independants' but
along vilk then none are labelled 'Jo Party', and in the case of Sind one indepeudut nether
is shown as 'ioabtful' For unofficial figures, based upon newspaper reports, see Zaidi,
I B , 'Aspects of the Developient of Muslin League Policy, 1937-47' in Ci. Philips and
Jazwritt, Mary Ioreeu (ads , The Partition of India (London: George Allen and Unvin,
1773 pp 245-215
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Table 2.3
The Result of the 1937 Election for Reserved Muslim Seats in the Legislative Councils
Province	 Total	 Muslim	 AIML	 tNC	 Indepndents	 Others
	
Seats	 Seats
Madras	 46	 7	 3	 -	 2	 2 (Justice Party)
Bombay	 26	 5	 2	 -	 3	 -
Bengal	 30	 17	 7	 -	 9	 1 (Krishak Proja Party)
United	 52	 17	 -	 -	 16	 1 (National Agriculturist
Provinces	 Party)
Bihar	 14	 4	 -	 -	 1	 3 (United Party 2 No Party 1)
Assam	 18	 6	 -	 -	 -	 6 (Muslim Party 6)
Total	 186	 56	 12	 -	 31	 13
[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India: 1937 (Cmnd 5589), (London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), pp.26-27, 53-54, 70-71, p.91, p.106]
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other two provinces with Muslim majorities - NWFP and Sind - AIML
could not win even a single seat. Nevertheless AIML scored
substantial success in the Muslim minority provinces (Madras,
Bombay, United Provinces, CP and Berar, Assani).
Of the Muslim constituencies for the 	 Legislative
Councils, AIML could get 12 seats out of 56, and all these were
from three provinces (Madras, Bombay and Bengal).
An analysis of the results would indicate that neither
INC nor AIML was very popular with Muslim voters. 243 Muslim seats
in the Legislative Assemblies (nearly 50 per cent of the total)
were won by the provincial parties; of the remaining 50 per cent,
Independent candidates took their share of 23.5 per cent.
Out of a total of 56 seats in the Legislative Councils'
31 (i.e. more than 55 per cent) were won by the Independent
candidates; 13 seats were shared among the different provincial
parties. Muslim voters cast their lot with provincial parties -
the Unionists in the Punjab, the Khudà'i Khidrnatgãr Party in the
NWFP, the United Party and the Muslim Political Party in Sind, and
the Krishak Projã Party in Bengal.
2.31	 The Struggle between INC and AIML
During the interval between the passage of the Government
of India Act, 1935 to the commencement of the 1937 election, INC
and AIML had fairly friendly relations. Muhammad kli Jinnh
returned to India from London (24 October 1934) and was still an
'ambassador of unity'. He told party workers (March 1936) that
151
[t]he Hindus and Muslims must be organised
separately, and once they are organised they
will understand each other better, and then we
will not have to wait for years for
understanding ... I am helping eighty million
[Muslim] people and if they are more organised
they will be all the more useful for the
[Indian] national struggle.196
The manifestos of INC and AIML were drafted according to
their differing orientations. AIML especially highlighted cultural
issues.	 It pledged to 'protect and promote the Urdu language and
script', 'to protect religious rights of Musalmans' and 'to make
every effort to secure the repeal of repressive laws'. 197 It also
spoke of the economic development of the country in general.
INC, for its part, highlighted economic issues and
pledged land reform and a policy of welfare of labourers and
peasants. The cultural theme was kept at a low key.
In spite of minor differences, the leaders of INC and
AIML and impartial observers alike reached, by and large, similar
conclusions about the manifestos which they regarded as more or
less identical with regard to political issues.198
Close co-operation existed between Rafi Ahinad Qidwai of
INC and Chawdhari Khaliquzzamãn of AIML in UP. The latter, who was
an erstwhile Congressman, had joined AIML 'as a vote-catching
device lest otherwise he should be disturbed by his fellow
Muslims'. 199	INC and AIML co-operated in a few constituencies
where both viewed the National Agriculturist Party as the opponent.
Rafi'Ahmad Qidwã'i, the only Congress Muslim candidate, managed to
get elected with the help of Chawdhari. Khaliquzzamãn.
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After the election, provincial ministries were to be
formed.	 INC leaders indulged in controversy as to whether or not
the Governors of the Provinces should exercise the special powers
vested in them under the Government of India Act, 1935. 	 In four
non-INC provinces (i.e. Bengal, Sind, Assam and the Punjab), there
was	 no difficulty	 in forming ministries. 	 In	 Bengal
A.K. Fazl-ul-Haq formed a coalition government under the leadership
of the Krishak Projä Party, along with AIML, Independent members
and the representatives of the scheduled castes. 	 Fazl-ul-Haq also
enjoyed the support of 25 European members of the Legislature. 	 In
the Punjab, the Unionist Party, under the guidance of Sir Sikandar
Hayát (1892-1942), formed a government.	 Similarly, Allah Bakhsh
and Sir Muhammad Sa'adullh formed coalition governments
respectively in Sind and Assain.
Upon the assurance of Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, to
the effect that Governors would not unduly interfere with the
affairs of the provincial governments, INC decided (7 July 1937) to
form ministries in seven provinces. From the party position in the
provinces of Bihar, Orissa, CP and Berar, Bombay, Madras and the
NWFP, the question of any INC co-operating with other parties was a
non-issue in view of its overwhelming majority. 	 In UP, however,
INC had the support of only one Muslim member of the Legislative
Assembly.
Negotiations for coalition took place on the basis of an
'unwritten agreement' between AIML on the one hand and on the other
the INC Muslim leaders of UP.
	
At the same time, regard had to be
paid to the strategic importance of UP which contained some 15 per
cent of Muslim population, and had been a citadel of Muslim
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politics. Mawlänà Abul Kalãin Azd, the INC negotiator, offered
AIML a coalition on condition that it agreed to cease to function
as a separate party in the Legislative Assembly, to dissolve the
Muslim League Parliamentary Board in UP, and to refrain from
putting up its candidates in any future by-elections. 20° The AIML
leadership characterised these terms as the 'death warrant' of the
party and refused to accept the offer.
Mawlãnã Abul Kaläm Azãd, in his account of these events,
blamed Jawaharlal Nehru on the grounds that the negotiations broke
down due to the latter's insistence on giving only one seat to AIML
instead of the two demanded by its leaders. In Nawlãnã kzäd's
view, Nehru made a serious mistake which resulted in strengthening
AIML position which 'ultimately led to Pakistan'.201
INC, politically in need of Muslim support in the
Legislative Assembly, offered a place in the Cabinet to Hãfiz
Muhammad Ibrähim, elected on an AIML ticket. He accepted the offer
and crossed the floor. AIIIL interpreted this as a calculated
attack against it. The rift between AIML and INC grew wider and
wider from this point onwards.
2.32	 The Pe-vitalisation of AIML
The controversy between INC and the (British 	 dian
Government on the question of the Executive powers at the disposal
of the Governors, had the effect of intensifying the anxiety of the
minorities, safeguards for whose interests had been vested in the
Governors. Many Muslims came to believe that their rights uld be
trampled upon by INC ministries in the Province.
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The outcome of the 1937 election made it clear to Muslim
intellectuals (e.g.,
	 Dr.	 Muhammad Iqbal) that 'a political
organisation' which gave 'no promise of improving the lot of the
average Muslim'	 was incapable of attracting 'our 	 [Muslim]
masses'. 202
	At the same time, INC's landslide victory in several
provinces made the leaders of the Muslim majority provinces realise
that INC would definitely be stronger than any other party if it
decided to give effect to the federal part of the Government of
India Act, 1935.	 And, what was t prevent INC from creating a
strong federal government?203
In the light of such a general perspective, the annual
session of AIML after the election (Lucknow:
	 15-18 October 1937),
proved to be a landmark in its political career. 	 For the first
time since its formation (1906), it opened its membership to every
adult Muslim and spoke of raising the living conditions of
labourers and increasing their wages. It was resolved 'to frame
and put into effect an economic, social and educational programme'.
The ultimate aim of AIML was changed from 'full responsible
government' to 'full independence'.204
The leaders of the ruling parties in Bengal, the Punjab
and Assain (Sir Sikandr Hayät of the Unionist Party,	 A.K.
Fazl-ul-Haq of the Krishak Projä Party and Sir Muhammad Sa'adullãh
of the Muslim Party) were present at the Lucknow session with large
numbers of their followers.	 AIML's most important achievement on
this occasion consisted of winning the Unionist Party's support.
According to the Sikandar-Jinnãh Pact, 205 Muslim members of the
Unionist Party were taken into the fold of AIML; and AIML secured
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the support of the Unionists on national issues concerning the
Muslim community.
In UP, the defeat of the National Agriculturist Party
(which won 22 seats out of a total of 228 in the Legislative
Assembly), followed by the enactment of the United Provi
Tenancy Act, alarmed the big zariündãrs. In their desperation, they
turned to political parties opposed to the ruling INC. Thus it was
that the Muslim zamindãrs of the national Agriculturist Party
turned to AIML and the Hindu zamlndãrs to the Hindu Mahãsabhã.
From the election results, INC realised its meagre
following among the Muslims and started a campaign of 'Muslim mass
contact' with a view to propagating its message among the Muslims.
AIML resented the campaign which it countered by publicising the
ill-treatment being meted out to the Muslim community in provinces
in which INC was in power. 206
 Through its propaganda machinery,
AIML persuaded the average Muslim to believe that INC would never
attach any importance to the preservation of Muslim culture. The
adoption of Vande Mãtaram20 ' as a national anthem, the educational
schemes of Vidyã Handir and Wãrdhá, the encouragement of Devanãgri
script, and the on-going Hindu-Muslim riots, seemed to prove the
point.	 When INC called for the resignation en bloc of its
ministries (22 October 1939), on the plea that India had been
dragged into World War II without the consent of the Indian
leaders, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnãh called upon Muslims to observe on 22
December 1939 as Deliverance Day. The resolution that was passed
in various gatherings on that day embodied the view that
[t]he Congress Ministry [sic.] both in the
discharge of their duties of the administration
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and in the legislatures have done their best to
flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim
culture, and have interfered with their
religious and social life, and trampled upon
their economic and political rights.
According to R. Coupland, a constitutional historian of
(British) India,
Indian observers agreed with British officials
that Hindu-Muslim relations had never in their
experience been so bad [as in 1939].209
2.33	 The Lahore Resolution (23 March 1940)
This background of fear of INC domination (equated to
Hindu domination) in an independent India made AIML think in terms
of partition. Several writers and politicians had proposed
partition as a solution to the Hindu-Muslim riots and tensions.210
Muhammad Iqbãl was the first to echo publicly the idea of a Muslim
state either within India or without (Annual Session of MIlL,
Allahabad, December 1930).
Chawdhari Rabmat Ali (1897-1951), a Cambridge student,
denounced the constitutional schemes of the Indian Federation and
urged the creation of a Federation of Pakistan as separate from the
Indian Federation. He suggested the name 'Pakistan' in January
1933.211 In October 1938, the Sind Muslim League Provincial
Conference canvassed the idea of 'Federation of Indian Muslims'
with	 a	 separate	 constitution	 to	 assure	 'political
self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and
Muslims' 212
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AIML held its annual session (Lahore: 	 22-24 March 1940)
in which a resolution for a separate Muslim homeland was passed.
Echoing Sayyid Abmad Khän, Muhammad 'All Jinnáh spelled out in his
presidential address that Hindus and Muslims were two nations. He
said:
It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our
Hindu friends fail to understand the real
nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not
religions in the strict sense of the word, but
are, in fact, different and distinct social
orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and
Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality...
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different
religious philosophies,	 social customs and
literatures. They neither intermarry, nor
interdine together; and indeed they belong to
two different civilisations which are based
mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.
Their aspects on life and of life are
different.	 It is quite clear that Hindus and
Musalmans derive their inspiration from
different sources of history. 	 They have
different epics, their heroes are different and
they have different episodes. Very often the
hero of one is a foe of the other, and
likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.
To yoke together two such nations under a
single State, one as a numerical minority and
the other as a majority, must lead to growing
discontent and final destruction of any fabric
that may be so built up for the government of
such a State.213
The resolution demanding the partition of India, ran as
follows:
No constitutional plan would be workable in
this country or acceptable to the Muslims
unless it is designed on the following basic
principles, viz., that geographically
contiguous units are demarcated into regions
which should be so constituted, with such
territorial readjustments as may be necessary,
that the areas in which the Muslims are
numerically in a majority as in the North
Western and Eastern zones of India should be
grouped to constitute Independent States in
which the constituent units shall be autonomous
and sovereign.214
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This resolution was incorporated as an 'aim and object'
of AIML's constitution at its next annual session (Madras: 	 April
1941).
2.34	 The Growth of AIML (1937-1947)
Under the able guidance of Muhammad Ali Jinnãh, a shrewd
politician and strategist par excellence, AIML grew from strength
to strength during the decade of 1937-47.	 He clearly perceived
that the constitutional struggle for India's independence would
finally be resolved through the initiative of the colonial power.
He strongly believed that AIML should be raised to the status of
the sole recognised representative organ of the Indian Muslims.
Soon after the outbreak of World War II, AIML offered its support
to the (British) Indian authorities in return for creating 'a sense
of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans',	 and
recognising AIML as '[t]he only organisation that [could] speak on
behalf of Muslim India.' 215 The Punjab and Bengal ministries,
which were closely linked to AIML, gave unconditional support to
the war efforts of the Indian government.	 Punjab supplied a
continuous stream of recruits to the army during the war.
In contrast to AIML, INC, which was proud of its
representative character, opted for a policy of confrontation. 	 It
withdrew from provincial ministries. 	 This situation added to the
relative importance of AIML.
British defeats on the Eastern Front compelled the
British Government to seek INC support in the war effort. Sir
Stafford Cripps visited India (March-April 1942) with the mission
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of seeking the co-operation of INC and AIML by promising a
constitutional scheme.
	 AIML's demand for a separate Muslim
homeland was validated in the scheme, by means of a provision to
the effect that any province that did not wish to accede to the
Indian federation could secede from it. 216 INC, sensing Britain's
weakness in its defeat at the hands of Japan in Malaya and Burma,
rejected Cripps' offer as a 'postdated cheque on a crashing
bank' 217
INC took the policy of confrontation to a high pitch with
the 'Quit India' resolution (14 July 1942), fully endorsed by the
All India Congress Committee (8 August 1942). 	 It demanded the
immediate 'withdrawal of the British power from India'; otherwise,
'a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible
scale' 218 under the leadership of Gandhi would be launched.
The	 'Quit India'	 movement was crushed, 	 though
disturbances were 'serious enough in any circumstances'. 219
	INC
was outlawed; its most important leaders were put behind bars. The
political vacuum created as a result of the failure of the 'Quit
India' movement, proved highly beneficial to the growth of AIML.
It had called upon the Muslims to have nothing to do with INC; and
offered the (British) Indian government its support if only the
government would give an undertaking to create an independent State
of Pakistan.
Lord Wavell succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy (October
1943) when the War was still going on. He came out with a proposal
to form a 'new Executive Council'. The three main tasks of the
proposed Executive Council would be to
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1) prosecute the War against Japan;
2) carry on the governmental responsibilities until a
new constitution was framed; and,
3) consider how an agreed-upon constitution could be
f rained.
As a means of forming the proposed Executive Council, a
conference was called of the leaders of AIML, INC, the Premiers of
the four non-Congress ruled provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Assam),
the former Premier of Bengal, former Premiers of the provinces
where no ministry could be formed after the resignation of INC
ministries (Bombay, UP, Orissa, Madras, Central Provinces, Bihar),
leaders of political parties in the Central Assembly,
representatives of the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes (Simla:
25-29 June 1944).
The gulf between INC and AIIIL could not be bridged at
this meeting. INC claimed that it was a national and not a
communal organisation, and it therefore had the right to nominate
not only Hindus but also members of other communities.
	 AIML, for
its part, emphatically asserted that it was the only body which
represented Indian Muslims; and that it had the exclusive right to
nominate the Muslim members of the Council.220
While being deeply involved in winning recognition from
the (British) Indian government for AIML as the only representative
Muslim organisation, Jinnãh was equally concerned to rally the
Muslims under the AIML banner.	 Muslims were categorically told
that Hinduism and Islam stood in sharp contrast - from doctrine and
ritual worship to the elaborate social systems. 	 There is nothing
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common - from birth to death - between the two communities. The
AIML leadership made use of the religious cleavage. The cry of
'Islam in danger' played a part in mobilizing the Muslim population
especially where it was in a minority and even in the province of
the Punjab where the margin between the Muslim majority and the
non-Muslim minorities was sufficiently narrow to cause political
concern among the former.
From the early '40s onwards, the pronouncements made tq
Jinnãh and other leaders of AIML became increasingly
Islamically-oriented. For instance, Jinnãh told the MML session
(Karachi: December 1943)
(ut is the Great Book, [the Qurän], that is
the sheet-anchor of Muslim India.221
He reiterated his views in an address to the Pin]an
Students' Federation (March 1944) in which he asserted that oipx
bedrock and sheet-anchor is Islam... Islam 15 our iie
complete code for our life'. 222
 He pleaded for separate aationlond
of Indian Muslims on the basis of religion: 'Islam is tot merely a
religious doctrine but a realistic and practical code of
cond ctt.223 He told the NIFP Muslim League Provincial onference
November 1945 that
the Muslims demand Pakistan, where they could
rule according to their own code of life and
ac ording to their own cultural growth
traditions and Islamic laws.224
The desire for an Islamic vay of life and fear of Eirnu
'cm1ntior in an independent India were the na;or inediants of
1ML's natinal mo,e ent.
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Jinnãh had an open course before him, to win over the
Muslim voters through mass contact. 	 But, he refrained from
adopting such a course because of his temperament, 225
 and the
formidable resistance that he anticipated from provincial parties
and influential individuals. 	 These influentials, either involved
in party politics or playing their game individually, were largely
zamindãrs and the elders of barãdaris (groups based on kinship).
Jinnãh was able to enrol these people in AIML and automatically
captured their boroughs in favour of AIML.
Since 1937 the Unionist Party of the Punjab and Krishak
Projã Party of Bengal had been supporting AIML's policies at the
national level.	 The link between AIML and Krishak .Projä Party,
however, broke when Fazl-ul-Hag, the leader of the latter and Chief
Minister of Bengal, joined the Defence council (1941) in defiance
of the former's high command.	 Even though he was expelled from
AIML he was able to carry on as Chief Minister for some time before
the Bengal government was replaced by an AIML government under
Khawäjah Nazim-ud-din.	 The Unionist-AIML alliance ended after
seven years in May 1944, when Khizar Hayát Tiwna, the Chief
Minister, was expelled from AIML. The members of both these
provincial parties continued to move into AIML during the run up to
the 1945-46 election.
The Muslim members of the Sind Legislative Assembly had
been returned on the tickets of different parties or as
Independents.	 Before the Karachi Session of AIML (December 1943)
all of them, with the exception of Mawl Bakhsh, joined AIML.
Similarly, the Independents in NWFP co-operated with AIML.
	 Sardär
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Awrangzeb Khn led the AIML ministry for some time (May 1943 -
March 1945).
AIML, though not organised on a broad mass basis,
especially in Muslim majority provinces, showed a capacity for
winning election.	 Until July 1945, AIML had lost only one of 70
by-elections which it had fought since 1937.226
AIML was equipped with all the paraphernalia of a
political party.
	 A student wing of AIML was organised under
'All-India Muslim Students' Federation'. 227
 A country-wide corps
of 'Muslim National Guards' was raised (May 1944), consisting of
more than a million persons. 228
	A 'Committee of Writers' was
formed (1944) which started 'Pakistan Literature Series' 229 'to
dispel misconceptions and help all fair-minded people to make a
dispassionate study of the peculiar conditions of India and
appreciate the position and viewpoint of the Muslim nation in
India' 230
AIML rapidly secured a strong voice in the press, either
by founding its own newspapers or by winning over established ones
and persuading them to publicise AIML's policies. 231
 AIML's press
was duly aided by the Orient Press, a Muslim news agency, founded
in 1942.
The idea of Muslim separatism with potential territorial
bases in the northwestern (the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan)
and the northeastern (which now constitutes Bangladesh) zones
gained the support of all the influential classes of Muslims within
AIML.	 The overall success of AIML in by-elections and the sharp
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difference between the religions of the Muslims and the Hindus
convinced intellectuals, 	 even outside the purview of AIML's
influence of the need for some form of separatism.
	 K.M. Panikkar
(1895-1963), a scholarly caste-Hindu, advocated that the separation
of	 'Pakistan' would be 'obviously the one way' 232
 in which the
Hindu-Muslim problem could be solved.
C. Rajagopalachari (1879-1972), a moderate INC leader and
ex-Premier of Madras,	 favoured the creation of Pakistan,
consisting of the Muslim majority areas, subject to a referendum of
all their inhabitants.	 He suggested a formula to that effect at a
meeting of the All India Congress Committee.
	 Although it was
rejected at the time (May 1942), it later became the basis of the
Gãndhi-Jinnh Talks (May 1944).233
The communist leaders decided to support 'what is just
and right' in the Pakistan demand.
	 G. Adhikari, the leading
theoretician, writing on the framework of the doctrine of
nationality, stated as follows:
where ever people of the Muslim faith
living together in a territorial unit form a
nationality ... they certainly have the right
to autonomous state existence just like other
nationalities in India.234
2.35	 Split in JUH
During the period when INC was in power in the provinces
(1937-1939), dissension occurred within the rank and file of JUH as
Indian Muslims became more and more conscious of their separate
identity.	 JUH, being a Muslim party under the leadership of the
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u1a.ma was fully aware of the need to keep up the cultural and
religious identity of the Muslims; it was therefore, not behind
AIML in its denunciation of the Wirdhã and Vidyã Nandir educational
schemes, 235 which the INC ministries adopted.	 JUH believed that
they would undermine the Muslim culture and religion.
In spite of Mawlân Ahmad Sa'id's efforts to rally Muslim
support for AIML in the 1937 election, there was no consensus on
the question among the rank and file in JUH.
	
Some of the'ulamã'of
JUH	 (e.g. Mawlãnä Hifzur Rahiian) were active in INC politics.
Mawlän Hifzur Rahmän had been a member of the working committee of
the UP Congress party. 	 He had played a crucial role in winning
over Häfiz Muhammad Ibrhim (a relative and member of the UP
Legislative Assembly), to INC.236
INC's ideology of 'Indian nationalism' was a matter of
controversy among Muslim intellectuals. On a theological basis,
Islam is opposed to nationalism. In the traditional view, all the
Muslims in the world are supposed to belong to one umrnah on the
basis of belief, irrespective of their land, language and colour.
All the non-Muslims,	 whatever the differences between them,
constituted one community, vis-à-vis the Muslim.	 Contrary to
established traditional views, Mawlnä Husayn Ahmad Madani
(1879-1958)	 propounded a theory of nationalism based on
geographical identity, irrespective of the religion professed by
the people.	 He advocated this viewpoint in 1938 in a treatise
Hutahiddah Qawmi yat Awr Islä.rn231 (Composite Nationalism and Islam).
This treatise provoked instant reaction from the 'ulamã'as well as
the modern educated Muslim intellectuals. 	 Nawlãnä Sayyid Abul A'1
Mawddi (1903-1979) contributed an authoritative rebuttal to it.238
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Muhammad Iqbàl, the poet-philosopher, carried on a long controversy
with Mawlnà Husayn Ahmad Madani. 239
 The latter, in spite of his
scholarship, could not hold his position firm on the issue that
Hindus and Muslims in India formed 'one nation'.
Mawlänã Ashraf li Thãnwi had resigned from the post of
Rector of Där-ul-'ulUm Deoband. In 1938, he began to side with AIML
openly.	 He advised his adherents to join AIML; and a branch of
AIML was organised in Thanah .Bhawan, the town where he lived, with
his blessing (April 1938). 240
 A delegation of his close associates
attended the Patna Session of AIML (26-29 December 1938).
	
His
message to the leaders of AIML included advice to the effect that
they should take part in obligatory worship in their daily life,
and a council of 'ulamã'be attached to AIML.
	 The council of 'ularna'
was meant to advise AIML in matters of a purely religious nature;
and the close co-operation with the 'ulamä'would increase AIML's
strength because the masses, under the influence of the 'ulamä,'
would be automatically attracted to it.241
Mawlãnä Ashraf AlI Thãnwi looked on INC as an irreligious
party, committed to communism, under the pretext of the socialist
utterances of Jawãharlãl Nehru.	 He feared the elimination of
religion	 if INC were to come to power. 242
	Therefore,	 he
automatically disliked any party sympathetic to the cause of INC.
He turned down the invitation of fellow Deobandi 'ularnã 7 to attend
the annual session of JUH (Delhi: 3-5 March 1939).
Mawlãnã }jusayn Ahmad Madani reached the helm of JUH's
affairs in 1940. He replaced Mufti Kifáyatullãh as President; and
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presided over JUH for three consecutive sessions (i.e. June 1940,
March 1942, and May 1945).
	
In January 1940, JUH's Working
Committee endorsed the INC stand on World War II and resolved to
support its campaign. 	 The glaring difference of opinion between
Mawlânâ Husayn Ahmad Madani (himself a teacher in Dàr-ul-'ulüm
Deoband) and some teachers with Thãnwi connections (e.g., Mawlãnã
Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmãni, Muhammad Ibrhm Balyw1, Mufti Muhanunad
Shafi', Mawlãnã Zahür Abmad and Khalifah Muhammad Aqil), on the
issue of co-operation with INC came to a head; and, the weaker
party with the Thànw connection was forced to resign.
2.36	 The 'Demand for Pakistan' and the 'U1arn'
With the passage of the Lahore Resolution (1940) of AIML,
the 'ulamä'becanie divided. 	 JUH, under the leadership of Mawlãnã
Madani, opposed the resolution. The'ulaznã outside JUH, generally
upheld the resolution on the basis of the two-nation theory. 	 They
were unanimous in opposing Indian nationalism based on the argument
of geographical homogeneity, 	 but could not agree that Indian
Muslims were a nation, detached from the remaining body of Muslim
ummah. The 'ulamá who were fully in accord with AIML, later formed
their organisation Jarn'iyat-u1-'U1amã-i-Is1.m (JUI) and worked for
the cause of AIML.	 There was a tiny group of 'u1am'which neither
supported 'Indian Nationalism' nor 'Indian Muslim Nationalism'.
The chief ideologue of this group was MawThn Abul Alá Mawdüdi.
The group was, however, politically weak at the time; but, its
approach was so logical and consistent that it did attract some
attention.
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It is appropriate to consider the stand of JUH and
Mawlãn Mawdi:idi on the demand for Pakistan with AIML as its
principal exponent.
2.36.1	 The Position of JUH
JUH's response to the Lahore Resolution of AIML was
hostile.	 It was the moving spirit behind 'Azãd Muslim Conference'
(ANC) (Delhi:	 27-30 April 1.940) which was attended by splinter
groups of nationalist Muslims, namely All India Muslim Hajlis, MAI,
All India Homin Conference, Khudãi Khidmatgar Party,
Anjuman-i-Watan (Baluchistan) and the All India Shi'ah Political
Conference.	 ANC expressed strong opposition to the Lahore
Resolution and to the division of India.
	 It urged agreement on a
constitutional scheme with appropriate safeguards for the Muslim
culture and religion.	 ANC appointed a Board to make
recommendations for securing a lasting settlement of the
Hindu-Muslim question.	 It, however, never met to chalk out a
programme.	 Nevertheless, JUH put forward a formula of its own in
1942.	 The constitutional scheme proposed by JTJH envisaged a
federal government with a weak centre, incorporating safeguards
which the religious majority could not transgress.243
JUH opposed the demand for Pakistan on the following
grounds:244
1)	 The British Raj was the main enemy of
freedom-loving Indians.	 Muslims,	 according to
their religion, were bound to struggle for freedom.
But, they were in no position to drive out the
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British without the co-operation of the Hindu
majority in a joint struggle.
Pakistan was no more than an aspect of the British
policy of 'divide and rule'.
2) The realisation of the Pakistan demand and the
partition of India would split and weaken the
Muslim community. The Muslims left outside
Pakistan in Hindu majority provinces would be
reduced to the status of an ineffective minority.
3) The partition of India would hinder the missionary
activities of the 'ulamã' (one of the central
objectives of JUH being to propagate and spread the
message of Islam through peaceful missionary work).
4) An Islamic state on the pattern of the Rightly
Guided Caliphs was a chimera. A strange irony that
the very people who neither had an outwardly
Islamic appearance nor the character that accorded
with Islam should want to build an Islamic state;
and to conduct it on the basis of religion. It was
quite unbelievable that such people would revive
Islam. Their relation to Islam was that of
darkness to light or of water to fire.
The leaders of AIML spoke of the Islamic law when
they had to address the Muslim audience in order to
win popular support. 	 But, in legislatures, they
did not care for it.	 For example, Jinnãh's stand
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on the Shari'at Bill (1935) moved by Hãfiz 'Abdullãh
of Lyallpur was deeply shocking to sensibilities
of the 'u1amã
The AIML leadership was, however, strong in its viewpoint
of asserting the separate nationhood of the Muslim. 	 Even so, it
was vulnerable because it was lukewarm in the observance of the
fundamentals of Islam in public life. In order to cover their weak
position, AIML's leaders depicted the 'ulamä'of JUH as the paid
agents of INC, bent upon making their own fortunes. 245
 The piety
and simple-living of the JUH 'izlamä'was enough to convince their
adherents that the AIML propaganda against them was baseless.
Nevertheless, the 'ulamã'publicly refuted the allegation with all
the vigour at their command. They used to swear: 	 'God may not be
pleased with them if they had ever got any financial help from
INC' 246
2.36.2	 Jam'iyat-u1-'U1amã-i-Is1ra (Association of the 'Ula.mä' of
Islam) (JUI)
The activities of JUN were 'a thorn in the flesh of [All
India] Muslim League' 247
 and the latter was desperately in need of
the support of some or the other among the 'ulamã
Mawlânã Shabbir Ahinad 'Usmãni (1885-1949), among the
dissidents within JUN, was, in his own right, a figure as learned
and respected as Mawlnã Husayn Ahinad Madani.
	
He was the leader
most suited to fulfil the role of opposing the activities of JUH.
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Mawlnã Rãghib Ahsan from Calcutta had been a staunch
AIML worker for a long time.	 He called a convention of the 'ulamä'
from all over India (Calcutta: 26-29 October 1945). He had AIML's
support.	 More than five hundred du1amã attended. Mawlãnã Muhammad
Ibrählm Siyãlkoti, a pro-AIML 'aiim from the Punjab, highlighted in
his address the religious and cultural differences between the
Hindu and Muslim communities.	 He persuaded the 'uiarnã' to accept
Jinnáh's leadership, irrespective of his and his colleagues' life
style.	 He made a reference to Abü Ayüb Ansãri, a companion of the
Prophet, who joined the military campaign against Constantinople
under the command of Yazid B. Mu'ãwiyah.
	
The 'uiamâ'were in no way
better than or equal to Abü Ayub Ansãri and Jinnab had not been
worse than Yazld.248
At this convention, the jarn'iyat-ui-tiiamã-i-Isiäin (JUI)
was launched with the sole purpose of supporting AIML in its
struggle to achieve Pakistan.
	 Mawlánã Shabblr Abmad 4Usmäni was
elected as President in absentia.
The core of JUI, like that of JUH, consisted of Deobandis
who had parted company with JUH. Mawlãnã Shabbir Ahmad who had
worked side by side with INC during the Khiiãfat movement, was now
in the opposite camp. He justified his stance on the grounds that
co-operation with non-Muslims was lawful when Muslims held a
dominant position and non-Muslims played a secondary role. 	 In the
Khjlãfat movement, Indian Muslims were holding the banner of
struggle and the Hindus joined them. 	 But, after the collapse of
the Khiiãfat movement, INC, under Hindu leadership, became a menace
to Muslim culture in India.	 The struggle of INC would not result
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in raising the Islamic Order; it was therefore unlawful for Muslims
to join INC during the '40s.249
2.36.3	 The All India Sunnl Conference (AISC)
With the emergence of JUI, led by Mawlàn Shabbir Ahinad
'Umni, a Deoband! 'aiim, the hard-core Bareiwi'u1azn'pref erred to
revive their own organisation, the All India Sunni Conference
(AISC) rather than join JUl.
	 AISC was founded at a convention of
the Bareiwi 'uiamã'[Moradabad: 16-19 March 19251 when Hindu-Muslim
antagonism was in full swing and the Deobandi 'uiarnã'of JUH were
blamed for their part in the manifestation of Hindu-Muslim unity
during the Khiiäfat and Non-Co-operation movements. Mawlãnã
Na'im-ud-din Murãdãbädl and MawlânA Hãmid Razã Khn were the
outstanding figures to organise AISC. The former was an ardent
disciple and the latter a son of Mawlãnã Ahinad Razã Khãn. AISC
soon became inactive. Its lofty objectives such as the economic
uplift of Muslims and giving proper guidance to them in religious
matters, proved to be mere paper promises.
AISC was revived during the 1945-46 election. 	 Mawlãnã
Abdul Hinid Badayünl, a Bareiwi 'aiim, was associated with AIML for
a long time.	 As the propaganda secretary of AISC, he managed to
get pro-AIML messages from his fellow Bareiwi iiama
	 After the
election, AISC held a large gathering [Banaras: 27-30 April 19461
under the presidentship of Pir Jamã'at 'Au Shah 'Alipuri. 	 It
resolved to support AIML in its demand for Pakistan.
The Ahi-i-Sunnat 'uiama' and mashà'ikh are
prepared to render every possible sacrifice in
making the movement for an Islamic State a
success. They bind themselves to struggle for a
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state, based on the juristic principles in the
light of the Qurãn and the traditions of the
Prophet.25°
AISC constituted a committee of 13 leading Bareiwi 'u1am'
and p.irs to chalk out a framework for the Islamic State.
2.36.4	 The Position of Mawlãnä !lawdüdi and his Party
A section of the Deobandis under JUl and Bareiwis under
AISC accepted AIML's stand towards JUH as their own. 	 The stand
made by Mawlãnã Mawdüdi was different from both the pro- and
anti-AIML 'u1amã
Before embarking on the delineation of Mawdidi's position
with regard to the demand for Pakistan, it would be appropriate to
discuss his career; for, his role during the crucial period of the
freedom movement continues to be a matter of controversy even in
contemporary Pakistan.
Mawlãnã Abul Al Mawdüdi, 251 of an old Delhi family, was
born in Aurangabad (Andra Pradesh) on 25 September 1903. 	 His
father, Mawlawl Ahmad Iasan, was among the early students of
Aligarh College and adopted the Aligarh Westernised way of living.
By profession, he was a lawyer and practised at Meerut (up ) before
he moved to the Nizám's dominions. 	 At a late stage in his life he
turned to religion to such an extent that he gave up his legal
practice fearing that he might have inadvertently saved culprits
from legal punishment or pleaded for penalty against innocent
persons. He developed a dislike of Western education and nostalgia
for the Muslim culture of upper urban classes. 	 Therefore, he did
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not send Abul	 his youngest son, to school when he was a child
lest his language and manners should be spoiled through contact
with other children.	 Arrangements were made for his private
schooling.	 However, his father reluctantly allowed Abul Al to go
to school when he reached the age of 11 to complete his
matriculation.	 He joined Där-ul-'uliim (Hyderabad) but his father's
sudden illness and death compelled him to leave Dâr-ul-'ulüm before
he could complete the course.
He started his career as a journalist at the remarkably
early age of 15 years.
	
Along with Abul Khayr Mawdüdi, his elder
brother, he joined the staff of the religious-political weekly
Madinah of Bijnore (UP).
	 In 1919, he went to Jabalpur (Central
Provinces) to edit the
	
j, a journal started by Tãj-ud-dln, a
Pan-Islamist.	 It was the time of the Khilãfat movement and the
young editor of j took an active part in the Khilãfat activities
at the local level. 252 He had translated two pamphlets from
English with the aim of mobilising mass moral support for the
Ottomans. 2
	Later on (from 26 July 1922), he became the editor of
the Muslim (Delhi), the first organ of JUH.	 The	 ceased
publication on 8 April 1923 and Mawdudi returned to Hyderabad where
Abul Khayr Mawdildi, his elder brother,	 was associated with
Dãr-ut-tarjamah (Usmaniyyah University). 	 He remained busy in
scholarly pursuits and translated the second and third sections of
17th century Iranian philosopher Mullã Sadrä's famous classic
al-Asfär--ul-Arb'ah. In 1925, JUH started another newspaper
al-Jam'iyat, and Sayyid Mawdüdl was invited to be its editor, a
responsibility which he discharged for three years (i.e., until
15 May 1928).253
175
In 1926, Sawáini Sharaddhãnandã, a leading figure of the
Shuddhi movement, was murdered by a Muslim. The concept of jihãd
in Islam became a point of discussion. 	 The aggressive critics of
Islam and the British rulers always looked upon the Muslims as
militants.	 The modernists (e.g., Sayyid Ahmad Khãn and his
associates) denied the concept of militancy in Islam, interpreting
jihâd as defensive war.
	
Mirzã Ghulni Ahmad, the founder of
Ahmadiyyah, declared jihãd to be illegal.	 On account of the
various contradictory interpretations that prevailed, the concept
of jihãd was subject to much confusion.	 The need for an objective
study, free from the apologetics of the modernists, was keenly
felt.
Mawdüdi started a series of editorials with the aim of
clarifying concept of jihãd, but the columns of a daily were not
appropriate for such a lengthy study. 	 He completed the study
a1-Jihd fil IsThm (Islamic Law of War and Peace). It was
published by Dãr-ul-Musaniffin Azamgarh (1929).	 He analysed the
teachings of the five major religions - namely Hinduism, Judaism,
Christianity, Buddhism and Islam - relating to war. He opined that
Hinduism and Judaism allowed war for safeguarding the 'selves'
(i.e., the interests), of the followers. Neither religion makes a
distinction between right and wrong. Contrary to such a stand,
Christianity and Buddhism absolutely forbade the killing of human
beings by one another whatever the motivation. 	 Such a concept
could not be upheld in the real world.	 In practice, Christians
neglected the teachings of their religion and waged crusades
against other nations.	 As the concept of war in Christianity and
Buddhism went against the grain of human nature, it was bound to be
repudiated.	 Islam advocated war in order to depose kufr
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(infidelity) from the seat of authority. 	 Fighting against
oppression and in defence of truth is jihãd.
al-Jihãd Lii IsThm was a serious work. It brought
Mawdüdi into the limelight. 	 After leaving ai-Jan(iyat, he settled
down in Hyderabad where he was invited to write an Islamic primer
for senior students preparing for matriculation. 	 His widely read
book Dlniyãt (Towards Understandin g Islam) thus took shape; this
book	 'became one of the required texts for Muslim senior
matriculation students throughout India'. 255 In 1932, he toOk over
the monthly Tarjumän-ul-Quran (Interpreter of the	 Qurän).256
Within five years of its publication, Mawdüdi's powerful pen
attracted the admiration of a number of intellectuals.	 He was
regarded as 'a thoughtful and well-informed writer on Islamic
subjects'. 257
	Chawar1 Niyáz Ali Khn, 258 a Muslim devotee, and
poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbãl persuaded him to move from
Hyderabad to Jamalpur, a small village about four miles from
Pathankot (Punjab), where he was asked to take up the task of
organising and directing Dãr-ui-Isiãm, an educational research
institution.	 He gathered a few of his companions and set to work
in his own way.
	 After a year and a half, the trustees of the
educational research institution started to interfere in his
activities.	 He moved to Lahore where he carried on editing
Tarjumän-ui-Qurãn.	 At the same time, he served for a year as Dean
of the Faculty of Theology in Islamia College, Lahore. 	 In Lahore,
he founded Jamä.t-i-Isiãmi (The Party of Islam) on 26 August 1941,
amongst a select gathering of a few hundred persons. 	 75 of them,
from all over the sub-continent, became its founding members.
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The trustees of Dãr-ul-Islãm (Jamãlpur) were unable to
find a person of Mawdüdi's stature to advance the activities which
he had initiated at Där-ul-IsThrn. They again contacted him and
assured him that he would be able to work, without any
interference, according to his own plans. 	 In June 1942 Mawdüdl
returned to Dãr-ul-Islärn which remained the headquarters of
Jat-i-Is1ãrni until August 1947.
Mawdüdi took a clear-cut stand with respect to INC and
AIML first as an individual,	 and then as the leader of
Jamät-i-Is1ãmi.	 According to him, both INC and AIML were
champions of nationalism.	 INC's nationalism was based on the
geographical	 identity of India, whereas AIML attempted to
orchestrate a separate identity for all Muslims in India on the
basis of religion.	 The Muslims in India constituted a nation but
the Muslims outside its geographical jurisdiction were not a part
of the Muslim nation so conceived. 259
 In Mawdüdl's perception of
Islamic faith, there is no room for 'nationalism'.
	 His view was
best reflected in a booklet entitled Nas'alah_i_Qawrniyat26O (fl
Question of Nationalism), first published in 1939.
The philosophy of nationalism, in his understanding, 'has
made the life of man miserable' and
in their spirit and in their aims Islam and
nationalism are diametrically opposed to each
other ... the ultimate goal of Islam is a
world-state in which the chains of racial and
national prejudices would be dismantled and all
mankind incorporated in a cultural and
political system, with equal rights and equal
opportunities for all, and in which hostile
competition would give way to a friendly
co-operation between peoples so that they might
mutually assist and contribute to the material
and moral good of one another ... To be a
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Muslim and to adopt a non-Islamic viewpoint is
only meaningless. Muslim Nationalist and
Muslim Communist are as contrary terms as
Communist Fascist and Socialist Capitalist,
Chaste Prostitute •261
Mawdiidi's three-volume analysis of the Indian political
situation during the latter half of the '30s is also important. In
the first two volumes of this work, Husalmãn Awr MawjUdah SiyãsI
Kash,nakash262 (The Muslims and the Present Political Crisis),
Mawdüdi criticised and even vehemently condemned the theory of
Indian Nationalism as espoused by INC.	 He believed that if the
Muslims were to join INC, the Muslim minority would be assimilated
into the Hindu majority, if not annihilated altogether.	 In the
third volume, Mawdudi criticised Muslim nationalists and AIML. 	 As
a conclusion to the whole analysis, Ilawdudl proposed a new and
purely Islamic Party which he founded in the name of
Jama t-i -Isljni.
Mawdüdi's criticism of INC and pro-INC Muslim parties was
welcomed by AIML workers who made full use of the theological
arguments against 'Indian nationalism', as advanced by Mawdüdi.263
Mawdüdi's exposition of Islam as 'the way of life, encompassing
each and every aspect of human society', won the attention of
'religiously-minded Muslims in the universities of India'.264
Jamàt-i-Is1ärni was meant
to base and organise the entire human life in
all its varied aspects - faith and ideology,
religion and ethics, morality and conduct,
education and training, social system and
culture, economic order and political
structure, law and judiciary, war and peace,
internal and international affairs - on the
principles of submission and obedience to God
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Almighty and the guidance and instructions of
His Apostles..265
Mawdüdi addressed the task of organising a strict
ideological party in order to achieve these objectives. 	 For him,
the bulk of the Muslim masses lacked the capacity to create and to
maintain an Islamic state and society, because they were unaware of
the requisites of Islamic faith; whilst their nationalist leaders
lacked an Islamic orientation in their work and lives.	 Against
such a perception of the Muslim masses, Jarnãt-i-Is1ãrni was strict
in its policy of enrolment of members.	 Those seeking membership
must satisfy the local organisation of the Jarnãt that they had
fully grasped the aims and objectives of the party policy and
programme, and that they not only accepted them, but were also
practitioners of the basic teachings of Islam including prayer
fives times a day, fasting during the month of Rarnazãn, refraining
from drawing their livelihood from sources condemned by Islam
(usury, bribery, selling of liquor, gambling, and all the illegal
sources).
Due to such a high standard of enrolment, along with
strict discipline, Jamãt was, until 1947,
	
a tiny party of 625
members.
Jamät-i-is1am1 developed and advocated the idea that to
serve the government, not established on the principles of the
Qurãn, in any capacity - in its army or civil service, the
judiciary or its legislative assemblies - was harãm. 266	 It,
therefore, did not enrol those who were attached to the (British)
Indian government; and, by the same token, it was not interested in
taking part in elections for legislative assemblies.
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The reasoning that led Mawdüdi to pursue a line different
from the 'ulamã'in league with either INC or AIML, was clear and
consistent.	 In his view, Muslims had an ideology.	 They were
divinely bound to struggle for its implementation, and not to leave
an area where they could propagate their ideology. 	 The demand of
the Indian Muslims for Pakistan would be quite genuine if they were
considered merely as a nation without any mission. 267	Mawdüdi
wished to see Indian Muslims' struggle for a state based on Islamic
principles. In a speech before the students and teachers of Muslim
University, Aligarh, Mawdüdi declared with all his logical vigour
that the movement 'under the leadership of the Muslim League did
not represent a step towards the creation of an Islamic state, but
rather a step in opposite direction'. On another occasion he said:
The basis of this movement is a spirit of
nationalism, and nationalism is incompatible
with	 Islam ...	 what is
	
selfishness	 in
individual	 life is nationalism in social
life.268
2.37	 The 1945-46 Election
The utter failure of the Simla Conference, followed by
Japan's surrender (15 august 1945) paved the way for election,
which the	 (British) Indian government had ruled out as
impracticable during the War period. Elections were, in fact, long
overdue.	 The Central Assembly had been last elected in 1934 and
the Provincial Legislatures in 1937.	 There was no disagreement
that they had long since ceased to represent the electorate.
Contrary to the principle of adult suffrage, only about
ten per cent of the population of British India was eligible to
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vote in the Provincial elections, under The Government of India
Act, 1935.	 But the election for the Central Assembly was to be
held under the Act, 1919, since the federal part of the Act, 1935
could not be put into practice due to the unwillingness of the
rulers of the princely states. The voters for the Central Assembly
seats constituted less than one per cent of the population.269
The two main election issues posed by AIML were:
Pakistan;	 and,	 AIML's position' as the only representative
organisation of the Indian Muslims. By contrast, INC sought to
prove its claim as a national organisation, i.e., representing
Muslims, along with other communities. Its success, in and of
itself, was to constitute the irrefutable proof of the negation of
the demand for Pakistan.
These elections were crucially important for AIML's
future. If it failed to secure the majority of Muslim seats, its
demand for Pakistan would go by the board.	 The election for the
Central Assembly took place (December 1945).
	 31 seats were
reserved for Muslims.	 AIML contested and won all these seats,
securing 86.7 per cent of the total Muslim votes. INC could hardly
secure 1.3 per cent; nationalist Muslims favoured by the S.zlamã'8.9
per cent; and independent candidates 3.1 per cent.270
AIML's position in the elections to the Provincial
Legislatures is reflected in Table 2.4.
AIML took nearly 89 per cent of the Muslim seats.
	 It
secured 74.7 per cent of Muslim votes cast in the elections to the
Provincial Legislatures.271
182
Table 2.4
The Number of Muslim Seats Won by AIML in
the 1946 Election for Provincial Assemblies
Province	 Total number of	 Number of
	
Seats
Muslim seats	 won by AIML
Madras	 29	 29
Bombay	 30	 30
Bengal	 119	 113
UP	 66	 55
Punjab	 86	 79
Bihar	 40	 34
CP and Berar	 14	 13
NWFP	 38	 17
Assain	 34	 31
Orissa	 4	 4
Sind	 35	 35
	
495	 440
[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central
Legislative Assembl y and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46
(New Delhi: Manager of Government Publications, 1948)1
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The overwhelming success at polls was a concrete proof of
AIML's claims.	 And this remarkable success was partly due to the
participation of the 'ulamã'in AIML's favour.
2.38	 The Role of the 'Ula.mä'in the 1945-46 Election
The 'ulamã' had been sharply divided on the issue of
Pakistan.	 They fully participated in the election campaign,
highlighting their differing viewpoints.
JUH in collaboration with MAI, All India Homin Conference
and All India Muslim Hajils, formed the Muslim Parliamentary Board
(MPB) under the presidentship of Mawlãnã Husayn Ahinad Madani.
	
It
is appropriate at this point to consider the political
characteristics of the collaborators of JUH in MPB.
The 'ulamä' participating in the activities of HAl were
largely drawn from the Ahl-i-Ijadis and the Deobandi bla.rnã' in the
Punjab, though it also included a few Barelwis ( e.g. Fayz-ul-Hasan
Alümaharwi).	 It was the most popular party among the religiously
inspired lower-middle classes during the early '30s. 	 Its downfall
started with the agitation over Shahidganj. 272 In 1937 it could
hardly secure a seat in the Punjab. 	 In 1940 when AIML passed the
Lahore Resolution, the opposition from MAI was too feeble to pose a
threat to AIML.	 Nevertheless, HAl voiced its opposition to the
demand for Pakistan. 	 The 'ularnã'in the rank and file of MAI had no
faith in the Islamic pronouncements of AIML leaders. Their doubts
resembled those of JUH. The dream of an Islamic state, free from
exploitation of the poor by the rich, was a cherished ideal of MAI.
184
Its working committee accepted a resolution visua].ising the
Hakümat-i-I1hiyyah (Kingdom of God) (Saharanpur: 26 April 1943).
MAI does not consider it a religious or
ultimate obligation of a Muslim to establish
certain geographical,	 ethnic or linguistic
barriers or to maintain them. On the contrary
the divine measure is to follow the
instructions of Allah and His Prophet, to live
with piety, to support virtue and to make it
prevail.	 MAI	 seeks	 to	 establish
H.kümat-i-Ilãhiyyah wherever its feasibility
exists.	 So that it can be propagated how the
worldly troubles are remedied through
practising the golden principles of Islam; and
how salvation can be achieved in worldly life
and the life hereafter.
In this respect MAI considers it appropriate to
clarify that grasp of power by the Muslim
majority or by some Muslim individuals in
certain areas, is not synonymous of
Ifakümat-i-Ilãhiyyah. Such personal or communal
states, formed for the realisation of personal
gains, proved to be a stigma on Islam; and the
people disliked it. MAI cannot be satisfied to
repeat past experience by handing over the
reins of power to a party or group which knows
nothing about Islam.273
After this resolution was passed, MAI made overtures to
AIML with a view to making a deal; but AIML, with rapidly
increasing popularity, insisted on unconditional support. As these
talks broke down, MAI became, perhaps, AIML's bitterest opponent.
Jinnãh was known as the Qã'id-i-Azam (The Great Leader), Mawlãnã
Mazhar 'All Azhar of MAI branded him Këfir-i-Aam (The Great
Infidel).
The All India Momin Conference was led by the
middle-class Ansär5 (Muslim weavers). 	 The basic idea behind the
organisation was to raise the community of Ansärs, 'economically
and culturally, and to protect it'.274 The base of the party was
so small that it could not attract much of a following from the
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Muslim masses, in spite of its claims to represent the working
classes of the Muslim community.
The All India Muslim Hajlis (organised in May 1944) was a
joint front of all the Indian Nationalist Muslims who had gathered
together in opposition to the AIML Lahore Resolution (March 1940).
MPB filed its candidates in the election.	 INC gave
support to MPB's candidates.	 The winds were so changed in favour
of AIML's demand for Pakistan that MPB was an electoral failure.
It hardly secured 6.4 per cent of the total Muslim votes cast in
the elections to the Provincial Legislatures.
JUH's influence was largely neutra].ised by the pro-AIML
appeal of Jul and by the direct participation of the 'ulamá'in AIML
politics.	 For instance, Mawlãnã Jamal Miyan Farangi Mahalli, the
son of Mawlãnä'Abdul Ban, was very active in AIML's struggle for
Pakistan. 275
The JUl lzlainä'condemned INC's policies.
	 They issued a
fatwa forbidding Muslims to join INC. 276
 During the elections they
toured extensively in order to mobilise Muslim support for AIML
candidates.
UP was considered to be the stronghold of JUH.
	 It made
Saharanpar (UP) the venue of its 1945 session, a few months after
which an election was held. In an important contest, AIML's
Liyãqat 'All Khan stood against JUH-supported Muhammad Ahmad Kãzimi
for the constituency of Saharanpar and Muzaffarnaqar districts.
The latter was defeated.	 Liyãqat 'All Khãn acknowledged the
186
effective role played by Mawlãná Zafar Ahmad'Usmãni. as a factor
contributing to his electoral success.277
Along with JUI, the Bareiwl 'ularna'and pirs, either in
their individual capacity or under the loose organisation of AISC,
gave support to AIML. Maw1nä Mawdüdi and his Jamã'at-i-Islarni kept
aloof from the election activities. Mawdüdi clarified his stand as
follows:
Whatever the importance of the coming election
or elections in the future, and howsoever they
may affect our nation or the country, it would
be impossible for us, as a party of principles,
to tolerate the liquidation of the very
principles in which we believe, for reason of
expediency. Our whole struggle against the
existing system is based on the principle of
people's sovereignty as the basis of the
system; and this principle gives absolute right
of legislation to the Assembly, elected by the
people, and there is no greater authority. Our
belief in the Oneness of God demands that there
must be sovereignty of God,
	 not people's
sovereignty.	 God's revealed Book should be
taken as the final authority;	 and,	 the
legislation must be in accordance with the Book
With such belief in the Oneness of God, how
can we take part in elections? Can it be
lawful for us that on the one hand we resolve
the legislation, not bound by the authority of
the Book, shirk (polytheism); and on the other
hand, we try to elect with our votes persons
who want to enter the Assembly in order to
usurp the prerogatives of God. If we are true
in professing our belief, the only way forward
for us is to employ all our strength to get the
principle accepted according to which
sovereignty belongs to God only; legislation
must be based on the authority of the Book. As
long as this principle is not accepted, we do
not consider any election or voting lawfuL278
Punjab was recognised as the province of greatest
strategic importance in the struggle for Pakistan. 	 It was the
Muslim majority province which had disappointed AIML in the 1937
election.	 Electoral victory in the Punjab would act as a
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deterrent against the spread of the influence of the Khud'i
Khidmatgãr Party of the NWFP which refused to concede the idea of
Pakistan.	 Pakistan could not be contemplated without NWFP as a
part of it.
In the election, AIML had solid support of the 'ulaznã'and
hereditary pirs of the Punjab.	 The leading p.ir families which had
staunchly supported the Unionist Party since its inception switched
their loyalties to AIML. 	 The response was enthusiastic even from
plrs who had previously been politically inactive.279
JUl held its All India conference (Lahore: January 1946)
which was attended by the 'ulamà'from all over the country. Some of
them proceeded to tour the Punjab for propaganda work on behalf of
AIML. The 'u1am' depicted all the anti-AIML Muslim organisations as
traitors to Islam who were bent upon destroying the very interests
of the Muslim umrnah.	 The AIML propaganda gave the widest possible
circulation to the religious appeals made by the 'ulamã' and plrs in
its support. It is interesting that the Unionist Party, which had
no religious basis, tried to imitate AIML's Islamic orientation to
no avail.
It is often said that the 'majority of them [the 'u1ama
were at the outset against the establishment of Pakistan'. 280	But
this statement is not valid if we look deeply. The anti-AIML 'ulamä'
were grouped mainly in JUN, and, to a lesser extent in MAI. 	 JUH,
as we have already noted, had become almost exclusively an
organisation of the Deobandi 'uiamä which was weakened by the
defection of Ashraf AlI Thãnwi group. 	 In spite of its missionary
zeal and intellectual contribution, the Deobandi school of thought
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remained the creed of a minority among Muslim masses. The majority
of the Muslim masses had been under the spell of popular Islam of
the Bareiwi 'ulamã'and of the hereditary pirs.	 It was, therefore,
no surprise that JUH, after its bifurcation, failed to get the
support in the name of Islam.
The failure of the JUH 'ularnã' in the 1946 election was
partly due to the appeal that they had had during the Khifafat and
Non-Co-operation movements.
	 Out of religious obligation, Muslims
were supposed to boycott foreign goods, to give up government
services, not to send their dependents to government schools.
Millions of Muslims suffered economically by accepting the
religious call of the 'u1a.m	 Thousands of them migrated to
Afghanistan for religious reasons. Muslims were repeatedly told
that they would get their reward in the life hereafter for every
material sacrifice which they made on this earth in the cause of
the faith.	 In 1946, JUH was opposed to the demand for Pakistan
because it feared that the Muslims left behind in India as a
consequence of partition would suffer. In contrast to JUH, the
other .z1amã'and especially the JUl 'ularnã continued to uphold the
underlying religious approach of the Khilãfat and Non-co-operation
movements.	 To them, the	 formation of a new state, (i.e.,
Pakistan), represented a step towards the realisation of Islamic
ideals.
2.39	 Transfer of Power
In the aftermath of World War II colonialism had no
future.	 The colonial powers could no longer command the resources
that would be needed for the economic reconstruction of the
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metropolitan countries and for the control of the colonies.
Britain shared the problems of fellow colonial powers. 	 Its
coercive state apparatus in India in the form of the civil
bureaucracy was understaffed and overburdened. 	 The British
soldiers stationed in India were eager to join their families at
home.	 The indigenous garrison, which provided a focus for
nationalist infiltration, was no longer as servile as it was before
the War.	 A hunger strike by some ratings of the Royal Indian Navy
in Bombay, followed by an open revolt in Bombay and Karachi (18-23
February 1946) was indicative of the prevailing mood. 	 The Indian
soldiers, recruited for the needs of the War were to be relieved
and would almost certainly take part in political agitation during
the post-War period.
Britain was the first among the colonial powers to
appreciate the expediency of the post-War period and Attlee, the
British Prime Minister, despatched a three-member 'Cabinet Mission'
'with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her
[India]
	
to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as
possible' 281
2.39.1	 The Cabinet Mission Plan
After its arrival in India (23 March 1946), the Cabinet
Mission had prolonged deliberations with politicians of all shades
of opinion including the u1amã'of JUH.	 But the two parties which
actually mattered were INC and AIML. Their views were poles apart.
The Mission recorded its inability to secure agreement between
them.
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The Mission put forward its own plan to 'ensure a speedy
setting up of the new constitution'. The plan had, of course, 'the
full approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom'.
It envisaged an Interim Government to 'carry on the administration
of India until such time as a new Constitution be brought into
being'. It made the following recommendations:
1. The future Constitution would be based on a
three-tiered system, i.e., Provinces, Groups or
sub-federations of Provinces, and a Union.
2. Three Groups or sub-federations of Provinces would
be formed.	 Group 'A' would include the Hindu
majority provinces (Madras, Bombay, UP, 	 Bihar,
Central Provinces, and Orissa). Groups 'B' and 'C'
would consist of Muslim majority provinces in
North-West India (Punjab, NWFP, Sind) and North-East
India (Bengal and Assam).
3. The Union would control three subjects, namely,
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.
4. The Union would have an Executive and a Legislature
constituted from the elected representatives of the
Provinces of British India and representatives of
the princely states. It would have powers necessary
to raise the finances required for running the
government.
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5.	 A Constitutuent Assembly would be indirectly
elected, through Provincial Legislative Assemblies.
6.	 The Constitution of the Union and of the Groups
would contain a provision whereby any province could
call for a reconsideration of the terms of the
Constitution after a lapse of ten years.
The Plan was an exercise towards a compromise between
AIML's 'separate and fully independent State of Pakistan' and INC's
cherished ideal of 'strong and organic centre'. 	 From the day of
the announcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan up to its rejection by
INC and AIML, a series of statements, counter-statements and
clarifications were issued. These sometimes aroused hopes that INC
and AIML might after all agree to give it a try. In fact, however,
neither was willing to withdraw its fundamental claims.282
2.39.2	 The Direct Action Day
The Council of AIML rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan
without even a single dissension (28 July 1946). 	 Jinnãh accused
the British of having 'played into the hands of the [Indian
National] Congress'. He announced that 16 August would be observed
as 'Direct Action' day and called upon AIML members to renounce all
titles awarded by the British government. 	 Jinnáh declared a big
shift in the policy of AIML.
What we have done today is the most historic
act in our history. Never have we in the whole
history of the League done anything, except by
constitutional methods and by constitution-
alism.	 But now we are obliged and forced into
192
this position.	 This day we bid goodbye to
constitutional methods. 283
Nearly all the meetings under the AIML banner took place
in and around the mosques after the obligatory Friday prayer. 	 The
'ulamä' spoke on the grievances of the Muslims and in support of
AIML's cause.	 The 'Direct Action' day passed off smoothly
everywhere except in Calcutta where fierce riots took place.
	 In
two days nearly 5000 people were killed and some 15,000 were
injured.	 The rioting spread from Calcutta to Noakhali (East
Bengal), as well as to Bihar and UP.
2.39.3	 The Interim Government (2 September 1946-14Atgust 1947)
Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, had been trying for some time
to form an Interim Government exclusively consisting of Indians.
Negotiations with Jinnâi had brokei down on the issue of whether
AIML should have the sole right to nominate all Muslim Ministers.
In line with Wavell's thinking, INC was willing to form a
government provided that it was given the right to nominate
minist rs not only from among the Hindus but also from amongst the
Muslims and Scheduled Castes.	 The composition of the 14-member
Interim Government was as follows:
Caste Hindu
	 5
Scheduled Castes
	 1
Muslim	 5
Sikh	 1
Indian Christian	 1
Parsee	 1
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Jawãharlãl NehrU formed the government which included
five Caste Hindus (Sardãr Vallabhha Patel, Sarat Chandrä Bose, C.
Rajagopãlachari, Dr. Rãjendrä Prasãd, and NehrU himself), one
scheduled caste Hindu (Jagjiwan Ram), three Muslims (Asif 'Ai±,
Shafãt Ahmad Khàn, Sayyid .li Zahir), one Sikh (Sardãr Baldev
Singh), one Parsee (C.H. Bhabha) and one Indian Christian (John
Matthai).
The Interim Government could not be considered
representative,	 neglecting AIML which had demonstrated its
popularity among the Muslims - first in the 1945-46 election, and
subsequently, in the election to the Constituent Assembly (July
1946) in which it won all the Muslim seats but five.	 AIML was
again invited to join the Interim Government, and it accepted the
invitation on the grounds that it would be folly 'to leave the
entire field of administration of the central government in the
hands of the Congress'. 284
 AIML continued to insist that it alone
had the right to nominate all the Muslim members, but INC was not
ready to surrender its status as a national organisation
representing all Indians including the Muslims. AIML was given the
opportunity to nominate five representatives. INC wanted to retain
a Muslim, Asif 11, as its representative, therefore three members,
including one Hindu (Shafãt Ahmad Khãn, Sayyid 'A13 Zahir and Sarat
Chandrã Bose) had to resign in order to accommodate new ministers
nominated by AIML.
	 Even though AIML could have nominated five
Muslim nominees, it in fact chose to include Jogendrã Nath Mondal,
a Scheduled Caste representative, among them. 	 Mondal had
previously been a member of the AIML's ministry in Bengal. 	 AIML's
nomination of Mondal was in retaliation of INC's retention of Asif
di in the Interim Government.	 The other four nominees of AIML
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were Nawãbzãda Liyãgat'Ali Khn, Rãjã Ghazanfar'Ali Khn, Ismil
Ibrhim Chundrigar and Sardr 'Abdur Rab Nishtar.
The Interim Government which now consisted of
representatives of INC and AIML, proved unable to prevent the
collapse of law and order and the distrust between the Hindus and
the Muslims which was already paving the way for a civil war. His
Majesty's Government, for its part, announced its intention 'to
effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands' not
later than June 1948.
	
It sent Lord Mountbatten to India, with
'plenipotentiary powers', 285 	to take over from Lord Wavell as
Viceroy (March 1947).
2.39.4	 The Final Round
From the 1945-46 election onwards up to the arrival of
L rd Mountbatten, the key members of INC who had earlier been
adamant in their resistance to AIML's 'two nation theory' gradually
aine t ac pt it. After the collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan
(June-July 1946), Sardãr Vallabhi Patel was thoroughly convinced
that 'Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation.
There was no alternative except to recognise this fact'. 286 His
exp ne c of the Interim Government gave further corroboration to
the fe ling that collaboration with AIML in administering India
w uld be impossible. The Interim Government remained sharply
divid d into two mutually hostile (INC and AIML) blocs. The AIML's
nominees did not attend the 'daily meetings' of the ministers.
They only attended Cabinet meetings called by the Viceroy. 28 7
 The
AIML nominees opposed INC members as a matter of course, thus
practically rendering the INC members ineffective, and Paralysing
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the Government. The budget presented by Liyqat 'Au Khãn, imposed
swingeing taxes on the wealthy and on businessmen and
industrialists,	 from whom INC derived substantial financial
support.
After the (British) government's announcement of its
withdrawal from India not later than June 1948, AIML was induced to
intensify its struggle in Muslim majority provinces. In Bengal and
Sind AIML was in the saddle.	 In the Punjab, a coalition of Akali
Sikhs, the Unionists and INC held office. 	 AIML was the largest
ingle party in the Assembly, holding 74 out of a total of 175
seats.	 But it did not enjoy absolute majority.	 The leaders of
AIML in the Punjab had claimed the support of 88 MLAs, but the
Governor favoured inviting Malik Khizar Hayt Khãn Tiwãnã to form a
coalition gove nment (8 March 1946). 	 AIML registered its protest
by calling a province-wide hartãl (closing of shops) on the
following day.	 AIML started a civil disobedience movement against
the Punjab coalition government, and forced Khizar Hayát Khãn to
resign through its exercise of street power. 	 The Governor took
charge of the administration and the Punjab government was
dissolv d.	 During this civil disobedience (24 January - 2 March
1947), several 'ulamä'and pirs were arrested. 288
	Mawlnã Dãwüd
Ghaznawi assumed the leadership of the whole movement when all the
Punjab Muslim League members Went to jail.
The Lahore Resolution of AIML demanded 'the whole of the
Punjab' for Pakistan. 	 INC feared the inclusion of two divisions,
Anthala and Jalandhar, in would-be Pakistan. 	 In neither division
was there a single district which had a Muslim majority. 	 In
Ainritsar district, the Hindu-Sikh population, combined together,
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outnumbered the Muslim population. The INC working committee
demanded a partition of the Punjab.
The demand for the partition of the Punjab made MAI
furious.	 Its working committee resolved to resist such partition,
with the assistance of other Muslim organisations and parties
(Lahore: 23 March 1947). MAI severed its connections with INC,
and made overtures of a co-operative nature to AIML. 289 It was the
last of MAI's efforts to seek the attention of the Muslim masses by
suddenly espousing the cause of Pakistan.
INC also suggested the partition of Bengal; and, by
suggesting the division of the Punjab and Bengal into Hindu and
Muslim majority areas, it actually pleaded for the partition of
India on a religious basis.	 The support for India's partition had
gained momentum even before Lord Mountbatten arrived (Delhi:	 22
March 1947).
Mountbatten's assignment was to wind up the British Raj
in India, along lines preferably agreed upon by INC and AIML.
After holding interviews with both sides, he made up his mind in
favour of partition as the only possible solution. At the same
time he realised the necessity for transferring power even before
the British Government's deadline of June 1948.
A plan for 'immediate transfer of power' was announced on
3 June 1947. 290
 According to it, the wishes of the Muslim majority
districts of the Punjab and Bengal, the Provinces of Sind and
Baluchistan should be ascertained as to whether their Constitution
was to be framed by the sitting Constituent Assembly or by a new
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and separate Assembly consisting of their representatives. If the
Punjab decided in favour of a separate Assembly, then a referendum
in NWFP 'in view of its geographical situation and other
considerations' would be held.	 The referendum would be on the
question of whether NWFP would like to join the existing Assembly
or elect a new one. Similarly, Bengal's decision in favour of a
separate Assembly would pave the way for a referendum in the
predominantly Muslim district of Syihet (Assam) on whether it would
wish to join Muslim East Bengal or continue to remain in India's
Assain.
AIML and INC accepted the Mountbatten plan on 9 and 15
June respectively; the verdict of the Muslim majority areas was
secured speedily, within less than a month during a four week
interval (20 June - 17 July).
NWPP was the stronghold of the Khuda'i Khidmatgãr Party, a
staunch ally of INC; and Syihet was considered to be under the
influence of JtTH. Nawlãnä Husayn Ahinad Madani, the President of
JUH us d to stay during the month of .Rarnazãn in Syihet. MML
depended heavily on the services of the 'ulamã The 'ulainã'of JUl
extensively toured the areas and turned the voters in favour of
AINL. In NWPP, Than 'Abdul Chaff ãr Khãn, the Khudä'i Khidaatgar
Party leader, asked his party members to boycott the referendum but
his appeal went unheeded. AINL secured a victory in the referenda
l'eld in ?ThTP and in the district of Sylhet.
After this exercise, the Indian Independence Act,291
intended to transfer power to the two new dominions on 15 August,
was duly passed (18 July 1947). It came into effect in due course.
I q
2.40	 Conclusion
The role of the 'ulamã'during the struggle for freedom,
stretching back to the beginning of the 19th century, underwent a
number of changes. 	 In the period of the consolidation of colonial
rule, they were at the forefront of the resistance movement. 	 They
remained at the centre of Jihãd and Farã'izi movements, and played a
significant role in the Insurrection of 1857. But, towards the end
of colonial rule, their political role was at best peripheral.
With the failure of the armed struggle in 1857, the
collapse of Muslim rule in South Asia was complete. The failure of
'ulamã.L led movements resulted in changes in their thinking. 	 By and
large, they accepted the harsh reality of colonial rule, and
con erned themselves with the task of preserving Muslim identity
through religious activities.	 Hadrasahs were established.	 The
newly-introduced press power was fully utilised for the propagation
of Islamic beliefs and norms of Muslim culture.	 Until the
beginning of the second decade of the present century, the 'ularnã'
were more or less indifferent to colonial rule.
While the tulamä' were engaged in tasks relating to
religious education, the effects of modern English education began
to be felt	 By the last quarter of the 19th century, a new class
of English-educated Indians had come into existence. This aspiring
English-educated class, comprised mostly of Hindus, demanded a
better share of government jobs and of membership of representative
institutions.	 The Muslim upper class, which in the past had been
affiliated to the Mughal state, felt threatened by the emergence of
a new class of English-educated Hindus.
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Under the leadership of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khän, the Muslim
upper class devoted itself to the promotion of English education
in the Muslim community, and to the task of establishing close
links with the colonial rulers. Sayyid Ahmad Khãn's policy of
drawing close to the colonial government was not to the liking of
the 'ulamã	 Not content with confining their activities to the
promotion of English education,	 Sayyid Ahmad Khãn and his
intellectual associates introduced a new interpretation of Islamic
beliefs and teachings, which bore the appellation of 'Islamic
Modernism'.	 It contrasted sharply with the theological approach
that the 'ularnä' had established in South Asia. Muslim intellectuals
in South Asia were thus divided into two main groups - one which
adhered to the theological approach of the 'iilamá and the other, to
'Islamic Modernism'.	 The mass of the Muslim people remained under
the influence of the 'iii amä whilst a tiny but very effective
section of the Muslim community propagated 'Islamic Modernism'.
The 'ula.rnã's indifference to colonial rule, and the vocal
representation of the Muslim cause by Sayyid Ahmad Khãn resulted in
the effective removal of the 'ulamã' from the political arena.
Muslim politics was dominated by Sayyid Ahmad Khãn and his
followers.	 The 'ulamã' proved irrelevant in the politics of
petitions, memoranda and conferences that constituted the bulk of
indigenous political life in India after the 1857 Insurrection.
This situation changed when Pan-Islamic ideas penetrated
South Asia.	 The 'iilamã'now had a chance to bridge the gap between
them and the modern educated Muslims.	 Religious-cultural
organisations were established, and the 'ulamã'once again entered
the arena of the modern educated Muslims.	 The outbreak of World
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War I, and subsequent developments gave rise to the Xhilãfat and
Non-co-operation movements.	 The purely religious nature of the
Khilãfat issue projected the 'ularnã'as a vital political force.
This phase was, however, short-lived.	 The Khilãfat was dissolved
in Turkey (1924). 	 Its reverberations in India were immediate and
to the detriment of Gandhi's Non-co-operation Campaign.
The 'i,1am' entered Muslim politics when agitation against
colonial rule and confrontatiàn had assumed a central position in
Indian nationalist politics.	 They were a strong force in the
mobilisation of Muslim masses. 	 But the change in the course taken
by politics from confrontation to negotiation, shifted the struggle
from the streets and pandãls to the assembly halls.	 Although the
'ulamã' were marginalised once again in the delicate constitutional
discussions that ensued, they tried to keep their political
identity through their own organisations which continued •to
maintain an agitational posture. During the Pakistan movement
(1940-1947), however, the 'ulamã's role assumed new significance,
but they were followers of one or other of the two main camps. JUH
opposed partition from its position as a supporter of INC. 	 On the
other hand, Jul and AISC supported AIML's movement in favour of
partition.
During the Pakistan Movement, AIML emphasised the
distinctive character of Islam.	 It claimed that Pakistan would be
a laboratory of Islam.
	
And, without partition, the dream of
applying Islamic injunctions through state power could not be
realised.	 The u1amä however, were not clear on the issue of
whether AIML should be supported.	 Their attitude was based on how
different sections perceived AIML's leadership. 	 JUH and Mawlänä
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Mawdüdi (of Jarnã'at-i-Is1ãrni) were totally dissatisfied with the
standard of 'Islamicity' of AIML's leadership. As far as they were
concerned, AIML was unfit to hold office in an Islamic state that
might result from partition. 	 JUl and AISC, on the other hand,
were willing to trust AIML's leadership.
The internecine divisions among the 'i1amä' during the
Pakistan Movement should not be seen as stemming from any
differences on the question of establishing an Islamic state.
Quite the contrary, all sections of the 'ularnã' highlighted the
characteristics of the Islamic state; but, whilst some believed
that the political fortunes of an Islamic state could under no
circumstances be entrusted to AIML's care, others believed that an
Islamic state as a fait accompli could be expected to bring out the
best in AIML.
Among the three groups of the Sunni iziamä Deobandis were
the most vocal and articulate, in spite of their thinner
theological following. On the other hand, the Bareiwis, who
enjoyed a much larger following, were no match for the Deobandi
'ulamã' in the spheres of organisation and propaganda. 	 The third
group (Ahl-i-Hadis) co-operated with the Deobandi organisations,
and did not establish an overt political identity of its own.
Although the 'ulamä' were on the periphery of the
nationalist political scene, it was expected at partition that they
would play an important political role in Pakistan because of its
religious character.
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